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Abstract
During 2007 the UK experienced outbreaks of three notifiable exotic livestock dis-
eases; Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
and bluetongue. Large epidemics of any of these diseases would have a serious im-
pact on animal welfare, farming, food production and the economy. In light of this,
understanding holdings which are most likely to acquire and spread infection and
being able to identify areas at higher risk of an epidemic is valuable when preparing
for and managing an epidemic. This thesis uses a spatial epidemiological framework
and the detailed disease and demographic data from the 2001 Great Britain (GB)
FMD epidemic to develop static models of the risk of FMD susceptibility and trans-
mission. These models are used to develop maps of FMD risk. These methods are
then applied to the outbreak of FMD in 2007.
The inputs for this analysis comprised a set of data relating to the farms diagnosed
with FMD and farms culled as part of the disease control measures. The cleaning of
these data is described and data which were estimated relating to dates of infection
and putative sources of infection are evaluated. The distribution of farm holdings
and animals is taken from the June 2000 GB agricultural census, off-fields of farms in
the agricultural census are recorded in other datasets and these have been identified
and linked to census holdings.
A model of holding level susceptibility is developed using both farm level variables
and measures of animal numbers in the locality of the holding as well as the distance to
the nearest farm infected before the ban on animal movements (seeds). The overall fit
of the model was very good with an area under the Receiver Operator Characteristic
(ROC) curve of 0.91. A further model was developed to describe the risk of FMD
transmission. However, due to incompleteness of transmission data, this was a model
of the risk of finding a subsequent Infected Premises (IP) within 3km of an IP. Risk
factors were a combination of holding level variables and locality measures as well
as data relevant to the infection, such as infectious period and the species initially
infected. The area under the ROC curve for this model was 0.71, which is regarded
as an acceptable fit. Geographical barriers to FMD transmission were investigated
using a case-control methodology, linear barriers comprising rivers and railways had
a significant protective effect with respect to disease transmission (odds ratio = 0.54,
95% CIs = 0.30,0.96, p=0.038).
Modelled values for the transmission and susceptibility models were transformed
to a raster surface in ESRI ArcMap for both the disease as it was seeded in the 2001
epidemic and a non-specific background risk surface independent of the distribution
of seeds. A risk map generated for the outbreak of FMD in Surrey in August 2007
suggested that there was little risk of a large outbreak in Surrey. Potential disease
introductions through livestock movements from Surrey into Scotland were identified
and these suggested that if the disease were introduced into Scotland there was great
danger of substantial local spread.
These methods described in this thesis have been used to map risk of FMD
and subsequently applied to inform the risk presented by a different outbreak of
FMD. The study underlines the value of detailed data both disease and demographic,
for epidemic management. Similar methods could and should be applied to other
infectious diseases threats of livestock such as HPAI and bluetongue.
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1.1 The biology of Foot and Mouth Disease
1.1.1 Foot and Mouth Disease viruses
The family of viruses called the Foot and Mouth Disease viruses (FMDV) are the
pathogens responsible for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). FMD affects all cloven
hooved mammals including cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, buffalo, camelids and cervids.
FMDV belongs to the apthovirus genus of the Picornaviridae family, genetically it is
composed of a single RNA strand of around 8,500 positively polarised neucleotides
(Ferrer-Orta and Fita, 2004). In keeping with other Picornaviridae, FMDV are 22-
30nm wide taking an icosahedral form and does not have a lipid envelope (Ferrer-Orta
and Fita, 2004). The naked RNA strand is surrounded by a protein shell (capsid)
which is composed of 60 protometers each of which is made up of four capsid proteins:
VPs1:3 which comprise the surface and the smaller VP4 which is hidden beneath the
surface (Ferrer-Orta and Fita, 2004). As with other RNA viruses the process of
RNA genome replication is highly prone to error so FMDV populations consist of
genetically related but not identical genomes (Domingo et al., 2002).
There are 7 distinct forms or serotypes of FMD virus each of which produces a
distinct set of immune responses and a distinct set of antibodies in the host (Ander-
son, 2002; Davies, 2002b; Domingo et al., 2002; Grubman and Baxt, 2004). These
serotypes show geographic patterns with Europe, North and Central America, Green-
land, Australasia and Oceania largely FMD-free with the exception of occasional
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outbreaks (Knowles and Samuel, 2003). Within the Endemic areas of Africa, Asia,
the Middle East and South America the seven serotypes were broadly geographically
clustered as such (Knowles and Samuel, 2003):
1. Types O and A are the most widely distributed serotypes found throughout
Africa, southern Asia, the Far East (not type A) and South America. Type O
is the most common of all the FMDV serotypes.
2. Type C is largely restricted to the Indian subcontinent.
3. SAT (South African Territories) 1, 2 and 3 is largely restricted to Sub-
Saharan Africa. SAT1 and SAT2 have been slowly moving north through Africa
and there have been outbreaks in the Middle East. All three serotypes have a
reservoir in wild buffalo, which makes control difficult (Knowles and Samuel,
2003; Vosloo et al., 2002).
4. Asia 1 is circulating in Asia.
The relationships between the seven FMD serotypes are shown in Figure 1.1. This
shows that there can be some very large differences within an individual serotype
(particularly the SAT serotypes). This is the result of the same serotype circulating
within relatively isolated populations for long periods of time.
The serotype branches in Figure 1.1 can be further broken down into distinct
topotypes. The topotypes have evolutionary lineages and are broadly geographically
clustered. An example of how serotype O breaks down into eight topotypes is shown
by Figure 1.2. Individual virus isolates are usually identified by the country of origin,
for example the isolate O\UKG\12\2001 is an isolate from the 2001 UK epidemic.
Furthermore sequencing isolates can be used to trace the course of an epidemic (Cot-
tam et al., 2006). Antibodies generated during the immune response are serotype
specific, therefore a single animal can be infected by several serotypes.
1.1.2 FMDV transmission and infection
The virus enters the host through the respiratory tract, through the skin via an
abrasion or via ingestion. The virus then multiplies at the site of entry, either in
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Figure 1.1: An unrooted Neighbour-joining tree showing the relationship between
outer-capsid polypeptides (VP1,2,3) of representatives of each of the seven FMD
serotypes (Knowles and Samuel, 2003, p.66). The sequences are based upon animo
acid sequences. The first letter in the identifier for each isolate is the virus serotype.
The Figure is from Knowles and Samuel (2003).
the abrasion tissue, or mucosa in the respiratory tract (Kitching and Hughes, 2002),
before the virus spreads throughout the body via the blood stream or lymph system.
Virus replication is concentrated in the epithelium in mature adults, in particular
in the hooves and mouth. In juvenile animals replication is concentrated in heart
muscle.
The infected animal excretes the virus in excretions (mainly faeces) and secretions,
however, the greatest amount of virus is released through exhalation and in secretions
from ruptured vesicles (Haydon et al., 2004). The volume of virus excreted in the
breath varies by two orders of magnitude by species with pigs excreting the greatest
volume of virus and sheep the least (Donaldson et al., 2001). Furthermore the stage
of infection varies between species, with sheep becoming maximally infectious 1-2
days before the development of clinical signs, compared to cattle and pigs which are
maximally infectious when they show early, acute signs of disease (Hughes et al.,
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Figure 1.2: Unrooted Neighbour-joining tree showing the relationship between selected
type O FMDVs. Based on complete VP1 gene sequences (Knowles and Samuel, 2003,
p.68)). The identifiers in the black boxes (with the exception of PanAsia strain
represent the virus topotypes. The Figure is from Knowles and Samuel (2003).
2002).
The infected animal is infectious for only a matter of a few days before the anti-
body response neutralises the virus. In most cases the virus is completely removed
from the host, unless the animal becomes a carrier (Davies, 2002b). However due to
the volume of virus produced by infected animals they can be very infectious during
the period of infection. The virus can spread via a variety of means between animals
across different distances. These mechanisms by which animals can become infected
are:
1. Inhalation. Susceptible animals in close contact with infected animals prin-
cipally acquire infection through inhalation of infected droplets and saliva, or
through infection by virus in excretions and secretions (Aggarwal et al., 2002;
Bouma et al., 2004; Donaldson and Alexandersen, 2002).
2. Maternal transmission. Transmission from mother to weaning infant through
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infected milk (Donaldson and Alexandersen, 2002).
3. Fomites. Given the correct conditions the virus can survive outside a suitable
host for up to 60 days (Davies, 2002b) and can be transported on inanimate
objects known as fomites such as straw, farm machinery and clothing (Bartley
et al., 2002). By these means the virus can be transmitted between animals
on a single holding and between animals on separate holdings, potentially over
long distances. Such mechanisms of spread are likely to be responsible for the
outbreak in Surrey in 2007 (DEFRA, 2007d).
4. Viral plumes. Infected animals exhale virus, as a result the virus can be trans-
mitted through the air. The distance over which this is possible is dependent
upon the numbers and species of infected animals and climatic conditions. Pigs
excrete an order of magnitude more virus than cattle, which in turn produce
an order of magnitude more virus than sheep (Donaldson et al., 2001). Under
the correct conditions with large numbers of infected pigs, the virus has been
shown to have infected animals over large areas and long distances (Gloster
et al., 2003; Sørensen et al., 2000; Tinline, 1970). The susceptibility of animals
to windborne spread is dependent upon the quantity of virus to which the ani-
mal is exposed and the species being challenged (Donaldson et al., 2001) with
pigs requiring the greatest infectious dose and cattle the smallest (Donaldson
and Alexandersen, 2002, 2001).
In addition to these mechanisms of spread, the movement of infected animals can
disseminate the virus over large geographical areas. Moving infected animals can
bring FMD to the farms receiving the infected animals. Additionally, the vehicles
in which the animals were transported may harbour the virus if the vehicle is not
disinfected. By this mechanism the vehicle can act as a fomite and can cause disease
in subsequent batches of animals.
Some days after the onset of clinical signs the animal seroconverts and the antigen
is cleared. Lesions heal by serofibrinous in filling which takes around four to 5 days
for mouth and feet lesions. After around 7 days the epithelium has recovered and
there is no further clinical evidence of infection (Donaldson, 2004) and in most cases,
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after clinical symptoms have cleared no antigen remains in the body. Cattle and
buffalo can be the exception to this rule, the virus can persist in the animal for
several months in the oropharynx (Alexandersen et al., 2002). Known as the carrier
state these animals are defined as any animal from which live virus can be recovered
28 or more days after infection (Davies, 2002b). There is, however little evidence for
transmission by carrier animals (Alexandersen et al., 2002).
1.1.3 FMD Diagnosis
Virus replication in the epithelium results in the separation of the epithelium from
the connective tissue. This cavity then fills with vesicular fluid producing the vesicles
in the feet and mouth of infected animals which earns the disease its name (Kitching
and Alexandersen, 2002). The appearance and subsequent bursting of these vesicles
to form lesions form the principal symptoms of FMD and can appear anywhere
from 2 to 14 days post infection (Garland and Donaldson, 1990). Further symptoms
include lameness (usually the first sign of infection in sheep), reduced productivity
particularly in milk yield, lethargy - particularly in pigs, and discomfort - particularly
in cattle (Kitching, 2002; Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002; Kitching and Hughes,
2002). Furthermore, infected animals often suffer pyrexia as part of the immune
response. Although sheep generally show the fewest clinical signs; high mortality
among lambs due to the acute myocarditis or “tiger heart” condition Kitching and
Hughes (2002) can serve as a sign of infection within the flock.
In addition to clinical diagnosis, infections can be identified or confirmed in the
laboratory by testing for antigen or antibodies. Wherever possible animals are nor-
mally tested for antigen by taking samples of infected tissue from lesions. However
this is not always possible if there are no or few clinical signs in the animal being
sampled. In these cases blood (serum) samples are taken. The speed with which
these samples reach the laboratory is a key factor in the accurate diagnosis of FMD.
Different diagnostic tests are carried out depending on whether antigen or anti-
bodies are being tested and on the nature and quality of sample of blood or tissue
submitted. Figure 1.3 outlines the diagnostic testing procedure implemented during
the 2001 UK FMD epidemic. If a large sample of epithelium is submitted the presence
16
or absence of antigen can be established immediately using a Direct Sandwich En-
zyme Linked Immunosorbant Assay (DS ELISA) (Alexandersen et al., 2003b). When
there is insufficient epithelium, or a sample of blood is submitted the sample may
be inoculated in bovine thyroid tissue for three days to produce more antigen and
the sample is studied to look for a cytopathic effect. Presence of antibody may also
be detected in blood samples using a liquid phase blocking (lpb) ELISA (Hamblin
et al., 1986a,b). Blood samples submitted for antibody testing as part of a serological
survey are tested using a combination of solid phase competitive (spc) ELISA (Paiba
et al., 2004) and non-structural protein (nsp) ELISA (Mackay et al., 2001) which
typically have sensitivities and specificities of over 99%. Samples are then genetically
sequenced to establish the serotype, strain and isolate. The virus neutralisation test
(VNT) may be used to test for virus if the ELISA is inconclusive. The VNT is con-
sidered the gold standard antibody test but takes several days to yield results (OIE,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   



























   
   





















   
   
   
   
   
   








































   
   
   
   
   




























































































































































































































































































FMD is a notifiable disease under the Office International Epizooties (OIE) Interna-
tional Animal Health Code. The OIE recognises two statuses for FMD free countries:
FMD free and FMD free with vaccination. FMD free countries are entitled to export
animals providing there has not been a case of FMD for at least three months and
providing at least three months have passed since the slaughter of the last vaccinated
animal (OIE, 2000).
These trading restrictions dictate that the disease presents very different chal-
lenges in those countries where it is endemic compared to those which are disease
free. Endemic countries typically concentrate on monitoring and containing the dis-
ease through mass vaccination, however, infected animals are usually allowed to re-
cover and go through their full life (de C Bronsvoort et al., 2004, 2003). Following
introduction of the virus, countries which are normally disease free focus on the swift
eradication of the virus in order to restore full trading rights (Anderson, 2002). How-
ever, the swift eradication of the virus is balanced against the numbers of livestock
slaughtered.
As a result of the speed with which the virus can spread through populations
disease control in non-endemic countries is normally conducted at the herd or farm
level. At the basic level the virus is contained through farm biosecurity which is
often increased during epidemics. During the 2001 UK epidemic the Ministry of
Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) identified eight precautional methods against
FMD which included keeping livestock separate, cleaning and disinfecting, avoiding
other farms and keeping unnecessary vehicles away (Anderson, 2002). However, these
measures are dependent upon the compliance of the farmer.
However, if disease eradication is the goal, enhanced biosecurity alone may be
insufficient to contain the disease. Control may be achieved through the slaughter of
infected and at risk stock (Howard and Donnelly, 2000; Matthews et al., 2003). A
further possibility for controlling FMD is vaccination (Barnett et al., 2002; Keeling
et al., 2003; Toma et al., 2002) which is used extensively in FMD endemic coun-
tries (Perez et al., 2004). Although vaccines can confer protection to most animals
around 4 days post inoculation (Barnett and Carabin, 2002) they have the following
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limitations which have limited their use in FMD epidemic countries:
1. Vaccines are strain-specific although multiple vaccines have been developed.
2. The vaccine does not confer 100% immunity.
3. The vaccine stimulates production of antibodies but not memory cells and as
a result the antibody titre decays with time. After approximately six months
the antibodies are no longer present (Kitching et al., 2007).
4. If an animal has been infected with FMD before vaccination the animal will
still develop the disease, although will not generally develop clinical signs.
5. Animals which have been vaccinated and been infected can still carry virus in
the carrier state. Such animals must be identified and slaughtered.
6. Most ELISA antibody tests can not differentiate between antibody generated
as a result of infection and the vaccine. However, non-structural protein ELISA
tests have recently been developed which can differentiate between virus and
vaccine (Lu et al., 2007).
7. If vaccination is in response to an epidemic, resources may be very limited and
vaccinating all at risk animals may be difficult (Brownlie, 2001; Tildesley et al.,
2006).
As a result of these limitations, in countries normally disease-free, vaccines are
only used as a means of containing the virus. Vaccines can be used in three ways;
either vaccination of an area, ring vaccination to protect stock surrounding an in-
fected premises (IP), or selective vaccination of particular stock (Barnett et al., 2002;
Davies, 2002b; Keeling et al., 2003; Toma et al., 2002). OIE restrictions dictate that
countries which employ ‘vaccination to live’ must wait 12 months after the last case to
regain disease-free status, or 24 months after the last case when routine prophylactic
vaccination is applied to all animals (Anderson, 2002)
1.1.5 Monitoring the epidemic - R
Monitoring the status of the epidemic and the efficacy of control strategies is achieved
by analysing the case reproduction ratio (R). An epidemic can be considered to be
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spreading ‘out of control’ while R is greater than 1 (Tompkins et al., 2002). R is a
statistic referring to the number of secondary cases which are likely to be generated
by a primary case given a fully susceptible population. Therefore, if R is greater than
1 the epidemic will continue to increase in size, but if it is less than 1 the epidemic
will die out. Calculation of R is used to indicate the state of the epidemic and to
evaluate the effectiveness of control strategies.
1.2 FMD in the UK
In the years prior to 1967 there were regular outbreaks of FMD in the UK. However,
in this period cases rarely exceeded 200 and the outbreaks were contained rapidly
through a stamping out policy (Northumberland, 1968). An introduction of FMDV
in October 1967 resulted in an epidemic lasting 212 days which included 2364 infected
premises in 16 counties, principally Cheshire and Staffordshire (Haydon et al., 1997).
Following that outbreak the UK managed to eradicate small outbreaks and between
1968 and 2001 there was one case of FMD in the UK, this was on the Isle of Wight
in 1981 (Sørensen et al., 2000).
The UK and much of Western Europe remained largely disease free between 1981
and 2001. However, in 2001 there was an epidemic lasting 221 days comprising 2030
outbreaks in the UK (Alexandersen et al., 2003a; Davies, 2002a; Gibbens et al., 2001;
Mansley et al., 2003). Additionally there were a number of secondary outbreaks in
Ireland, France and The Netherlands (Bouma et al., 2003; Chmitelin and Moutou,
2002; Costelloe et al., 2002; Pluimers et al., 2002). This epidemic will be described
in more detail with particular reference to the epidemic in Great Britain (GB) which
comprised 2026 of the UK cases, the remaining four were in Northern Ireland.
The UK remained FMD free for 6 years until on August 3rd 2007 FMD was
confirmed on a cattle farm in Surrey and a second IP was confirmed on a nearby
cattle farm on the 6th August. The resulting epidemic comprised 8 IPs, with 1,578
animals (principally beef cattle) slaughtered on IPs, of these 278 animals were found
to be infected with the type O strain of the virus (Ryan et al., 2008). The virus
was introduced from a vaccine production plant at the IAH Pirbright (Cottam et al.,
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2008). The outbreak comprised two groups of cases; two cases around the first IP
and a secondary cluster of 6 IPs (one on two locations) 15km further north in Surrey
as a result of introduction from IPs 1 and 2 onto IP5, the estimated date of infection
is the 6th to the 18th August 2007 (Figure 1.4, DEFRA (2007c)). However, IP3 was
the first holding to be declared an IP in this cluster. This was confirmed on the 12th
September and is likely to have been infected as a result of local spread from IP5
(Cottam et al., 2008).
1.2.1 Epidemiology of the 2001 UK FMD epidemic
Origin and early dissemination
The likely source of the 2001 epidemic was a waste food feeding pig farm in Heddon-
on-the-wall in Northumberland called Burnside Farm, where pigs may have been
illegally fed uncooked swill infected with FMDV (Alexandersen et al., 2003a). The
disease was identified on the 19th February 2001 in pigs sent from Burnside Farm to
an abattoir in Essex. The time between introduction of the virus and the detection
of the first case was possibly as long as three weeks (Alexandersen et al., 2003a).
The second oldest lesions were found on a mixed sheep and beef cattle farm in
Ponteland close to Burnside Farm (Alexandersen et al., 2003a). These animals are
likely to have been infected by the large airborne viral plume from Burnside Farm
produced by the large number of infected pigs (Gloster et al., 2003). Infected sheep
from the Ponteland farm were transported to a market in Hexham in Northumberland
(Figure 1.5). Sub-clinically infected stock were unknowingly purchased and taken
from Hexham to the Longtown market in north Cumbria, where a large number of
animals became infected (Mansley et al., 2003). These infected animals were sold
off in several lots and seeded infections locally in several locations in Cumbria and
Dumfries and Galloway. The problem was exacerbated as this was a time of year
with large numbers of sheep being moved (Anderson, 2002), one dealer in particular
transported infected animals south to seed infection in multiple locations in the Welsh
Borders area and Devon (Gibbens et al., 2001; Gibbens and Wilesmith, 2002; Mansley



















Figure 1.4: Distribution of IPs in the 2 clusters in Surrey against the farm population.
The links are links identified by tracing according to DEFRA (2007c); no link had
been suggested for IP8.
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Figure 1.5: Path of virus dissemination from The Ponteland IP infected to Longtown
market through sheep movements. Diagram from Mansley et al. (2003).
Following confirmation of the first case, a local animal movement ban was imposed
in Essex on the 21st February and epidemiological investigations began. When the
case in Northumberland was identified on the 23rd February a national movement ban
(NMB) on susceptible species was imposed commencing at 5pm, although animals
already in transit were allowed to complete their journey. Following imposition of the
24
Figure 1.6: Path of virus dissemination from Longtown market throughout the coun-
try via sheep movements. Diagram from Mansley et al. (2003).
NMB virus spread changed from being long range through animal movements to being
local through contact between animals, fomites and occasionally wind. Thus the virus
was restricted largely to areas in which it had been seeded initially (Keeling et al.,
2001). It is estimated that between 70 and 119 farms may have been infected before
the NMB (Figure 1.7) (Gibbens and Wilesmith, 2002; Haydon et al., 2003; Mansley
et al., 2003). Had the NMB been imposed when the disease was first identified, then
around 40 premises would have been infected prior to the NMB and the epidemic
would have been between one-third to one half its final size (Haydon et al., 2003).
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of IPs confirmed before the 31st March. Additionally IPs
with a like to the Hexham or longtown markets are highlighted. Diagram from
Mansley et al. (2003).
1.2.2 Animals affected
Unusually for the type O strain of FMD the main infected species were sheep (Kitch-
ing and Hughes, 2002), with spill over into the cattle population which frequently
resulted in identification of infection (Gibbens et al., 2001). There were very few
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cases in pigs after the index case. The heavy infection of sheep presented its own sets
of problems, summarised by Davies (2001):
Infected sheep are often difficult to detect, particularly when the disease is in its
early stages; it presents as lameness which, as veterinarians will know, is a very
common condition at this time of year. The disease may not become evident until
it is well established in the flock and the virus is being released in quantity (Davies,
2001, p.386).
Davies goes on to explain how this was facilitating disease spread locally. A
large number of cattle were infected during the epidemic, however, cattle were not
considered the main problem because cattle present distinct clinical symptoms early
in the course of infection (Anon, 2001c; Davies, 2001). This was particularly the
case during the early stages of the epidemic when it was feared that latently infected
sheep were transmitting infection to cattle (Davies, 2001).
1.2.3 Progression of the epidemic
Following the NMB the disease continued to spread locally, principally in Cumbria,
the Welsh borders, Devon, Dumfries and Galloway and North East England (Fig-
ure 1.7). Nationally the epidemic peaked in early April after which the number of
new cases per day declined (Figure 1.8). This decline was retarded somewhat by a
new disease cluster in the Settle area of North Yorkshire (Table 1.1). The virus was
eradicated from Dumfries and Galloway and Devon fairly early in the tail (Table 1.1),
but persisted in other areas until August or September.
Spread of the virus can be divided up into three broad phases which follow the
typical pattern for an epidemic curve (Swinton et al., 2002) and corresponds to the
phases in Figure 1.8:
1. Phase 1 (Dark grey area): Initial rapid growth as the epidemic spreads
through the susceptible population and susceptible holdings are removed, R is
greater than 1.
2. Phase 2 (Mid-grey area): Epidemic under control. The numbers of cases
declines steeply as the susceptible population is reduced, R is less than 1.
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Figure 1.8: Number of cases per day for the GB FMD epidemic. The dark grey
corresponds to the initial rapid growth of the epidemic, the intermediate grey to the
epidemic under control and in decline and the light grey to the epidemic tail.
3. Phase 3 (Light grey area): The long tail. This typically corresponds with re-
covered individuals reentering the susceptible population (Swinton et al., 2002),
however in this epidemic it corresponds with the virus entering new areas, R
fluctuates either side of 1.
1.2.4 Control measures
The goal of disease control was to eradicate the virus and to regain the UK’s ‘FMD
free without vaccination’ status (Keeling, 2005). This required the rapid containment
of the epidemic and broadly comprised two components:
1. Enhanced biosecurity. These measures and restrictions broadly comprised three
levels:
(a) Biosecurity on susceptible holdings. Such measures include footpath clo-
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Report date
Region Total IPs First IP Final IP Duration (Days)
Cumbria 892 28 Feb 30 Sep 214
Welsh Borders 253 26 Feb 11 Aug 166
North East England 190 22 Feb 28 Sep 218
Dumfries and Galloway 176 28 Feb 23 May 84
Devon 172 2 March 17 June 107
Settle 102 10 May 16 Aug 98
Rest of England 214 19 Feb 21 Aug 193
Rest of Wales 16 25 Feb 25 April 59
Scottish Borders 11 28 March 30 May 63
Table 1.1: Duration of the epidemic in the major FMD regions. The regions described
in this table are illustrated in Figure 1.9.
sures and the disinfection of vehicles and individuals entering the holding.
(b) Biosecurity on holdings at elevated risk. This was at two levels (National
Audit Office, 2002, p.57):
i. Upon confirmation of the IP (either clinically or on laboratory grounds)
an infected area is declared around the IP with a minimum radius of
10km. Inside the infected area all stock movements are banned, live-
stock vehicles must be cleansed and disinfected and milk can only be
fed to animals on the same premises.
ii. A 3km Protection Zone (PZ) is imposed around the IP, these restric-
tions can also placed on farms believed to have some link with an
IP. The restrictions include the isolation of all animals and movement
restrictions on owners of susceptible stock. Additionally all visitors
must disinfect thoroughly.
(c) Biosecurity on IPs prior to slaughter. Further restrictions and enhanced
disinfection. Personnel that had worked on an IP were declared ‘dirty’
and were not allowed on another holding for a further 72 hours.
2. The rapid identification and slaughter of IPs. This was aided through patrol
visits to premises within the 3km PZ and 10km Surveillance Zone (SZ). Fur-
thermore, declaration of an IP was accompanied by the swift identification and
slaughter of DCs.
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of IPs broken down by the regions described in Table 1.1.
The colour of data points corresponds to the labels.
However, during the early stages of the epidemic reporting to slaughter times
were in many cases substantially longer than during the last major FMD outbreak
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in 1967/1968 (Haydon et al., 2004). This was partly due to a large decrease in
veterinary resources since the 1967/68 epidemic and the more localised spatial scale
of the 1967/68 outbreak (Anderson, 2002). Further logistical problems and public
concerns frequently lead to a long delay before disposal of carcasses (Gloster et al.,
2001; Jones et al., 2004; Lowles et al., 2002; Scudamore et al., 2002).
Towards late March evidence suggested (Anderson, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2001a;
Keeling et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2001) that the case reproduction number was
above 1 and that the epidemic was out of control. It was asserted that the epidemic
would remain out of control unless more intensive control policies were adopted (An-
derson, 2002). Various alternative strategies for epidemic control were considered
(Anderson, 2002) and subsequently the 24/48 policy came about. The 24/48 policy
required that all stock on IPs were to be culled within 24 hours of confirmation, and
all stock on Dangerous Contact premises (DCs) or premises contiguous to IPs (CPs)
were to be culled within 48 hours of confirmation. Other local policies were adopted
including a cull of sheep and pigs within 3km of any IP in Dumfries and Galloway and
Cumbria, amidst concern that the sheep population may be harbouring widespread
sub-clinical infection. A similar ‘Local’ cull was implemented in Anglesey and north
west Wales (Anderson, 2002). Also, towards the end of March the delay in receiv-
ing laboratory confirmation on suspect IPs was identified as a bottle neck (Anderson,
2002). To overcome this the Slaughter on Suspicion (SOS) category was implemented
whereby if a veterinarian could not diagnose FMD, but at the same time could not
be certain that FMD was not present, the animals would be slaughtered as a precau-
tion without waiting for clinical diagnosis (Anderson, 2002). These policies lead to a
substantial increase in the ratio of IPs to premises culled showing no clinical signs of
FMD (non-IPs) (Figure 1.10).
Various vaccination strategies were considered (Brownlie, 2001) and resources
placed on standby for vaccination of cattle housed indoors in Cumbria during April.
Cattle housed indoors would be easier to vaccinate and it was feared that once the
cattle were released they would contract the disease from latently infected sheep
causing a resurgence of the epidemic (Anon, 2001d). This vaccination was never im-
plemented due to strong opposition by farmers groups and a shortage of the necessary
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Figure 1.10: Daily nonIP:IP culling ratios by the day of the epidemic on which
animals were slaughtered, day 0 is the day the NMB was imposed. A ratio of 2
means that 2 non-IPs were culled for each IP on that day.
resources (Anon, 2001e).
In order to demonstrate disease-free status and resume trading a program of post-
epidemic serosurveillance must be undertaken. This involved sampling animals from
all small-ruminant holdings within the PZ such that a prevalence of 5% could be
detected with 95% confidence (Thrusfield et al., 2005a). Within the SZ serosurveil-
lance must detect one infected holding given an estimated flock prevalence of 2%
(Thrusfield et al., 2005a). These samples were analysed using a competitive ELISA
with a VNT to confirm positive results.
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1.2.5 Animal welfare
Disease control measures, in particular enhanced animal movement restrictions within
the PZ and SZ were having an increasingly adverse effect on the health of many
animals (Anderson, 2002). Many farms had pregnant animals, or animals being
reared which during a ’normal’ year would have been moved on during the spring. The
movement ban meant that many farms had more stock than the available resources
could cater for, such resources were principally feed, pasture and shelter (Anon,
2001a). To alleviate these problems licensed movements of stock were allowed in
disease-free areas. The Livestock Welfare (Disposal) Scheme (LWDS) was introduced
in infected areas whereby adversely affected stock could be slaughtered in order to
reduce livestock numbers on the farm (Anon, 2001b,a). A total of 2,293,000 animals,
principally sheep (1,821,000), pigs (366,000) and cattle (166,000) were slaughtered
under this scheme (Anderson, 2002). Sheep were principally affected as a result of
lambing in the Spring which lead to overstocking in many areas.
1.3 Analysis of the UK 2001 epidemic
The disease dataset generated during the 2001 epidemic has resulted in a large amount
of analysis of the epidemic. This has principally comprised mathematical and statis-
tical modelling and reconstruction of the pattern of transmission.
1.3.1 Mathematical Modelling
Three mathematical models of FMD spread were used during the FMD epidemic
and the findings of the models shown to the government to advise on control policy
(Ferguson et al., 2001b; Keeling et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2001; Anderson, 2002) and
a further model developed since the epidemic (Diggle, 2006). The models were all
distinctly different, one model being deterministic and initially not spatially explicit
(Ferguson et al., 2001b) but with a spatial component added at a later stage (Fergu-
son et al., 2001a), whilst the others were spatially explicit stochastic models of spread
(Keeling et al., 2001; Morris et al., 2001). The models of Morris et al. (2001) and
Keeling et al. (2001) differ in that Morris et al. (2001) requires many more parame-
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ters than the transmission kernel and species level transmissibility and susceptibility
required by the model of Keeling et al. (2001). The three models were all populated
with data from the June 2000 agricultural census and all models produced similar
results during the epidemic which possibly lead to a great deal of belief in the relia-
bility of their results (Anderson, 2002). However, there are potentially very limiting
assumptions in these models which need to be further investigated (Haydon et al.,
2004; Kao, 2002; Keeling et al., 2001), these include (not all limitations apply to all
models):
1. The farm data used to seed the model is accurate both in its spatial and demo-
graphic components. There were discrepancies between the farm demographic
data used and the distribution of livestock which was observed during the epi-
demic (Haydon et al., 2004; Keeling et al., 2001).
2. Euclidean distance is an accurate measure of disease transmission across space.
Models assume that there are no geographic features which may facilitate, or
hinder the spread of the virus. This has been investigated at a coarse scale by
Savill et al. (2006) who demonstrate that when holdings are separated by an
estuary road distance may be a more accurate predictor of risk than Euclidean
distance.
3. The transmission kernel of Keeling et al. (2001) is based upon contact tracing
data which tended to overestimate the importance of local spread (Haydon
et al., 2004).
4. That susceptibility and transmission can be modelled as a linear function of
the number of animals on the farm (Diggle, 2006; Keeling et al., 2001).
Further investigations of these assumptions are required in order to validate the
models’ structure and to make improvements to the models.
Further mathematical modelling involved the deconstruction of the landscape to
a hexagonal lattice and treating each hexagon as a cell (Kao, 2003). The effects of
different control strategies within the hexagons are explored, including culling based
upon expert knowledge and it was found that expert knowledge would not have
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alleviated the epidemic. Further empirical analyses (Honhold et al., 2004a; Thrusfield
et al., 2005a) looked at the effects of control strategies in different regions of the UK.
The studies underline the importance of minimising reporting to slaughter time and
some results suggest that the control effort may not have been entirely effective.
However, the results ignore spatial and species level differences and assumes that R
will decline in a linear manner during the epidemic which calls these analyses into
question.
1.3.2 FMD transmission analysis
Although data on likely routes of infection were gathered during the epidemic these
data were only partially complete and the accuracy is uncertain. To overcome the
incompleteness, Haydon et al. (2003) use the contact tracing data to reconstruct
the pattern of spread as epidemic trees, using the data to fill in missing branches.
Where contact tracing data was missing a source farm is randomly assigned based
on proximity and infectious window. Further analysis of the trees was carried out
by ‘pruning’ certain branches. For instance by implementing the NMB on the 20th
February rather than the 23rd February the average epidemic size was 793 farms,
and by reducing time between reporting and slaughter from 1.23 to 1 day the average
epidemic was 1093 farms. This simple model included several generalisations, in
particular that only one of several possible sources was assigned as the route of
infection, and that once a farm had been ‘pruned’ that it would not have become
infected by some other source. It has subsequently been demonstrated that accurate
epidemic trees can be constructed using genome sequencing (Cottam et al., 2006).
This was applied to 23 FMD virus isolates from 21 farms in the UK and Ireland, the
authors found an average of 1.5 nucleotide substitutions per farm infection, suggesting
a rapid rate of mutation, although these analyses need to be applied to more farms.
1.3.3 Overview of FMD analysis
The 2001 FMD epidemic generated the most complete dataset of any epidemic of
animals (Haydon et al., 2003), and it resulted in a large amount of analysis. Much
of this retrospective analysis has focused upon the control of the epidemic (Honhold
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et al., 2004a,b; Keeling et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2004). Whilst this is valuable re-
search for informing future epidemics the mechanisms by which the virus is moving
between holdings and factors which put holdings at risk of becoming infected trans-
mitting infection have been largely ignored. By understanding such processes in their
spatial and temporal settings, tools can be developed to identify areas and holdings
at greatest risk of infection and the information can be used for targeting resources.
This requires detailed spatial epidemiological analysis of the epidemic in order to
develop methodologies which can be applied prospectively to future epidemics.
1.4 Spatial epidemiology
1.4.1 Background
“Spatial epidemiology is the study of spatial variation in disease risk or incidence”
(Ostfeld et al., 2005, p.328). Although spatial epidemiology undoubtedly goes back
further, it is often traced back to the work of the physician John Snow and his
analysis of cholera in London in August and September of 1854 (Snow, 1965). Snow
mapped the locations of some 616 cholera deaths in Soho in London (Figure 1.11)
during a particularly serious outbreak. Mapping cases in relation to the location of a
potential pollution source, in this case water pumps, showed that cases were clustered
around a pump on Broad Street (Figure 1.11). Disabling this pump bought an end
to the epidemic and demonstrated for the first time an underlying biological cause
for cholera, namely waterborne bacteria.
Snow’s work is a very simple example of how analysing spatial patterns of disease
can reveal underlying processes. The spatial aspects of diseases were explored in
depth by Pavlovsky (1966) who coined the term landscape epidemiology. Pavlovsky
(1966) identifies three fundamental aspects of diseases which underpin landscape
epidemiology:
1. That disease tends to be limited geographically. Many diseases are constrained
in their spatial extent.
2. These spatial variations arises from variations in the physical and/or biological
conditions that support the pathogen and/or its vectors;
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Figure 1.11: John Snow’s Broad street Cholera map: the black lines represent deaths
from cholera, locations of water pumps are also marked. Source: University of Illinois
at Chicago (2008).
3. By mapping these biotic and abiotic conditions current and future risk can be
predicted.
The two questions which arise are (Ostfeld et al., 2005):
1. How to understand and quantify the conditions which result in a disease dis-
tribution.
2. How to use these parameters to map risk and make the predictions.
Subsequently, research into spatial epidemiology can be divided into two broad
strands:
1. Disease mapping and cluster analysis. At the simplest level such studies
involve the simple mapping of case data to explore patterns in a disease. In
human diseases in particular, the mapping of cases is related to the population
at risk to look for excess incidences (Lawson et al., 1999, 2003; Openshaw, 1996),
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or potentially areas of reduced incidences. In relation to FMD, clustering of
cases has been investigated in two ways:
(a) Spatial transmission kernels (Ferguson et al., 2001a; Keeling et al., 2001;
Diggle, 2006) describe the probability of an individual farm becoming in-
fected given its Euclidean distance to an infectious source. These trans-
mission kernels help to explain the development of national clusters around
initial point sources (acting similarly to Snows pumps), in this case the
point sources currently infected IPs.
(b) Spatio-temporal cluster analysis. Analysis of spatial and temporal win-
dows over which transmission occurred and exploration of these values to
understand the processes operating (Picado et al., 2007; Wilesmith et al.,
2003).
These analyses of FMD were all carried out using point data as both the nu-
merator (case) data and the demographic data are available as point datasets.
However in many studies, particularly of human diseases (Lawson et al., 1999,
2003; Openshaw, 1996) but some livestock diseases (Stevenson et al., 2000;
Perez et al., 2002; Ward and Perez, 2004), these data are only available as
counts or rates aggregated over some spatial unit, in these instances different
techniques are used for analysis.
2. Geographical correlation. Following the identification of a pattern in dis-
ease incidences further analysis can be conducted to see if the pattern is the
result of some environmental risk factors. Such factors may include a point
source of pollution such as the pumps in Snow’s cholera work, or some under-
lying environmental risk factor such as the Normalised Difference Vegetation
Index (NDVI) or temperature. Such factors are commonly identified statisti-
cally based on the distance to point sources, or a measure of the background
measures of infection risk. In the study by Odiit et al. (2006) on sleeping sick-
ness this is implemented using background measures (such as NDVI) and by
measuring the distance to the swampland which is the habitat for the tsetse
vectors and can be considered as point sources. Once these predictors have
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been identified their distribution can be used to generate risk maps or to infer
the likely distribution of a disease in area in which the disease has not been
sampled (Clements et al., 2007, 2002; Hay and Snow, 2006; Tatem et al., 2007).
An additional area of analysis is analysis of the role of landscape features in disease
transmission (Ostfeld et al., 2005). This requires fine scale infection data on an
infectious disease which is not always available. Such analyses have been applied to
the effects of fragmented habitat patches on lyme disease transmission (Allan et al.,
2003) and on the effects of rivers on rabies transmission (Smith et al., 2002).
1.4.2 Tools and data sources for spatial epidemiology
The previous twenty years have seen a dramatic increase in the volume of spatial epi-
demiological research. These increases can be attributed directly to the introduction
of ESRIs ArcInfo Geographical Information System (GIS) in the 1980s and in the
1990s the more user-friendly ArcView which made mapping a tool widely available
to epidemiologists. Use of GIS has been fuelled by massive increases in the avail-
ability of digital spatial data. The development of relatively cheap hand held Global
Positioning Systems (GPS) has provided a means for gathering very accurate (within
5m) case data in the field. Digital landscape data has also increased in volume and
availability, in particular in the UK to a point where EDINA (www.edina.ac.uk) is
licensed to distribute all Ordnance Survey (OS) map products free of charge to aca-
demic users. However, the distribution and spread of viral diseases is dependent on
the distribution of information on the host population. In both animals and humans
this is very dynamic and difficult to monitor remotely. Therefore, developing an ac-
curate map of the host demography is essential for performing spatial analysis on a
viral disease.
1.5 Outline of this thesis
This thesis will utilise the spatial epidemiological methods described above and apply
them to the 2001 FMD epidemic to develop spatial measures of FMD risk. Once these
have been developed they will be applied to develop retrospective risk maps of the
39
2001 FMD epidemic and prospective risk maps applied to the 2007 FMD outbreak
in Surrey (DEFRA, 2007c). These analyses will require both detailed spatial, demo-
graphic and epidemiological datasets on the 2001 FMD epidemic as well as spatial
and demographic datasets on farms in the UK. These will be developed at the start
of the thesis. Therefore, the thesis will contain the following chapters:
1. Analysis and cleaning of FMD data. Epidemic data gathered during the
2001 epidemic will be evaluated to identify potential inaccuracies or inconsis-
tencies.
2. Building, analysis and cleaning of demographic data. Assembling an
accurate inventory of all farms in the UK and accuracy assessments of both
the spatial components and demographic (numbers of animals) components in
terms of their compatibility with data from the 2001 FMD epidemic.
3. Risk factors for holding level susceptibility. Epidemiological and de-
mographic risk factors for susceptibility will be identified and analysed using a
case-control approach. This will be a spatial correlation analysis with predictors
including point sources (locations of disease introduction) and local predictors
(livestock densities).
4. Risk factors for holding level transmission. The pattern of transmission
events during the 2001 epidemic will be reconstructed to assess which IPs in-
fected other farms. Using this data a model of the likelihood of infecting other
holdings will be developed using epidemiological and demographic risk factors.
5. Barriers to FMD transmission. Fine scale analysis of known transmission
events in a case-control framework will identify potential landscape features
which may influence disease transmission.
6. Risk mapping of FMD. The models developed in 3,4 and 5 will be combined
using a GIS to develop risk maps of risk of FMD. Both retrospectively for the





Data on the 2001 FMD epidemic were recorded in two databases at separate institu-
tions. Many studies (for instance (Ferguson et al., 2001b,a; Honhold et al., 2004a,b;
Gloster et al., 2005; Haydon et al., 2003; Kao, 2003; Keeling et al., 2001, 2003; Law-
son and Zhou, 2005; Matthews et al., 2003; Savill et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2004;
Tildesley et al., 2006; Wilesmith et al., 2003)) make reference to the use of FMD
data gathered during the 2001 epidemic. However, few studies attempt to validate
the quality of the data, or compare datasets where data are duplicated (Keeling et al.,
2001; Savill et al., 2007a). Savill et al. (2007a) evaluate the impact of data quality
on their attempts to model changes in transmission potential over the course of an
IP’s infection period. The authors quantify the effect of missed infections and incor-
rectly estimated infection dates on their analysis. However, there have been no other
analyses of these data.
This chapter will evaluate the different sources of FMD data for the 2001 GB
epidemic. Where data have been estimated the accuracy of these estimates will be
evaluated and where possible corrected. Based upon this, these analyses will develop
a single dataset comprising all culled farms (IPs and non-IPs) including the following
fields for both IPs and non-IPs:
1. County-Parish-Holding (CPH) number.
2. A coordinate.
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3. The reason for the holding being culled.
4. The date of slaughter.
5. The numbers of animals by species which were slaughtered.
Further fields to be identified for IPs only:
1. Estimated date of infection.
2. Date of reporting.
3. Most likely source of infection.
4. Results of laboratory diagnosis.
These data will be extracted from the DEFRA Disease Control System (DCS) database
and the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) FMD epidemiology database and
cleaned.
2.2 Data management during the 2001 FMD epidemic
Epidemic management and much of the data gathering was organised locally by
Disease Control Centres (DCCs), of which 16 existed for some period of the epidemic.
A DCC was established in an area when a case was identified in that area (National
Audit Office, 2002) and as a result the locations of DCCs generally follow the locations
of seed IPs. New cases are generally allocated to their nearest DCC, although national
boundaries and to a lesser extent county boundaries can be seen to influence this
(Figure 2.1). As a result IP clusters can generally be grouped according to DCC.
However, when administrative boundaries (national or county boundaries) intervene
such as is the case for the Carlisle/Ayr DCCs, natural clusters can be broken up
(Figure 2.1).
The FMD dataset used comprises only data for the epidemic in GB and therefore
the remainder of the thesis will be solely concerned with analysis of the GB epidemic.
This data is an amalgamation of two databases (DEFRA, 2007a):
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of IPs coloured by their respective DCCs. The names of the
location of the DCCs are alongside the IPs and the number of IPs assigned to each
DCC is in brackets below the name. IPs are overlayed on county boundaries.
1. DEFRA Disease Control System (DCS) database: Established to ad-
minister the day to day management of the epidemic. This contains records of
all premises culled for Disease Control purposes (LWDS data were held else-
where). The data includes:
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(a) Holding details: CPH number, address, OS map reference of the farm,
administering DCC.
(b) Details of slaughter: Numbers of animals by species1, slaughter date.
(c) Details of reason for slaughter: In the cases of DCs, which IP it is linked
to and why the holding is at elevated risk. If these tracings prove to be
infected these DCs were reclassified as IPs.
2. Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) epidemiology database. The
database of all IPs. This includes:
(a) Slaughter details: Numbers of animals culled by species.
(b) Timeline of the IP: Dates of reporting, confirmation, slaughter and esti-
mated date of infection.
(c) Results of on-site epidemiology: Dates of oldest lesion (from which the
infection date is estimated), the species initially infected, most likely source
IP, most likely route of transmission. This was possible for the majority
of holdings, however there are some missing data in particular for IPs
identified by serosurveillance.
(d) Results of Pirbright diagnostics: The results of tests for FMD antigen and
antibody conducted by the IAH (Pirbright).
Some data fields for IPs are duplicated between the DCS and VLA databases.
Where this is the case the DCS records will be used as this will ensure consistency
between the IP and non-IP culls. Preliminary cleaning of the data was carried out
by Dr DJ Shaw at the University of Edinburgh, further steps in cleaning the data
will be described in this chapter.
The culled holdings in the DCS database can be broken down into three groups
based upon reasons for which some or all of the animals of a holding were culled:
1. Infected Premises (IP): (2026 farms) Premises on which animals have been
identified based on clinical or laboratory diagnosis as having or having had
FMD.
1This is a record of the number of animals for which compensation was paid. Only adult animals
were compensated, the value of animals born since the start of the epidemic was included in the
value of the mother and therefore were not recorded in these numbers (National Audit Office, 2002)
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2. Slaughter on Suspicion (SOS): (250 farms) Introduced on the 24th March to
slaughter animals in cases where the veterinarian “felt unable to confirm a case
on clinical grounds but was equally unable to be sure there was no infection”
(Anderson, 2002, p.95). Prior to the 24th March no action would be taken in
such cases, pending laboratory confirmation - under the SOS policy animals
were slaughtered upon declaration of SOS status and the status of the farm
changed to IP if the samples were positive - this was the case in 16% of SOS
culls (National Audit Office, 2002). No preemptive culling of linked holdings
would be carried out unless infection was confirmed (Thrusfield et al., 2005a).
3. Dangerous contact: (8570 farms) This category includes all holdings on
which no evidence was found indicating the presence of FMD but it was felt
that the holding was at elevated risk of harbouring pre-clinical infection. The
reasons for a holding being declared a DC were recorded in a DCFLink column
in the DCS database and can be divided into 5 categories:
(a) Traditional dangerous contact (DC): (1423 farms) Premises culled
because they were linked in some way to an IP. For instance animals,
people or vehicles moving between a farm with infected animals to one
apparently uninfected.
(b) Contiguous Premises (CP): (3619 farms) Officially introduced on the
27th March to include premises with fields or buildings neighbouring an IP.
The CP culling was relaxed from the 26th April by allowing the exemption
of some cattle and rare breeds from culling and more local control in CP
culling (Honhold et al., 2004b). This gave veterinary inspectors power to
cull only parts of a holding where it was felt the entire holding had not
been exposed (National Audit Office, 2002). The CP culling was never
carried out fully, so in many cases not all contiguous parcels of land were
culled (National Audit Office, 2002).
(c) 3km cull: (2980 farms) The cull of 700,000 sheep on 2,000 flocks in north
Cumbria and south west Scotland was approved by MAFF on the 15th
March and formally implemented on the 22nd March (National Audit Of-
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fice, 2002). These holdings lay within 3km of an IP and were thought to
be at elevated risk of already being infected from the initial seed at Long-
town market (National Audit Office, 2002; Thrusfield et al., 2005b). The
3km cull ended in mid May and was never implemented fully in Cumbria
(National Audit Office, 2002).
(d) Local cull: (280 farms) Principally in North West Wales where all farms
which had purchased animals from the Welshpool market while it was
infected (one of the early nodes from which infection spread) were culled.
(e) Other or combination: (268 farms) In most instances this is farms for
which there was more than one reason for culling it. Usually it was a
contiguous farm which had also been in contact with an IP via some other
route such as personnel exchanges, which would qualify it as a CP and a
DC. Additionally, this category includes 38 holdings whose animals were
found positive for FMD antibodies in PZ and SZ serosurveillance but were
not classified as IPs (Section 1.2.4).
The proportion of animals by species taken in each of the cull types varies greatly
(Table 2.1). The two main species culled were cattle and sheep but within these
groups there is variation in the reason for their culling. Over 50% of the cattle culled
were culled on IPs compared to under 30% of sheep, the principal reason for this
difference is the 3km cull of sheep (Table 2.1). This reflects the 3km cull being
predominantly a cull of sheep and pigs.
2.3 Designating an IP
As discussed above, a farm could be designated as an IP on clinical grounds or
following laboratory analysis of samples. Farms were diagnosed on clinical grounds
following inspection of animals by a veterinary inspector. Clinical signs of FMD were
discussed with MAFF officials at the Page Street headquarters before the farm was
officially declared as an IP. Veterinary inspectors would visit a holdings for three
reasons (National Audit Office, 2002):
1. Reports of suspect disease from farmers or their private veterinarians.
46
Cull Total Farms Cattle (%) Sheep (%) Pigs (%) Goats (%) Total Animals
IP
2, 026 294, 716 974, 785 20, 475 865 1, 290, 841
(18.7) (50.7) (28.0) (14.0) (33.6)
SOS
250 12, 659 109, 967 2, 334 295 125, 255
(2.3) (2.2) (3.2) (1.6) (11.4)
DC
1, 423 60, 577 401, 131 32, 628 102 494, 438
(13.1) (10.4) (11.5) (22.3) (4.0)
CP
3, 619 192, 387 1, 001, 272 54, 105 695 1, 248, 459
(33.4) (33.1) (28.7) (37.0) (27.0)
3km
2, 980 11, 082 884, 151 4, 373 559 900, 165
(27.5) (1.9) (25.4) (3.0) (21.7)
Local
280 1, 532 54, 302 20, 145 14 75, 993
(2.6) (0.3) (1.6) (13.8) (0.5)
Other
268 8, 846 61, 006 12, 085 47 81, 984
(2.5) (1.5) (1.7) (8.3) (1.8)
10, 846 581, 799 3, 486, 614 146, 145 2, 577 4, 217, 135
Table 2.1: The number of animals removed in each cull category. The percentages
are percentages of the column total.
2. Direct contact tracings from other IPs.
3. From patrol visits within the PZ of other IPs.
In most instances following declaration of an IP, samples of tissue and/or blood
were taken from suspect animals for laboratory diagnosis at the IAH FMD World
Reference laboratory at Pirbright. The testing strategy employed was described in
the introduction (section 1.1.3). In addition to analysis of samples from clinical cases
of FMD, samples were analysed from DCs and as a result of serosurveillance. In total
there were three reasons by which samples of blood or tissue (blood in the case of
animals with no or few clinical signs of infection) were taken:
1. Samples from suspect cases. Such holdings could follow two paths:
(a) The holding was declared an IP on clinical grounds and samples taken to
support this diagnosis.
(b) Samples were taken due to uncertainty in diagnosis and would only be
declared an IP upon laboratory confirmation. Such holdings were later
culled under the SOS scheme prior to the analysis of samples.
2. Samples taken from holdings culled as Dangerous Contacts.
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3. Samples taken from animals in serological surveillance to demonstrate disease
freedom.
IPs were either diagnosed based on solely clinical diagnosis, solely laboratory diag-
nosis or both clinical and laboratory diagnosis. From the data it is not possible to
identify IPs which were declared solely on laboratory diagnosis, but those diagnosed
on just clinical diagnosis can be identified.
Samples were tested for antibody and/or antigen and the results of the tests
conducted are presented in Table 2.2. From Table 2.2 it can be seen that a majority
(over 63% of samples) were positive for antigen and all but 2 of these were not
subsequently tested for antibody. Of the remaining IPs, 239 (11.8%) were negative
for both antibodies and antigen, a further 145 of those which tested negative for
the antigen have not been tested for antibodies to FMD. Furthermore 310 (15.3%)
samples have not been tested for antigen or antibody. Of the negative samples, 177
(74.1%) were solely from sheep.
Antibody
+ - no test Total
+ 1 (0.05) 1 (0.05) 1,271 (62.7) 1,273
Antigen - 15 (0.7) 239 (11.8) 145 (7.2) 399
no test 32 (1.5) 12 (0.5) 310 (15.3) 354
Total 48 252 1,726
Table 2.2: The results of antigen and antibody tests for FMD. Numbers in brackets
are the number as a percentage of all 2,026 IPs.
Statistical analysis of laboratory diagnosed IPs has been conducted by McLaws
et al. (2006). The authors look at relationships between whether the IP was labora-
tory negative compared to positive, the type of surveillance which detected the IP,
the presence of other IPs within 3km, suspect species, age of lesion, time of reporting
relative to the epidemic and local DCC. All variables were significant in univariate
analysis and the authors conclusions from multivariable modelling were (data from
McLaws et al. (2006)):
1. The odds of being laboratory positive was higher if the disease was suspected
in cattle rather than in sheep (odds ratio (OR)=4.62, 95% CIs=3.23, 6.61).
48
2. The odds of being laboratory positive was lower when the disease was detected
by active (instigated by disease control authorities) rather than passive (insti-
gated by the farmer) surveillance (OR=0.22, 95% CIs=0.13, 0.37).
3. Both of the above relationships are decreased when the disease was detected in
cattle by active surveillance (OR=0.41, 95% CIs=0.22,0.77).
4. The odds of being laboratory positive is higher if the lesions on the holding
are less than 3 days old compared to holdings with lesions older than 3 days
(OR=1.62, 95%CIs=1.21, 2.18).
5. The odds of an IP being laboratory positive are higher if the case was reported
during the first month of the epidemic or after the end of the second month (de-
fined as the tail) (first month OR=3.26, 95% CIs=2.09,5.08, tail OR=2.98, 95%
CIs=1.51,5.86). This probability is further increased if the case was reported
by active rather than passive surveillance (OR=2.60, 95% CIs=1.14,4.41)
McLaws et al. (2006) report significant variations between DCCs, however due
to confidentiality issues they do not publish these results. Preliminary analysis by
Dr D.J. Shaw (personal communication) of laboratory results at the county level
shows that the percentage of laboratory positive IPs was lower in counties falling
within the Gloucester, Worcester and Stafford DCCs (less than 40%) compared with
around 70% for Cumbria (Carlisle DCC) and around 90% for North Yorkshire (Leeds
DCC). McLaws et al. (2006) do not consider those IPs which were not tested in the
laboratory, however further analysis could have been used to identify whether these
holdings are more similar to negative or positive IPs.
The analysis of McLaws et al. (2006) shows that laboratory negative IPs were
not occurring at random and were more prevalent among sheep farms where the
disease is harder to detect. Furthermore, laboratory negative IPs occurred at the
peak of the epidemic when resources were stretched and opportunities for validating
diagnosis would have been fewer. The relationship with certain DCCs, particularly
DCCs in the Welsh borders region (Figure 2.1) where IPs were more sparse suggests
that there may have been some pseudo epidemics where it appeared that an epidemic
was occurring but in reality very little virus was circulating.
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2.4 IP data evaluation
The VLA epidemiology data contains three fields which are estimated values or best
guesses. These fields are; the estimated date of infection, the most probable source of
infection and the most likely route of transmission. These fields will be evaluated in
turn with the exception of the route of transmission which is not used in this thesis
and therefore will not be evaluated.
2.4.1 Estimated date of infection
In most instances estimating a date of infection was based upon the ageing of lesions.
Veterinarians estimated the age of the lesions and a figure was added to this to
represent the latent pre-clinical period. There are four implicit assumptions which
must be met for this to generate an accurate date of infection.
1. There are lesions present on the IP. An IP could be confirmed in the laboratory
upon positive antigen or antibody tests. The infected animals on such holdings
may be sub-clinical or recovered in which case there will be no visible lesions.
2. Where lesions are visible, that all potentially infected animals were inspected to
find the animal with the oldest lesions. This is further complicated by holdings
on which the animal with the oldest infection has recovered.
3. The inspecting veterinarian has the knowledge and experience to accurately age
a lesion.
4. The period between infection and the development of clinical signs is the same
for all infections.
To generate an accurate estimate of the date of infection all four of these assump-
tions must be met. There is a small subset of IPs for which a precise date of infection
can be found such as farms which became an IP upon the arrival of an infected batch
of animals.
Dates of infection were estimated for all bar 37 IPs. The distribution of infectious
periods and period from infection to reporting is shown by Figure 2.2. There is some
evidence for a seven day effect in the infection to reporting data shown by the mode
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at 7 days, one day before the median and 1.65 days before the mean value. This could
suggest that infection dates were estimated as being a week previously, however the
seven day peak in Plot 2.2(a) is not an outlier, which suggests that this is genuine
rather than an artefact of estimation. The modal value for infection to slaughter time
is 9 days, whilst the median is 10 and the mean 10.2 days. The distribution has a
negative skew suggesting that the majority of infections are detected soon after the
development of clinical symptoms whilst a minority persist for up to four weeks in
near sub-clinical state before detection.
As a result of the weaker clinical signs of infection in sheep there is a delay in
detection, and the time from infection to slaughter is significantly greater in sheep
compared to cattle (F1,1875=164.57, p<0.001, ANOVA test, only holdings on which
cattle or sheep were the species initially infected and the infection occurred after the
NMB are analysed). The median delay from infection to slaughter in cattle is 9 days
compared to 10 in sheep, this difference is further exaggerated in the upper quartile
of the distribution of values for sheep (Figure 2.3).
Plotting infection to slaughter times against the epidemic timepoint at which the
holding is estimated to have been infected (Figure 2.4), shows that in the early stages
of the epidemic infection to slaughter time was high and it gradually declined as the
epidemic progressed.
Of the 37 IPs for which there is no infection date 36 are sheep infections and of the
37, 29 were positive upon serological screening for antibody, only 8 were checked for
antigen. This suggests that the IPs without an infection date were identified during
serological surveys and are unlikely to have had animals with lesions by which the
infection can be aged. As a result it is likely that these holdings were infected for
longer than the median period of 10 days as there must have been sufficient time for a
number of animals to recover. However, it would be prudent to underestimate rather
than overestimate the likely infectious period for holdings because the infectious
period will be used to evaluate sources of infection and a longer infectious period
increases the likelihood of misidentifying a source. Therefore for the IPs which have
no infection date the median value for sheep infections of the slaughter date minus 10
days will be used. As these IPs were predominantly the result of serological screening
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(a) Infection to reporting
(b) Infection to slaughter
Figure 2.2: Frequency distributions of infection to reporting and infection to slaughter
time for the 1989 IPs with estimated dates of infection.
many were reported as IPs after they were slaughtered. Therefore using the report
date to generate a date of infection may result in an infection date which is later than
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Figure 2.3: Boxplot of infection to slaughter time by species initially infected for 1876
IPs infected after the NMB for which an infection date was available and cattle or
sheep were the species initially infected. Box widths represent the number in each
group, whiskers represent ±1.5 times the interquartile range, the remaining data
points are outliers outside this whiskers.
the reporting date, therefore the slaughter date was used.
2.4.2 Evaluating sources of infection
The VLA database contains a field identifying a likely source of infection for IPs.
These were identified by veterinarians and epidemiologists on the ground using in-
formation obtained through interviews with the farmer. The DCS database contains
a record called the DCS Link which concerns visits to premises where a previous IP
had prompted the visit (DC tracing), the IP which prompted the visit and a reason
for the visit is recorded in the DCS. Haydon et al. (2003) have constructed epidemic
trees of transmission routes using the VLA data using a bootstrap algorithm to fill in
gaps in the data. However due to the uncertainty in the data the use of the bootstrap
algorithm resulted in wide confidence intervals for the sources of infection.
By combining the VLA and DCS datasets, sources could be identified for 1181
holdings. For the 221 of these for which there was both a DCS and a VLA source,
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Figure 2.4: Infection to slaughter time against the number of days after the NMB
that the holding became infected. The blue points are the data points and the black
line is a trendline generated using the supersmooth function in R (R Development
Core Team, 2004). Only data for holdings on which cattle or sheep were the species
initially infected are plotted.
these sources agreed in 126 (55.6%) instances and did not agree in the remaining 95
instances (Table 2.3). A further 11 holdings had a DC link, however this holding
number was the same as the case and these data were excluded. The accuracy of
these identified sources will be evaluated.
VLA
Y N
DCS Y 221 (126) 224 479
N 702 860 1547
946 1080
Table 2.3: Source of infection data for IPs broken down by data source (either VLA
or DCS) and whether (Y) or not (N) that dataset recorded a source of infection. The
value in brackets on the YY cell is the instances in which these sources matched.
Sources of infection for an IP were identified from a number of candidate IPs.
Candidate IPs are IPs which could possibly have infected the IP in question. Four
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factors will assist in identifying the likely sources of infection from the set of candidate
IPs:
1. Some clear route of infection such as receiving infected animals from another
IP.
2. Rapid identification of IPs. All candidate IPs must be known in order to accu-
rately identify the most probable source.
3. The number of candidate IPs. Fewer candidates will increase the probability of
selecting the correct source.
4. The resources are available to carry out the necessary epidemiological tracings
to establish the most probable source.
During the early stages of the epidemic many holdings were infected via move-
ments of infected livestock which provides a clear route of infection and, in addition,
there were few candidate IPs. As a result of this, farms infected before the NMB
have a greater proportion of identified sources. Of the 78 IPs estimated to have been
infected before the NMB, 67 (85.9%) have a source of infection identified, compared
to 44.8% of the 1948 IPs infected after the NMB (Table 2.4). This result is highly
statistically significant (χ21=45.4, p<0.001).
Source data
VLA DCS Both Neither
pre-NMB 60 1 6 (5) 13
post-NMB 642 223 221 (121) 860
Table 2.4: The origin of source of infection data (DCS or VLA) for IPs against
whether the IP was infected before the NMB.
The patterns noted above and the limiting factors for identifying sources are
matched by the daily proportions of IPs with identified sources (Figure 2.5). There
is an initial peak in the number of VLA identifications as there are few IPs and many
are infected by movements. This is followed by a trough as the epidemic peaks.
The trough is due to the number of candidate IPs and resource limitations. The
line flattens as the epidemic is brought under control, although there is a lack of
epidemiological information to reliably identify many sources. This contrasts with
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the DCS DC link, during the early stages of the epidemic, when few sources were
identified by DC tracing (Figure 2.5) due to a lack of resources. As the epidemic
is brought under control and resources (particularly personnel) become available,
DC tracings increase and more sources are identified by this route. Throughout the
epidemic, however more holdings had a VLA source than a DCS source.
Figure 2.5: The proportion of holdings with an identified source for each day of the
epidemic for DCS sources (red line) and VLA sources (blue line). Dashed lines are
95% CIs and the grey bars are the daily number of IPs. CIs for the proportion data
were generated using the Hmisc package in R (Harrell, 2007). All lines have been
plotted using the supersmooth function in R.
The reliability of identified sources can be evaluated by testing whether the sources
meet two criteria (Figure 2.6):
1. The source must have been infected before the case was infected.
2. The source must have been slaughtered after the case was infected2.
2The virus can survive for up to 60 days in the environment (Bartley et al., 2002) and transmission
can occur through fomites so this criteria is not strictly correct. It has been assumed that there was
no post-slaughter transmission
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Further allowance was made to accommodate estimation errors in the dates of infec-
tion so a window of ±2 days was applied to these. Figure 2.6 illustrates the process
of validating sources of infection:
1. IP1 could have been infected by the source, as it was infected after the source
was infected, and the source was slaughtered after IP1 was infected.
2. IP2 was infected after the source was slaughtered. This remains the case when
2 day confidence intervals are applied to infection dates. This will be referred
to as slaughter error.
3. IP3 was infected before the source (including once confidence intervals are
applied) and therefore could not be a daughter IP of the source. This will be
referred to as infection error.
Figure 2.6: Examples of the errors caused when identifying sources of infection.
Dashed lines represent the ±2 day sensitivity windows applied to the infection dates.
Evaluation of the positions of cases relative to the infectious windows of their
sources shows that VLA source data identified sources with far greater accuracy
than DCS sources (Figure 2.7, Table 2.5). The majority of errors (20% for the VLA
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and 32% for the DCS data) resulted from assigning a source which had been culled
out before the case had become infected. Furthermore the time frame over which
this occurs is large, with holdings being designated as a source when there is over
a 30 day gap between the date of slaughter of the source and estimated date of
infection of the case (Figure 2.7). There was relatively little error in the opposite
direction, instances of a source being assigned which was infected after the case are
few (Table 2.5). Although DCS links were less accurate than VLA links the greatest




Figure 2.7: Difference in slaughter timings against difference in infection timings. The
x and y axes represent dates of infection or slaughter as source-case. The crosshairs
represent the quadrant of possible values (red points), to the right of the vertical line
represents ‘infection’ error (green points) and below the horizontal ‘slaughter’ error
(blue points). The crosshairs do not pass through zero as a sensitivity window was
applied to the estimated dates of infection. The axes have been truncated, there were
8 instances in which there was a difference of more than 30 days between the infection
of the case and slaughter of the source for the IP sources. The corresponding number








708 (77.3%) 289 (64.0%) 95 (85.6%)
Slaughter Slaa<Infb-2 187 (20.4%) 144 (31.9%) 13 (11.7%)
Infection Infa-2>Infb 21 (2.3%) 18 (4.0%) 3 (2.7%)
Table 2.5: IPs with sources of infection and inaccuracies in source identification.
Farm a is the source and farm b the IP. Correct, slaughter and infection sources of
error correspond to the red, blue and green points in Figure 2.7. The percentages are
the values as a proportion of the column totals.
Analysis of these error categories by DCC reveals considerable differences between
DCCs in terms of the proportion of correctly identified sources (Figure 2.8). There
was significant difference when both VLA links (χ29=36.2, p<0.001 results of bino-
mial generalised linear model) and DCS links were tested (χ28=96.1, p<0.001, results
of binomial generalised linear model). Post-hoc analysis using generalised linear hy-
pothesis testing to compare the group means, showed significant differences between





Figure 2.8: Source identification accuracy broken down by DCC. Dark grey represents
correct sources, lighter grey slaughter error, and light grey infection error. The bars
are ordered by decreasing n with the exception of ‘Rest UK’. Red lines represent
95% CIs for correctly identified sources. Only DCCs for which n>15 are included,
the remainder are included in the ‘Rest UK’ category.
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There is greater error in the identification of DCS sources than in the identification
of VLA sources. This is primarily as a result of errors in the Carlisle and Ayr DCCs
where the epidemic was most intense, and therefore resources having been most
stretched and there are the greatest number of candidate sources. As a result of
these differences a final source will be designated according to the following criteria:
1. A valid (falling into the correct criteria Table 2.5) VLA source. If this is the
case and there is a DCS source the DCS source will be ignored.
2. A valid DCS source.
3. If neither criteria 1 or 2 are fully met no source will be assigned.
The results of this process were 953 IPs with a valid source. Of these, 721 were
assigned the VLA source and 160 the DCS source, and in 108 instances of the 721
VLA sources the VLA source matched the DCS source (Table 2.5).
The final infection distances identified by this method are shown in Figure 2.9.
71.9% of post-NMB infections were over a distance of less than 3km and 89.8% over
a distance of less than 10km. However these numbers are only estimates of the true
infection tree as they are based upon and the 881 IPs for which there was an identified
source.
Figure 2.10 shows that distances over which holdings were infected are relatively
smaller in the DCCs of Carlisle, Newcastle, Leeds and Exeter. The exception is Ayr
in which the median infection distance is considerably greater than the national me-
dian. Post-hoc analysis was carried out using generalised linear hypothesis testing in
the multcomp package (Hothorn et al., 2007) in R. Carlisle was statistically signifi-
cantly different from Worcester and Ayr (p<0.001) and the rest of the UK (p<0.001).
Similar analysis breaking infection distance down by DCC shows that infection dis-
tances are relatively smaller in Cumbria than the 3km in Dumfries and Galloway and
the Welsh Borders DCCs of Gloucester, Stafford and Worcester (Figure 2.10).
The source assigned to any IP will come from a set of potential sources all of
which were infectious at that time. The distance to these other sources relative to
the chosen source may provide information which could be used to assign a prob-
able source for those instances of IPs missing sources. In around 50% of instances
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Figure 2.9: The distances from source to case for IPs infected before the NMB (red
line) and those infected after the ban. Distances are plotted on a log scale.
Figure 2.10: The distance to the source of infection broken down by DCC. DCCs
are ordered by their number of IPs with identified sources. Box width represents
the number of data points in the group. The horizontal dashed line is the national
median infection distance. The boxes are ordered by decreasing number of data
points in each DCC.
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the source assigned was the closest possible source (Figure 2.11). The effect of
infections due to animal movements can be seen from the greater proportion of hold-
ings with 10 or more closer sources. 445 (50.5%, 95% CIs=47.2,53.8) holdings had
no closer potential source, this percentage increases to 52.1% (95% CIs=48.7,55.5)
when only post-NMB infections are analysed. There were 105 (11.9%) which had 10
or more closer potential sources, however 23 of the 105 were infected before the NMB.
Figure 2.11: The number of closer potential sources for each IP. The black portion
of the bar represents IPs infected after the NMB, the lighter section those infected
before the NMB.
This chapter has described the collation and evaluation of data on the 2001 GB
FMD epidemic. Sensitivities in the data to potential errors in the sources of infection
and laboratory testing have been evaluated. To place these data in their context
further analysis is required to develop a dataset of farms in the UK and comparison






In June 2000 there were 9.5 million heads of cattle, 6 million pigs and 40 million
sheep registered on the UK agricultural census (Anderson, 2002). This translates to
densities of 39.3 cattle, 24.8 pigs and 165.6 heads of sheep per km2 in the UK. Given
the numbers and economic value of these livestock, the importance of an accurate
inventory of all farms has been identified as essential for managing and evaluating
epidemics affecting livestock (Durr and Froggatt, 2002; Sanson and Pearson, 1997).
Indeed the lack of a farm dataset geared towards disease control was highlighted
as a failing by the “FMD Lessons to be Learned Enquiry” (Anderson, 2002, p.72).
Such an inventory should include both data relating to the stock on farms, and some
spatial reference for each farm (Anderson, 2002). This chapter will evaluate sources
of farm data and sources of spatial farm data and compile a full farm dataset for the
UK.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) encourages all countries to
conduct an agricultural census at least every 10 years (Stloukal, 1999) and the ma-
jority of countries outside Africa do conduct a regular census. The purpose of the
census is to collect data on farm holdings, crops, livestock and agricultural inputs
(Stloukal, 1999). The majority of countries outside Africa conduct an agricultural
census every five or ten years (FAO, 2008). The basic unit in an agricultural cen-
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sus is the agricultural holding which is defined by the FAO (1995) as ‘an economic
unit of agricultural production under single management comprising all livestock
kept and used wholly or partly for agricultural production purposes’ (FAO, 1995,
p.25). The holding may be owned individually, jointly, or by a corporation and the
land parcels comprising the holding may be fragmented. The agricultural census is
most commonly used for demographic analysis and for forecasting agricultural out-
put. However, census data have been used for spatial epidemic analysis for diseases
such as BSE (Stevenson et al., 2000) and FMD (Keeling et al., 2001; Savill et al.,
2006; Ward and Perez, 2004). Only New Zealand has developed a full database of
farms specifically for epidemic management (Sanson and Pearson, 1997; Sanson et al.,
1999), with georeferencing for all farms (Morris et al., 2002).
Although farm demographic data are required for many studies, there have been
no comprehensive reviews of sources of demographic data on farms. The majority of
demographic data has been acquired from agricultural censuses for studies of BSE in
Switzerland, France and the UK (Abrial et al., 2003; Doherr et al., 2002; Stevenson
et al., 2000), as well as bovine tuberculosis in the UK (White and Benhin, 2004)
and FMD in Uruguay (Rivas et al., 2004, 2003). These studies have been limited by
the spatial and temporal resolution of the census data. Other studies at the level of
the farm have surveyed farms to gather valid and accurate data on animal numbers
(Davison et al., 2003; Morignat et al., 2002). Due to the time and cost of gathering
such data this is only possible on small scales, and if the farmers are informed of
the benefits of the work to them (Davison et al., 2003). The following sections will
describe the development of a farm database including spatial referencing for each
farm and demographic data on the farms.
Some accurate means of identifying the locations of holdings has been identified
as essential for epidemic analysis (Anderson, 2002; Durr and Froggatt, 2002; Sanson
and Pearson, 1997). Durr and Froggatt (2002) analyse the utility of different means
of georeferencing farm holdings for epidemiological and biosecurity issues. Although
the authors acknowledge the value of digisised farm boundaries these are difficult
to maintain in a database and require a large storage capacity and regular updates
which are difficult to undertake (Durr and Froggatt, 2002). Therefore the authors
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evaluate the accuracy of taking a single coordinate for holdings recorded at different
locations on the holding. They conclude that the main farm building is the most
appropriate location for georeferencing with a single coordinate.
3.2 Animal husbandry in the UK
This chapter describes the development of a dataset to model livestock farms and
livestock production in the UK. Therefore consideration and understanding of live-
stock farms and livestock production is required in order to fully understand the
simplifications and assumptions which are being made when modelling farm hold-
ings.
In spite of the title this section will consider only cattle, sheep and pig produc-
tion. Poultry species are not susceptible to FMD and poultry production is largely
independent of production of FMD susceptible species. Commercial goat and deer
production is very small comparative to the production of cattle, sheep and pigs and
these species played little part in the UK FMD epidemic.
3.2.1 The structure of the farm holding
The farm holding typically comprises a main residence or farm house. Close to the
farm house there will typically be a set of farm buildings including animal housing
(barns, cattle sheds, pig units) and storage (for both machinery and feed). Addi-
tionally there may (although not always in the case of intensive pig farms) be a set
of fields. The fields are not necessarily to be found together around the farm build-
ings, there may be off-fields or satellites some distance from the main holding. These
may represent fields which have been purchased subsequent to ownership of the main
farm unit or temporary pasture - land loaned from other holdings to accommodate
additional animals on the main holding.
British farms are typically operated as family enterprises and the business is
passed down through family generations. As a result the core of the staff tends to
be family members who live on site. However, depending upon size and seasonal
variations in labour requirements (lambing seasons for instance) the holding may
67
employ outside labour and indeed may share labour between several holdings. In
addition to labour, machinery and feed production equipment may be shared between
nearby holdings as a means of saving costs.
The nature, extent and structure of livestock production is heavily influenced
by both current subsidies issued as part of the EU Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and trends initiated by historical subsidies (MAFF, 2000; The Royal Society,
2002). Depending upon the product, these subsidies can provide up to 50% of farm
income (The Royal Society, 2002). Furthermore the CAP implements certain trade
regulations which influences the distribution of production within the EU as well as
the profitability of production.
3.2.2 Cattle production
Cattle production can be divided into two non-independent streams: dairy cattle
and beef cattle. The annual production cycle for cattle is not necessarily fixed and
can occur at any time of year although many holdings aim to calve their animals
in Spring or Autumn, so mating takes place 9 months prior to the desired time for
calving (Allen, 1990).
The geographical distribution of dairy farming is very much driven by the distri-
bution of good quality lowland pasture which in turn is very dependant upon rainfall.
As a result there is a concentration of dairy farming in the west of England, south-
west Wales and south-west Scotland (The Royal Society, 2002). In 2000, there were a
total of 33,892 holdings with an average of 72 animals per holding which were actively
involved in milk production (The Royal Society, 2002). However, the average number
of animals per holding is increasing, whilst the number of herds is decreasing in re-
sponse to cuts in CAP support (The Royal Society, 2002). As a result of the reliance
on milking machinery, dairy farms tend to be intensive, although still requiring large
areas for pasture.
Beef farming is also dependent upon large areas of rich pasture, although beef
production can be more extensive and is therefore not as reliant on lowland areas
as dairy farming. There are two systems of production; the beef-breeding system
and dairy breeds. In beef-breeding system calves are reared on site by suckling the
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dam. This system is more extensive and more commonly found in more upland areas
(Allen, 1990). Such holdings are typically mixed cattle and sheep holdings. The
animals are weaned at 7-9 months before being transferred to a specialist finishing
unit before slaughter aged between 15 and 30 months. The second system involves
rearing dairy cows sired from beef bulls or are male dairy calves not required for
breeding (The Royal Society, 2002). Such animals are transferred away from the
natural dam during the fortnight after birth to specialist calf rearers where they are
suckled by a specialist multiple-suckler cow or fed milk by artificial means (Allen,
1990). Like the beef-breeders, they are slaughtered at 15-30 months old. Therefore
most cows will move between farms at least once during their life, and some animals
such as bulls may move regularly.
Diet for both dairy and beef cattle principally comprises live grass or silage during
the winter months when grass growth is slow (Allen, 1990). The animals may also
be fed artificial supplements, particularly during the finishing stages. During winter
months many animals are housed indoors and released in the spring (Allen, 1990).
3.2.3 Sheep production
Britain has the largest sheep flock in Europe which has benefited from and expanded
under CAP regulations (The Royal Society, 2002). Despite the large number of sheep
reared in Britain, the sheep industry is the most extensive of the livestock production
systems typically occupying the most marginal pasture either in lowland and upland
areas (The Royal Society, 2002). There are a number of sheep breeds, and the breed
reared usually depends upon the nature of the sheep farming (lowland, upland or
hill) and the geographical location (Fraser, 1987). Within the UK, sheep are found
throughout the west coast of England, western Scotland and Wales. Sheep are often
the sole species farmed in many upland areas of the country.
The sheep production cycle a holding adopts typically depends on the desired
date for sending lambs to slaughter. This is usually determined by whether the farm
is a lowland, upland or hill farm (Fraser, 1987). Unlike cattle, sheep are almost
exclusively fed on grass and lactating ewes require a large amount of food, therefore
lambing typically takes place early in the spring to take advantage of the most prolific
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grass growth (Fraser, 1987). The gestation period of a sheep is 21 weeks so tupping
takes place during the previous autumn. Ewes give birth to an average of 1.1 lambs
per year which are typically born indoors for warmth and hygiene. After giving birth
ewes and lambs are quickly returned to pasture. Lowland lambs tend to be weaned
after around 2 months and finished and sold in late spring and summer. Hill lambs
are weaned later, after around 5 months and sold as store lambs to be finished on
grass in lowland farms and slaughtered during the autumn and winter (Fraser, 1987).
3.2.4 Pig production
The pig industry operates very differently to cattle and sheep production. This is
partly because pig production is not subsidised and EU markets are not protected by
import barriers. Therefore, the industry is highly commercialised with animals kept
in large herds and pig production is very sensitive to changes in the pork market.
The pig industry is mainly concentrated in eastern and north-eastern England, a
distribution driven by the availability of grain for feed (MAFF, 2000). The majority
of pigs are housed indoors; in 2000 70% of breeding pigs and 96% of pigs being
fattened were kept indoors (The Royal Society, 2002).
The industry is driven by the highly productive nature of pigs. Each sow produces
around 20 piglets per year and gilts reach sexual maturity after around 170 days.
Therefore a pig can give birth in its first year of life as the gestation period is 115
days (Whittemore, 2006). Pigs are held in units specialising in one particular aspect
of pig production in order to minimise disease risk. A farm itself may specialise
in one particular aspect of production or contain several units (The Royal Society,
2002). The structure is divided into three broad units: breeding units where piglets
are kept until weaning at around 3 weeks, nursery units from 3 to 10 weeks of age and
after 10-14 weeks finishing units. Pig diet consists of cereal and protein supplements
(Whittemore, 2006). Until May of 2001 licensed holdings could feed a diet of swill
(waste food collected from commercial kitchens) which had been cooked for an hour.
However, following the suspected role of swill feeding in the beginning of the FMD
epidemic this was banned (The Royal Society, 2002).
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3.3 Development of the farm dataset
Farms are identified using a county-parish-holding (CPH) number which is a hierar-
chical identifier referencing the farm to the county at the first level and the parish
at the second level. The county and parish of the holding are identified using the
address of the holding and the spatial reference derived from this address (see below).
The farm dataset being developed requires 2 components: the farm demographic
component (type of farm, species and numbers of livestock kept and farm size) and
a spatial reference for each farm. There are several sources of these data each with
various levels of accuracy and completeness, the data sources will be evaluated to
ensure that the most complete and accurate dataset is developed.
3.3.1 Sources of farm data
There are three datasets in the UK which record farm data at the level of the holding
in the UK:
1. Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS; SIACS in
Scotland): This is a dataset of field boundary polygons. Prior to 2001 this
data was collected by DEFRA, and after 2001 the Rural Payments Agency
(RPA) in England and the Scottish and Welsh assemblies were responsible for
gathering the data. Farms must register a centroid coordinate for each parcel
of land for which they are claiming subsidy in May of that year.
2. The UK farm list: The farm list serves two purposes: it is a register of farm
holdings from which the agricultural census is sent out and it is as an inventory
of all parcels of land containing animals that was recorded in the early stages
of the 2001 FMD epidemic (Honhold and Taylor, 2006). The data consists of
the holding address, CPH number and an OS grid reference generated from the
address generated using OS address point data. Furthermore, for some holdings
it records species by their presence or absence.
3. The UK agricultural census: Is a detailed demographic survey of farms. It
is conducted by DEFRA as a complete census every 10 years and as a sample
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survey every year. The last full census was carried out in June 2000. The
census is a means of monitoring agricultural production and tracking trends in
agriculture. The census form is posted in mid-May to allow for completion by
June. Farmers have a legal obligation to complete the census form and most
return it quickly. For those who do not return the form a series of reminders are
sent out via postcard. Accuracy of data is checked by evaluating the consistency
of data and by comparing the data with pervious returns. Queries with the
responses are raised by telephone. The survey form asks questions about all
production, both crops and livestock, including a demographic breakdown of
livestock numbers by species and the total area of the holding. Further details
concerning changes in land ownership and labour are included. Each holding
is recorded as one unit at one location, irrespective of how distributed its fields
may be.
DEFRA record the location of holdings as a point rather than a polygon due to the
issues of recording and storing polygon data for holdings (Durr and Froggatt, 2002).
DEFRA generate point spatial references for holdings using four means (derived from
DEFRA (2008)):
1. IACS data: The centroids of all parcels of land belonging to a holding are
plotted in ArcView. Those centroids which fall within the same parish referred
to by the farm’s CPH number are identified and the average easting and nor-
thing of these centroids is taken, known as the AGR (average grid reference).
The centroid of the field nearest to the AGR is used for the farm’s location.
2. RADX database: A database of farm grid references derived from either the
farm address (see below) or a coordinate gathered during a veterinary inspec-
tion.
3. PAF (postal address file) data: Using the registered address of the holding
computer software validates the postcode against the address and where the
two agree an easting and northing. As a result these data refer to what is likely
to be the main farm building.
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4. Random point within a parish: A random point within the parish is gen-
erated as the grid reference.
Grid references recorded in the census are allocated by stepping through the
above stages until a grid reference within the same parish as the farm’s CPH number
is identified. The farm list records the RADX identifier or the PAF, which in most
cases (particularly for census holdings with an accurate record of their address will
be the same thing).
The livestock dataset must comprise some spatial reference for the holding and
a record of the numbers of animals broken down by species. Furthermore these data
must be compatible with the FMD datasets which comprise a single coordinate for
each culled premises. If the animals are within 1km of the main farm building the
animals are culled under the CPH and map reference of the main holding. If the
animals are more than 1km away they are recorded under a different CPH number
and map reference (Mansley et al., 2003). The census data is in a similar format to the
FMD data except that it records entire farm holdings irrespective of the distribution
of fields. The data on the farm list adds little value over the census with the exception
that it records the off-fields as they were at the beginning of the 2001 FMD epidemic.
IACS data records data at a much finer scale than the FMD data.
The majority of previous analyses have used agricultural census data to provide
the demographic component to the analysis (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Kao, 2003;
Keeling et al., 2001, 2003; Morris et al., 2001; Savill et al., 2006; Tildesley et al.,
2006; Wilesmith et al., 2003) where such a component is required. Only two papers
(Ferguson et al., 2001b; Honhold et al., 2004b) make reference to use of the IACS
data and this is to deal specifically with the issues associated with fragmentation. In
spite of the extra spatial data, the IACS dataset offers little of utility in this thesis
over and above the point location data. The issue of farm fragmentation can be
handelled more effectively using the register of parcels of land recorded in the farm
list. Therefore the dataset used in these analyses will be a combination of agricultural
census and farm list data.
The spatial component of the data will be taken wherever possible from the farm
list address data. This represents a meaningful central geographical point of the farm
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enterprise, and the main holding has been identified elsewhere as the best location
from which to georeference a holding (Durr and Froggatt, 2002).
3.3.2 Building the dataset
The dataset is being developed for analysis of the UK 2001 FMD epidemic, so it
should include all holdings with stock susceptible to FMD in 2001. Some of this
data, particularly that relating to farm fragments is on the farm list. The farm list
data can be broken down into four categories:
1. Livestock holdings which are also listed on the agricultural census.
2. Farms recorded as containing livestock on the farm list which do not appear on
the agricultural census.
3. Farms with no record of livestock which were off-fields of main holdings with
livestock listed in the agricultural census.
4. Farms which have no record of livestock because they have no livestock or no
longer exist as agricultural enterprises.
Table 3.1 shows the numbers in these groups by cross referencing the census with
the farm list. There are a total of 139,195 farms with livestock recorded on the
agricultural census. In addition there are a further 43,226 farms with a record of




Livestock 111,560 43,226 154,786
No Livestock 27,653 319,244 346,897
Totals 139,195 362,470 474,134
Table 3.1: The number of holdings by data source broken down by the datasets.
There were 556,994 holdings on the farm list however only 474,134 had unique CPH
numbers.
The following work was required to ensure the accuracy and completeness of this
dataset were maximised:
1. To identify the most accurate coordinate for each holding.
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2. Using the FMD data to evaluate the 43,226 farms with livestock on the farm
list but not the census and establish whether some or all of these holdings did
in fact have livestock which has not been identified by the census.
3. Using the FMD data to identify and populate the proportion of the 319,244
farm list holdings with no livestock on census, or farm list holdings which were
satellite fields to main holdings.
4. To assess how accurately the animal numbers assigned to each holding reflect
the numbers recorded in the FMD data.
These stages of analysis and validation will form the remainder of this chapter.
3.4 Evaluation of the spatial references
This section will compare the sources of farm spatial data by comparing georeferences
from the farm list and census with georeferences from the FMD dataset.
3.4.1 Assigning coordinates
There were three potential sources of coordinates for farms these were:
1. Census coordinate.
2. Map reference from the farm list.
3. A postcode.
However, there remained some 35,660 farms which could not be assigned a coor-
dinate from any of these data sources. This is summarised in Table 3.2 which shows
that there is a lot of overlap between the different coordinate sources. Furthermore,
for the majority of farms for which a source was available the source could be taken
from the census or farm list. This is preferable to using coordinates generated using
the postcode as these were assigned to some random point in a postcode district and
is not necessarily an accurate representation of the true location of the holding. The
process by which farms on the census are georeferenced is validated to ensure the
most accurate location is selected (section 3.3.1). Comparison of distances between
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the census and farm list georeference and between census and cull data shows there
is little discrepancy between census and cull but a much greater degree of error be-
tween census and farm list (Figure 3.1). However the farm list and cull datasets
are almost identical, only 15 holdings have different coordinates (median difference
63.0km, lower quartile 2.5km, upper quartile 100km) and are likely to be the result
of error in recording a grid reference.
Data source Census Farm list (livestock) Farm list (no livestock) Total
Total 139,195 43,226 319,244 474,134
Census 138,621 NA NA
Farm list 137,696 41,084 250,164 428,944
Postcode 126,277 36,936 149,078 312,291
No data 20 393 35,247 35,660
Table 3.2: Breakdown of holdings into the different coordinate types that are avail-
able. The farm list categories exclude those holdings which have already been counted
in the census column.
The farm list georeference was used in preference to the census coordinate. This
is because the farm list is a reference to the main farm building at which most move-
ments onto and off the farm are likely to be centered and it is likely the be the location
of the majority of the fields (Durr and Froggatt, 2002). The census coordinates are
the mean of the coordinates of the fields, therefore the census coordinate location
may bear little relation to the actual location of the farms premises. Indeed, the
mean location could be some distance from any property owned by the farm. This
coordinate was designated as a way of aggregating agricultural census data to 1km
raster grids which the public can access (EDiNA). Therefore, during this process the
exact location of the holding is unimportant, the coordinate location is intended as
a means of representing the geographical space occupied by the farm. The following
hierarchy was used to assign coordinates depending on availability: farm list grid ref-
erence, census data, and where neither of these is available, postcode. The numbers
of holdings assigned these coordinates are presented in Table 3.3.
Due to rounding of OS grid references to 100m there are 80,566 (25,579 livestock,
54.987 non-livestock) overlaying holdings. These holding locations were adjusted by
moving the farms by a random value drawn from a uniform distribution between -50
and 50 meters.
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative distribution plot of distances between farm locations accord-
ing to the census compared to the farm list (black line), between the DCS data and
census data (red line) and between the farm list and cull data (blue line). The x-axis
has been log10 + 1 transformed.
Data source Census Farm list (livestock) Farm list (no livestock)
Farm list 137,696 41,084 250,164
Census 1,473 NA NA
Postcode 6 1,849 5,521
No data 20 393 35,247
Table 3.3: The source of farm data (columns) against the source of the spatial data
(rows).
3.5 Evaluation of the demographic component
The demographic components of the dataset can be evaluated by comparing these
data with the FMD dataset (Chapter 2). The analysis will comprise three compo-
nents:
1. Evaluation of how well the census data reflects the FMD data given that there
will be movements on and off the holding and animals born (section 3.2).
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2. Evaluation of the holdings with livestock present/absent recorded in the farm
list but no census records. Identification of the nature of these holdings and
whether they represent a substantial number of livestock farms which have been
missed in the census.
3. Evaluation of the farm list holdings with no livestock recorded to identify those
holdings which are satellite holdings and to populate the satellites.
The breakdown of the reason for culling farms (section 2.2) by the data source
is presented in Table 3.4. The greatest percentage of culled farms were from the
census (58%), followed by the farm list with no livestock (36%), followed by the farm
list with animals (6%). Furthermore 4.5% of all census farms were culled, compared
to 1.2% of farms on the farm list and 1.6% of farms on the farm list with livestock
presence recorded (Group total row in Table 3.4).
Farm list
Reason for cull No livestock Livestock PA Census Total
IP
348 96 1582 2026
(17.2) (4.7) (78.1)
SOS
85 17 148 250
(34.4) (6.8) (59.2)
DC
764 105 554 1423
(53.8) (7.4) (38.9)
CP
1338 230 2051 3619
(37.0) (6.4) (56.7)
Other
111 25 132 268
(41.4) (9.3) (49.3)
3km
1177 150 1653 2980
(39.6) (5.0) (55.5)
Local
39 58 183 280
(13.9) (20.7) (65.4)
Column
3862 681 6303 10846
(35.6) (6.3) (58.1)
Group total
319,244 43,226 139,195 474,134
(1.21) (1.58) (4.53)
Table 3.4: Numbers of premises by data source broken down by the FMD cull cat-
egories described in chapter (Chapter 2). Percentages (derived from row totals) are
in brackets.
The breakdown of these data groups by FMD cull category and animal numbers
is presented in Figure 3.2. The conclusions which can be drawn from this are:
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1. The mean cull size was greater on farms with census data suggesting that larger
farms are more likely to have census records. This is shown by the differences
between the brown, yellow and blue bars.
2. Farms culled which were on the census had more animals recorded during the
census than the cull. This is particularly the case for sheep but also applies to
cattle for some cull categories.
3. Analysis of the data on culled sheep numbers presented in Figure 3.2 against
both classification on the census and the reason for the cull using analysis
of variance (ANOVA) revealed that there were highly statistically significant
differences (p<0.001) between sheep numbers for both groups of variables.
4. The relationship described above also applied to cattle, but only when cat-
tle numbers on IPs are compared to all non-IPs and when census farms are




Figure 3.2: The mean numbers of animals culled (from the DCS) broken down by
data source and species. The blue bar represents farms listed as non-livestock, yellow
those listed with animals present on the farm list but not the census and the brown
bar those on the census. For the holdings on the census, the mean number of animals
recorded on the census are shown (grey bar). Numbers above represent the number
of holdings in each category.
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Furthermore, Figure 3.2 shows that IPs generally have substantially more animals
on them than other culled farms. The distributions of farm sizes across the three
data sources is significantly different for cattle and sheep (both p<0.001 - Kruskal-
Wallis test was used due to non-normal distribution of data). However the difference
between the census species numbers and numbers for holdings on the farm list is
much greater for cattle than sheep. For cattle the majority (over 50%) of the farm
list premises have no cattle (Figure 3.3) and of those with cattle they are typically




Figure 3.3: Boxplots of numbers of animals culled by data source and species. The
x-axis categories correspond to whether a holding is listed on the census, listed only
on the farm list with animal presence (‘Livestock presence’) or whether is had no
animals recorded. Both plots are on a square root scale and the width of the boxes
represent the numbers in the groups.
82
3.5.1 Differences between census and cull numbers
Animal numbers reported during the census were compared to those in the FMD cull
data (Chapter 2) and differences evaluated. However, for 3km and local culls just
sheep and no cattle were culled. To overcome this, sheep numbers will be compared
against all cull data, but cattle numbers will not be compared with 3km and local
cull data. The resulting relationship between cull and census numbers is shown by
Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 shows a positive relationship between numbers on the census and cull.
However there are a large group of holdings in Figure 3.4 which have sheep culled
which are not recorded in the census or have cattle on the census which were not
culled. These data are presented more fully in Table 3.5 which shows that 488 (14.8%)
sheep farms had sheep on the cull and not the census. 404 (11.2%) of cattle holdings
had cattle on the census and not the cull. The latter can be explained by partial
cattle culls on DCs and CPs (Honhold et al., 2004b). Of these 404, 324 (80.2%)
were from DCs and CPs but DC and CP culls accounted for only 53.7% of these
main holding culls. The large discrepancy in the sheep data may be explained by the
different seasons in which the two datasets were collected. In June there would have
been lambs either suckling or being weaned in upland pasture (section 3.2). In the
winter however, many of these animals are moved to lowland pasture for finishing. It
is possible that these data represent lowland holdings which only buy sheep in winter
for fattening and potentially use their pasture for cattle (housed indoors in winter)
during the rest of the year. This is not as a result of new born lambs in the spring
of 2001 as new-born animals are not included in the cull data (Chapter 2).
To test the relationship between cull and census numbers it is necessary to remove
the groups of holdings with zeros in the cull or census categories as these groups make
the distribution non-continuous. Linear regression analysis shows both relationships
are highly statistically significant (p<0.001) and the slopes for each are positive (0.887
for cattle and 0.772 for sheep, both on a log10+1 scale). However, there is less residual
variance in the relationship for cattle (R2=0.687) compared to sheep (R2=0.597).
The difference between numbers on the census minus the cull is presented in




Figure 3.4: Graphs of animal numbers on the cull against the numbers on the census
by species. The solid line is the fit of a linear regression model with values of zero




Present Absent Present Absent
Census
Present 3110 404 2752 57
Absent 94 0 488 0
Table 3.5: The breakdown of species presence recorded in the cull and census for the
data which generated the plots in Figure 3.4.
of the numbers that were culled than is the case for sheep (Table 3.6). Furthermore
this difference is at its greatest in Wales where sheep numbers on the census are
an over-representation of the numbers present when holdings were culled, cull sheep
numbers in Wales are 41.3% of the numbers recorded on the census. Many regions
were statistically significantly different from zero at p<0.05, this might be expected as
a result of annual changes to farm structure during the year as adults give birth. The
differences therefore do not necessarily indicate inaccuracies in the datasets. However
the results which are statistically significantly different from zero at p<0.001 suggests
that there are inaccuracies in the data. This is underlined by the strong regional
differences in numbers shown in Table 3.6. Which may reflect differences in census
data collection or regional differences in farming practices such as regions in which
upland farming is practiced.
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Species Region Difference Median Median Percent
25% 50% 75% cull census Difference p
Cattle
UK -20 0 21 122 127 96.1 0.729
England -21 1 18 121 123 98.4 0.087
Scotland -23 7 50 180 206 87.4 0.001
Wales -10 2 25 70 80 87.5 0.013
Cumbria -25 -2 18 162 167 97.0 0.029
D&G -25 7 49 189 208 90.9 0.006
Welsh Bord -13 1 20 73 84 86.9 0.155
Devon -24 -1 14 101 103 98.1 0.114
Sheep
UK -73 16 277 300 385 77.9 <0.001
England -67 17 245 297 372 79.8 <0.001
Scotland -123 -5 224 360 396 90.9 0.034
Wales -2 165 795 246 595 41.3 <0.001
Cumbria -75 12.5 254 302 350 86.3 <0.001
D&G -135 -11 189 353 373 94.6 0.492
Welsh Bord -58 38 367 267 371 72.0 <0.001
Devon -92 -1 118 300 364 82.4 0.509
Table 3.6: Summary of the distributions of differences between animal numbers on the
census and cull datasets. The difference column is the quartiles from the distribution
of values generated from census data -cull data. The percentage difference column
is the cull numbers as a percentage of the census numbers. p-values are from a
two-tailed Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. The regions are defined in Figure 1.9.
The differences in Wales discussed above do not explain the 15% of holdings with
animals recorded on the census but not the cull. Analysis of those farms with sheep
on the cull but none on the census shows that only 8.3% of sheep farms culled in Wales
fall into this category compared to 12.4 and 22.4% in England and Scotland respec-
tively. The alternative explanations are that many more animals in Wales are sent
to slaughter between June and February, or that Welsh census data on sheep is inaccu-
rate.
The utility of census data from June 2000 as a representation of animal numbers
for 2001 has been evaluated by comparing animal numbers on the census to animal
numbers on the cull. Regional differences were greater for sheep than cattle. The
results suggest that the census greatly over predicts sheep numbers in England and
Wales and that in England these differences are particularly acute in Cumbria.
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3.5.2 Farms with only livestock presence recorded
Figure 3.2 demonstrated that at least some of the farms which recorded livestock
as either present or absent on the farm list, had livestock during the 2001 FMD
epidemic but were not recorded as having livestock in the census. This suggests
that the census may not be a complete inventory of all farms with FMD susceptible
livestock. However these holdings are generally smaller than those farms on the
census and a similar size to those on the farm list with no livestock records. The
farms could exist for three reasons, given that the farm list is the circulation list for
the census:
1. They are farms which did not return a census form. Completion of the agricul-
tural census is mandatory, however, ensuring that a large number of forms are
returned is difficult to implement and it is possible that only larger farms are
chased up for census forms.
2. The holdings did not have livestock when the agricultural census was sent out.
3. The holdings may have ceased farming or switched to arable production.
For the 111,560 farms for which there is both census and farm list species data the
two agree for cattle and sheep in the majority of cases (Table 3.7). However, there
is a large discrepancy for pigs with proportionately many more pig farms recorded
on the farm list alone than on the census (Table 3.8). This data could reflect pig
farms which previously farmed pigs but ceased farming, possibly as a result of market
pressures and the intense commercialisation of the pig industry.
Census only Farm list only Both Total
Cattle 7507 (9.1) 3383 (4.1) 71197 82,087
Sheep 3583 (4.6) 7604 (9.8) 66397 77,584
Pigs 2471 (14.3) 7298 (42.3) 7464 17,233
Table 3.7: Species recorded on he holdings by data source. Only those with both
farm list and census livestock data are presented. The ‘Farm list only’ and ‘Census
only’ columns relate to holdings on which only that data source records that species,
the ‘Both’ category is instances in which both data sources record that species and
therefore both data sources agree. Percentages of the row totals are in brackets.
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Census Farm list Total
Cattle 94,710 12,414 (11.6) 107,124
Sheep 82,785 25,687 (23.7) 108,472
Pigs 12,063 9,487 (44.0) 21,550
Table 3.8: Farm composition by species on the farms for the census compared to
those on the farm list with only species present. Percentages of the row totals are in
brackets.
Holding composition by species for farms with species presence data is broken
down by whether the farm is also on the census in Table 3.9. This shows that
sheep and pig holdings are over-represented and cattle holdings are under-represented.
Furthermore, partly as a result of the under-representation of cattle and therefore
drop in the number of mixed cattle and sheep holdings there are many more single
species holdings on the farm list (85.1% = 18%+48.9%+17.2%) compared to the
census (56.5%).
Species Farm list only Farm list and census
Cattle only (C) 7,319 (18.0) 29,420 (26.7)
Sheep only (S) 19,823 (48.9) 29,335 (26.6)
Pig only (P) 6,959 (17.2) 3,481 (3.2)
CS 3,922 (9.7) 36,650 (33.2)
CP 586 (1.4) 3,266 (3.0)
SP 1,355 (3.3) 2,771 (2.5)
CSP 587 (1.4) 5,243 (4.8)
Total 40,551 110,166
Table 3.9: Species composition for those holdings which are listed as species present
on the farm list broken down by whether the holding is recorded on both farm list
and census or just farm list. Percentages of the column totals are in brackets.
Figure 3.5 shows that the holdings with just a farm list record of livestock are
not evenly distributed and are typically found in the areas of eastern England which
are more commonly associated with cropping and pig farming (Figure 3.5). Despite
the tendency for livestock present holdings to be in different areas to the majority of
the FMD cases (Figure 3.5) the livestock present holdings are still under-represented
in the three counties with the greatest numbers of FMD cases (Table 3.10).
The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the 43,226 for which only
species presence is recorded:
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of livestock holdings listed as having livestock on the farm list
but with no records on the agricultural census broken down by county.
Census Farm list PA χ21
County Total Culled (%) Total Culled (%) χ21 p
Cumbria 5,114 1,987 (38.7) 1,137 136 (12.0) 168.3 <0.001
Devon 8,404 734 (8.7) 2,272 61 (2.7) 83.7 <0.001
Dumfriesshire 1,085 642 (59.2) 293 74 (25.3) 38.2 <0.001
Table 3.10: The number of culled holdings which were identified as having livestock
by the census against those whose livestock were identified only by the farm list. This
is for the three counties with the most holdings culled in the FMD control effort. The
percentages are of the neighbouring ‘Total’ cell.
1. From the cull data it is clear that some of these holdings did have animals
during the 2001 FMD epidemic. However the cull data also show that it is
likely that many did not.
2. When there are animals on the holding the presence data is a reliable indicator
of the species actually on the holding.
3. The farms with no census data are small farms. They are in most cases single
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species holdings.
4. The farms with no census data are less likely to hold cattle and more likely to
hold sheep and particularly pigs.
These findings show that it is an unknown fraction of these holdings which
have animals, therefore the population of these farms would have two uncertainties:
whether a holding has animals and how many animals that holding has. Further-
more populating these holdings would involve creating data which are not already in
the headline statistics for numbers of animals during the 2001 FMD epidemic and
increasing these figures. As a result these holdings will not be populated and from
here on these holdings will be treated as non-livestock.
3.6 Linking satellites to main holdings
Section 3.5 identified some 3,610 farms which were listed in the farm list as having
no animals but during 2001 were culled and animals removed. This section will
further investigate this and demonstrate that what was defined as a holding in the
agricultural census and what was defined as a holding during the FMD epidemic are
different. Methods will be developed to link some of the farm list holdings (satellite
farms) to holdings with livestock (main farms) and these parcels of land will be
populated with animals from their linked farm.
The DEFRA agricultural census records numbers of animals on all the fields
a farmer owns to one CPH number. In many cases a single CPH number on the
agricultural census really comprises a number of distributed parcels of land. In these
cases for FMD control if a field was more than 1km from the main farm holding the
field was recorded under a separate CPH number (Gibbens and Wilesmith, 2002).
Furthermore, a farmer may rent or lease fields from another holding as temporary
pasture for animals. At the beginning of the 2001 epidemic DEFRA conducted
an inventory of parcels of land in England and Wales which held livestock, each
parcel was assigned an emergency CPH number and its coordinate recorded, although
animal numbers were not recorded (Honhold and Taylor, 2006).
The parcels of land identified at the start of the epidemic were assigned certain
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holding (the H component of the CPH number) numbers. The numbers assigned
were different for England, Scotland and Wales. Analyses of these holding numbers
has been conducted for Cumbria (Honhold and Taylor, 2006), although not for the
rest of the UK. For this analysis these holding numbers were identified using data in
Honhold and Taylor (2006) and by comparing the holding numbers of ’non-livestock
farms’ from the farm list with the holding numbers of farms culled which were not
on the census (Figure 3.6).
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(a) England: non-livestock (b) England: Culled
(c) Scotland: non-livestock (d) Scotland: Culled
(e) Wales: non-livestock (f) Wales: Culled
Figure 3.6: Holding numbers of all farms with no livestock recorded and all culled
farms with no livestock respectively for England (Plot 3.6(a) and 3.6(b)), Scotland
(Plot 3.6(c) and 3.6(d)), and Wales (Plot 3.6(e) and 3.6(f)).
The peaks in the cull numbers in Figure 3.6 indicate that parcels of land in Eng-
land identified as having animals on them were assigned a holding number between
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6500 and 6600, those in Scotland a number between 8750 and 8800 and those in
Wales a number between 4500 and 4600. This is in partial agreement with Honhold
and Taylor (2006) who identify holding numbers in the range 6000 and 6500 as the
emergency holding numbers for Cumbria. This is shown by the 2,896 (80.2%) of 3,610
farms culled with no livestock records fall into these holding ranges, whilst farms with
these numbers comprise 81,509 (27.4%) of the 297,518 ’non-livestock’ farms in the
database. These newly identified farms are not distributed uniformly across England,
Scotland and Wales (Table 3.11).





England 6500-6600 66125 3085 2619 (84.9%)
Scotland 8750-8800 289 274 94 (34.3%)
Wales 4500-4600 15095 247 183 (74.1%)
Table 3.11: The number of holdings in the ranges of values identified in Figure 3.6
broken down by culls.
Table 3.11 shows that there were far fewer parcels of land identified in Scotland.
From the distribution of the parcels of land (Figure 3.7) it appears that only parcels
of land within FMD zones were recorded in Scotland, whilst a thorough inventory
was carried out for England and Wales covering all areas. This means that not all
land that might have housed animals in Scotland were identified. This will introduce
bias into any dataset which uses these parcels of land. Furthermore whilst many of
the 3,610 culled farms can be identified using their holding numbers there are still a
further 714 (19.8%) pieces of land with animals culled land which does not fall into
these holding number categories.
A further problem is that the holding number for these satellite pieces of land
merely identifies them; it does not indicate which holding owns the animals they
stock. However, the farm list records the owner of the parcel of land and this can
be used to link potential satellite holdings to main holdings. A Java program was
written to compare the owner name field of the livestock farms to the owner name
field of non-livestock farms. If several possible matches were found for a non-livestock
farm, the closest potential main farm was selected.
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Figure 3.7: Spatial distribution of all farms with holding numbers in the range 6500-
6600 (red points), 4500-4600 (green points) and 8750-8800 (blue points).
3.6.1 Evaluation of farm links
Using the owners name 71,911 (88.2%) of 81,509 farms which were identified as being
livestock farms by their holding number could be linked to a livestock farm on the
census using the owners name. Furthermore Figure 3.8 shows that these farms were
substantially closer together than those linked using the owners name which were not
identified as holding livestock using the holding number. The differences between the
two lines are highly significant using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p<0.001).
Based on these analyses a robust set of rules are required for linking satellite
holdings in the farm list to main holdings on the census. Given the differences in
Figure 3.8, farms which were not identified as being livestock by the holding number
can not reliable be linked to a main holding, they are too far away and the identical
name is likely to be coincidence. Therefore, only when the satellite farm has a holding
number in the defined ranges and an owner link will it be linked to a main farm.
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Figure 3.8: Cumulative distribution plot of the distance between the main and satel-
lite farm. In instances where one holding owns both pieces of land and the holding
number indicates a livestock (red line), and based just on owners name with no
holding number indication (blue line).
Using the criteria described above 71,911 satellite farms were linked to 27,415
main holdings.
3.6.2 Analysis of farm links
Investigations of main holdings reveals that the greater proportion of holdings with
satellites are mixed cattle and sheep farms. Furthermore a large number are mixed
cattle, sheep and pig farms, although overall these are relatively few in number (Fig-
ure 3.9).
The satellite farms were generally smaller than the main holdings and were more
likely to have sheep than cattle (Figure 3.10). The majority of satellite farms had
no cattle culled, shown by the median on zero in Figure 3.10. This is likely to be
a reflection of the fact that cattle were not culled on all farms and possibly that
farmers are more willing to put sheep on pasture outside the main holding. This is
also a reflection of the fact that the majority of main farms were IPs compared to the
majority of satellite farms which are CPs (Table 3.12). This suggests that the satellite
farms are close to the main farms as they were apparently taken as a contiguous cull
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Figure 3.9: Barplot of numbers of main holdings without satellites (blue area) and
with (red area) broken down by species composition of the main holding (cattle=C,
sheep=S and pig=P).
after the main holding had been declared an IP. The culled satellite farms were also a
slightly higher proportion of DCs, as they have a link to the main holding if the main
holding is declared an IP. Analysis of the reason for culling satellite holdings whose
main holding was an IP shows the greatest number were culled as CPs (Table 3.12).
Cull reason Satellites (%) Main holding cull (%) All Culls (%)
3km 776 (31.6) 320 (17.0) 2980 (27.5)
CP 828 (33.8) 218 (11.6) 3620 (33.4)
DC 472 (19.2) 194 (10.3) 1420 (13.1)
IP 240 (9.7) 1110 (58.9) 2026 (18.7)
Local 19 (0.7) 9 (0.4) 280 (2.5)
Other 67 (2.7) 24 (1.2) 268 (2.4)
SOS 50 (2.0) 11 (0.5) 250 (2.3)
Total 2450 1890 10800





Figure 3.10: Boxplots of numbers culled on main holdings compared to satellites for
cattle (plot 3.10(a)) and sheep (plot 3.10(b)).
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3.6.3 Populating farm fragments
In order to use the fragment data, census animal numbers from main holdings must
be distributed among the satellite holdings. This was achieved using data on culled
farms, but only those instances in which the main farm and all identified satellites
were culled. Additionally, for cattle farms, none of the component fields may have
been culled as part of the 3km cull. Two methods for populating farm fragments
were derived using these data:
1. Entire enterprise sampling Sampling based upon the proportion of animals
belonging to the farm enterprise which are on the satellites (Figure 3.11). The
cattle line in Figure 3.11 is composed of 218 data points. Each data point
represents a complete farm enterprise with fragments in which the main holding
and all identified fragments have been culled but not as part of the 3km cull.
The corresponding number of sheep holdings is 455, which is more than double
that for cattle because sheep holdings were taken in the 3km culls, so these are
included. To populate farm enterprises each derived frequency distribution in
Figure 3.11 is sampled (with replacement) and the corresponding proportion of
sheep and cattle subtracted from the census number on the main holding and
divided evenly among the satellites. For instance consider a farm enterprise with
200 cattle and 800 sheep according to the census which has 2 linked satellites.
The 2 distributions in Figure 3.11 are sampled and values of 0.4 for cattle and
0.8 for sheep chosen. 0.4× 200 = 80 and 0.8× 800 = 640. The values of 80 and
640 are subtracted from the 200 and 800 and divided by 2 to give the numbers
on each satellite. The enterprise now consists of a main holding with 120 head
of cattle and 160 sheep and 2 satellites each comprising 40 cattle and 320 sheep.
2. Satellite level allocation. The farms on which sampling is based must be
instances in which the entire farm enterprise (main holding and all off-fields)
was culled. Thus, the same rules that were applied to entire enterprise sampling
still apply. However, the enterprise on which the sample is based is taken from
a subset of enterprises with the same number of satellites as the enterprise to
be populated. The fragments are then populated according to the proportions
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of cattle and sheep on each fragment on the sampled premises. So for the
enterprise of 200 cattle, 800 sheep and 2 satellites an enterprise is sampled
from those culled with 2 satellites. The proportion of the enterprises cattle
on the satellites are 0.5 and 0 and 0.1 and 0.6 for sheep on the two satellites
respectively. So the enterprise is repopulated thus: the main holding contains
100 cattle and 240 sheep, the first satellite 100 cattle and 80 sheep and the
second satellite 480 sheep and no cattle.
Figure 3.11: Cumulative distribution plot of the proportion of cattle (blue line) and
sheep (red line) belonging to the entire farm enterprise which were on fragments
during the 2001 FMD epidemic.
The second approach would be the optimal solution as it is based upon the actual
satellite numbers rather than values pooled across the entire farm enterprise. It
makes allowances arising from differences in the numbers of satellites in relation
to the proportions of animals on the satellites. However there are very few entire
culled holdings with more than two satellites culled (Figure 3.12). As this method is
dependent upon matching to holdings with the same number of satellites this would
introduce bias as enterprises with several fragments would be sampled from a very
small population.
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Figure 3.12: Proportions of farm enterprises by the number of satellites linked to
them for the entire dataset (black bars), entire enterprises culled with cattle (grey
bars) and entire enterprises with sheep culled (brown bar). Numbers above the bars
are the number in each group.
As a result of these limitations with the satellite level allocation the entire en-
terprise sampling method was used to allocate animals recorded on the census to
satellite holdings. However there remain limitations in this method of allocation:
1. Equal numbers of animals are distributed among all satellites.
2. Fragments are left with no animals. This occurs because values of zero can be
sampled for both cattle and sheep and as a result all satellites for an individual
holding are left without animals. Another possibility is a value greater than
zero is sampled but there were no animals of that species recorded on the census
for the receiving enterprise. This was the case for 16,334 (22.3%) of fragments.
3. Farms with more fragments have a greater proportion of their animals dis-
tributed among their fragments (Figure 3.13). This was analysed using a gen-
eralised linear model with binomial errors result in which the outcome is the
proportion of animals on he fragment and the predictors the number of frag-
ments. The estimate for cattle was 0.268 (p<0.001) and sheep 0.259, (p<0.001).
However, for the reasons described above there is limited data on complete en-
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round All Culled entire farm enerprise culled %
Cumbria 3872 313 8.084
Devon 1218 19 1.560
Dumfriesshire 910 21 2.308
North Yorks 785 26 3.312
Northumberland 435 15 3.448
Hereford &Worc 395 6 1.519
Powys 392 9 2.296
Durham 384 16 4.167
Gloucestershire 363 7 1.928
Kircudbright 324 8 2.469
Lancashire 275 8 2.909
Gwynedd 238 1 0.420
Wigtown 214 5 2.336
Staffordshire 167 6 3.593
Gwent 149 8 5.369
Shropshire 127 0 0.000
rest of UK 598 18 3.010
Total 10846 486 4.481
Table 3.13: The number of entire farm enterprises culled during the course of the
2001 epidemic for counties in which more than 100 premises were culled.
terprises culled with more than one fragment and as a result this can not be
controlled for.
4. Bias in the spatial distribution of complete farm enterprises culled. The greatest
proportion of farms on which all animals on the main and satellite holdings
were taken are in Cumbria (Table 3.13). As no county other than Cumbria has
more than 30 complete holdings culled using different distributions for different
regions is not statistically feasible, so data from the whole of GB was used.
Therefore all populations are based upon data largely from the Cumbria disease
cluster and spatial variations in fragment population can not be accounted for.
A method has been derived for dividing animals recorded in the agricultural
census among satellite holdings where these satellites have been previously identified.
However the method chosen was driven by data limitations and the method has many
limitations. Given additional data on animal numbers on farm enterprises and data
on how these animals are distributed among the component units of the enterprise




Figure 3.13: Proportion of animals on satellites by the number of fragments owned
by the farm enterprise for cattle (plot 3.13(a)) and sheep (plot 3.13(b)).
3.7 Conclusion
A farm dataset has been constructed primarily using the agricultural census with
supplementary data on satellite fields from the farm list. A spatial reference was
selected using the farm list reference which identifies the main farm building and
matches the reference from the FMD data.
The demographic component on census holdings was evaluated to evaluate how
accurately the data reflects the data on the cull. Differences exist in the sheep data
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probably as a result of lamb sales for meat and movements of sheep from upland
to lowland pasture between June and February. Cattle analysis is complicated by
partial culls of cattle, otherwise the census was an accurate representation of cattle
numbers.
There were a number of holdings for which the farm list recorded species pres-
ence but not numbers. These farms represent holdings which have ceased livestock
production, or did not have stock at the time of the census or holdings which did not
return a census form. Therefore due to the uncertainty in how many holdings had
stock and how much stock they held these holdings were not populated.
Satellite holdings of main holdings were identified wherever possible and were
populated by sampling from distributions from the cull. However, although the
locations are known the population from which sampling was conducted was limited.
103
Chapter 4
Risk factors for holding level
susceptibility
4.1 Introduction
In the event of a future outbreak of FMD the immediate response must be the
minimization of further local and long range transmission events (Anderson, 2002).
This will be expedited by imposing a movement standstill on susceptible livestock
and elevating biosecurity measures (Anderson, 2002). Following these measures, there
may be continued local spread albeit at a reduced rate. Some holdings will be more
susceptible to infection by local spread and these holdings may be concentrated in
certain areas. Therefore if a model can be developed to identify holdings and areas at
high risk, infection control measures and resources can be targeted most effectively.
Furthermore, such a model can be used retrospectively to understand patterns of
transmission through the parameters which constitute the model.
Previous modelling studies have demonstrated the importance of spatial distribu-
tion of species numbers as a predictor of FMD incidences in the UK 2001 outbreak
(Keeling et al., 2001, 2003; Tildesley et al., 2006) and other outbreaks (Haydon et al.,
1997; Perez et al., 2006; Ward and Perez, 2004). In the models of Keeling et al. (2001,
2003) and Tildesley et al. (2006) two measures of animal numbers are important in
determining FMD transmission:
1. Given that holding i is not infected, the number of cattle and sheep on i deter-
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mines the farms susceptibility to infection.
2. Given that holding i is infected, the number of cattle and sheep in the neigh-
bourhood of i determines the potential of i to infect further holdings.
Additionally, the model takes into account the distance between the infected farm i
and a source of infection j. The probability that holding i will become infected on
day D is given by (Tildesley et al., 2006):
pi,D = 1− exp




where nc and ns are the number of cattle and sheep respectively, sc and ss are
susceptibility parameters and tc and ts are transmissibility parameters for cattle
and sheep respectively. Transmission is calculated based on all holdings which are
infectious on day D. dij is the Euclidean distance between i and j, and K(dij) is the
transmission kernel that weights transmission based on the distance between i and j.
The model described above is a dynamic spatio-temporal model of disease spread
which is designed for forward projection of epidemic progression. It is a means of
assessing the progression of the epidemic one generation at a time and is not intended
to give a start of epidemic measure of infection risk. Some means of assessing the risk
of infection for an individual holding would be invaluable for assessing areas most at
risk from infection before an epidemic. This would be particularly valuable if such
an assessment can be made statically or given a particular epidemic situation so that
resources can be targeted effectively. Any such index would ideally comprise three
measures:
1. Euclidean distance to an infectious source. This captures the spatial
dependency of FMD.
2. The number and species of animals on the individual holding. This
describes the number of animals on the holding which can become infected. Ad-
ditionally greater numbers of animals are likely to result in a greater throughput
of personnel, equipment, feedstuffs and machinery which could bring infection
onto the holding.
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3. The number of animals in the local area. The majority of infection
originates from nearby IPs via local spread, therefore some measure of the
potential of the local neighbourhood to spread infection is required.
This thesis chapter will develop a static measure of risk of FMD infection for indi-
vidual holdings based upon these measures. The study will have the following aims:
1. To evaluate whether these variables act as predictors for FMD cases in the 2001
FMD epidemic.
2. To derive a predictive measure of risk of FMD infection based on the variables
described above for the 2001 epidemic.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 The Model
Eight variables were calculated for each holding. These variables fall into four groups:
1. Distance to seed. The distance to the nearest initially infected infectious
source which are defined as the 78 IPs estimated to have been infected before
the imposition of the NMB.
2. Holding population. The number of cattle and sheep on each holding. How-
ever, this cannot be modelled as two continuous variables as there are a large
number of sheep only (22.4%) and cattle only (31.5%) holdings, so there are
a large number of zeros in the data. Therefore these data will be modelled
as species on the holding as a three level variable with mixed, cattle only and
sheep only holdings. Mixed is the reference level against which other levels will
be compared. A separate model for mixed holdings with numbers included will
be developed to investigate the effect of numbers of animals on the holding. An
additional predictor is the area of the holding in hectares. All data is taken
from the June 2000 agricultural census.
3. Country. Differences at the national level in the nature of farm holdings and
possibly the nature of census data collection have been described previously
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(Chapter 3). Furthermore, the epidemic was managed by different governments
in England, Scotland and Wales who exercised some independence in epidemic
management. Therefore, the country of the farm (England, Scotland or Wales)
will be included as a factor with England as the reference level.
4. Farming in the locality. Cattle and sheep numbers in the neighbourhood of
each holding. Calculations of these densities will use a kernel as described in
Section 4.2.4. Furthermore the total area (in Ha) under livestock (cattle and
sheep) production will be calculated.
The outcome for these analyses is whether a farm is an IP or not an IP. There
are two formal statistical methods for differentiating between two groups of values
using a set of predictor variables. These are logistic regression and linear discrimi-
nants analysis (LDA). Both methods perform similar analysis, the major difference
is that LDA seeks to place the data into the two groups (in this case IPs and non-
IPs (Armitage and Berry, 1987), and logistic regression is based on the likelihood
of each farm becoming an IP. The purpose of LDA is “to set up some rule which
will allocate further individuals to the correct population of origin with minimal
probability of misclassification” (The International Statistics Institute, 2006, p.116).
However the process of infection during the 2001 epidemic was highly stochastic, and
if the epidemic were repeated a different set of holdings are likely to become infected.
Therefore, assigning individuals to a particular group is not appropriate. There are
likely to be identifiable factors which predispose holdings to infection and determine
the likelihood of infection, identification of these factors is the aim of this chapter.
As a result logistic regression will be used rather than LDA.
There is spatial dependency in the outcome and in some of the predictors. This
is because IPs are spatially clustered and among the predictors are the numbers of
animals in the locality of the holding, distance to an infectious seed and country of
the holding, all of which are also spatially dependant. The significance of the spatial
dependance will be tested using Moran’s I statistic on the residuals of the GLM.
Moran’s I will be calculated for a range of nearest neighbours using the spdep package
in the R statistical environment. Significant autocorrelation in the residuals will be
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corrected by imposing a 5km wide hexagonal lattice upon the spatial distribution of
the data. The unique ID of the hexagon into which each farm falls will be assigned
as a random effect to form a generalised linear mixed model (GLMM, with binomial
errors). Previous studies (Haine et al., 2004; Pfeiffer et al., 2007) used political
boundaries as the random effect. However, political boundaries are uneven in size
and shape, so by imposing an arbitrary network of evenly sized polygons upon the
data, some of these problems have been overcome. The GLMM will be generated
using the lme4 package in the R statistical environment and the residuals of the
GLMM will be tested for spatial autocorrelation in the manner described above.
4.2.2 Data
The model requires data regarding numbers of sheep and cattle on IPs and non-
IPs. However as discussed in Chapter 3 there is no way of matching these datasets
perfectly. Three variations on the demographic and FMD datasets could be used to
generate the dependent variables, these variations are described in Table 4.1.




Census holdings Census IPs 135,142 1582 (1534)
Census holdings DCS data 135,142 2026 (1946)
Census holdings +
fragments
Census IPs + frag-
ments
197,525 2026 (1946)
Table 4.1: Combinations of possible datasets for these analysis.
There are areas of incompleteness, inaccuracies or biases with each demography
and FMD data combination, these are:
Census holdings & census IPs: Farm fragments are not included, therefore
numbers of animals on holdings are over represented and many potential IPs are
missing. However, data are accurate and there is no new bias being introduced
as census data is used for all analysis. Analysis would be of the subset of IPs
which are on the agricultural census.
Census holdings & DCS data: This includes data on all 2026 IPs. However
those 2026 include farm fragments which are not included in the non-IP data,
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therefore bias is potentially introduced. Furthermore data on animal numbers
are from two different sources.
Census and fragment data: This includes data on more IPs than the census
(but not all IPs) and most fragments. However data on animal numbers on
fragments is generated by bootstrapping (Section 3.5) and data is only partially
complete for Scotland.
As the census data is the dataset which comes from one source and is the most
robust for such analyses (Chapter 3) this will be used in these analyses, furthermore
census data has been used in previous analyses (Ferguson et al., 2001b; Kao, 2003;
Keeling et al., 2003; Matthews et al., 2003). After the initial stages the epidemic
predominantly involved cattle and sheep. Table 4.2 demonstrates that the proportion
of the national stock of pigs which was culled on IPs was an order of magnitude lower
than the corresponding proportions of cattle and sheep. Therefore farms without
cattle or sheep were excluded from the analysis. The 78 seed IPs will not be included
in the analysis as some of these were infected by processes such as animal movements
which were not operating in later stages of the epidemic. After removal of these farms
there were 130,136 non-IPs and 1,527 IPs in the dataset. Results will be compared
to analysis using the modelled fragment dataset (Chapter 3) to compare the census
dataset with data with fragments incorporated. The two models will be compared by
checking for an overlap in the confidence intervals of the odds ratios of the predictors
from the two models. Further analysis will be carried out by taking as IPs just those
1,025 which were laboratory positive.
Species National stock On IPs % on IPs
Cattle 9,501,181 294,716 3.10
Sheep 39,580,631 974,785 2.46
Pigs 6,317,475 20,475 0.32
Table 4.2: The percentage of the national stock by species which was culled on IPs
only.
Values for species composition can be taken directly from these data, and distance
to an infectious seed can be generated using the FMD data. However the kernel
densities for cattle and sheep must be derived using these data. The outputs of
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different kernel shapes described in Section 4.2.4 will be tested.
4.2.3 Logistic regression
The binary outcome variable (whether the holding was an IP) will be analysed by
univariate logistic regression analysis using each independent variable described in
Section 8.2 as the predictor. The logistic regression will be carried out using the steps
described in Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, p.92-98):
1. Univariate analysis. Will be carried out for all predictors against the out-
come. The distance to seed variable will be tested against a range of possible
transformations, as there is no reason to assume that the relationship between
distance to seed and the outcome will be linear. The different transformations
to be be tested are: log10, x1/n and x−n. Univariate analysis will be conducted
in the groups defined in Section 8.2.
2. Multivariate model development. All univariate predictors with p<0.25
are entered into a multivariate model. Terms non-significant at p<0.05 will
be removed using manual backward stepwise model fitting to generate a most
parsimonious main effects model.
3. Preliminary main effects model. Comparisons of the estimates of risk
factors in the multivariate model and univariate model will be carried out to
look for significant changes.
4. Variable checking. This involves checking for linearity of the logits of the
predictors in the multivariate model and will be carried out by plotting the
variable against the logits of the model which are generated in R using the
predict.lm function. Non-linear logits will be adjusted using a transformation
and where this does not work by dropping the variable from the model. The
resulting model will be called the main effects model.
5. Interactions Biologically plausible interactions will be tested. An interaction
will be retained in the model if p < 0.05. If the inclusion of a subsequent term
changes the p-values of another interaction to a value of p greater than 0.05 the
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non-significant term will be removed. The impact of removing interactions on
the p-values of the remaining interactions will be checked. Biologically plausible
interactions to be considered are:
(a) Holding level interactions: Between all three (Species and farm area)
predictors at the holding level. Holdings with more animals may occupy a
greater area, may be more likely to disperse animals on off-fields and may
be more likely to stock multiple species.
(b) Density interactions: Between cattle and sheep densities.
(c) Distance density interactions: How animal densities vary with dis-
tance to the seed.
(d) Species level interactions: How species on the holding interact with
animal densities.
(e) National level interactions: Differences in the other predictor variables
at the national scale. This is with the exception of distance to the seed
with which any interaction would reflect the distribution of seeds.
Models will be compared using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). AIC is
calculated as (Crawley, 2002):
AIC = −2× l + 2(p + 1) (4.2)
where l is the log likelihood and p the number of parameters. The model with the
best fit is the model with the smallest value of AIC.
Further model comparison will be conducted using the area under the Receiver
Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve (Dohoo et al., 2003) and is based upon the
modelled logistic regression prediction value. The area under the ROC curve is






where n+ is the number of true positives and n− the number of true negatives and
N = n+ + n−. r+ for true positive i is the number of true negatives which returned
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a lower modelled value than i. Possible values of AROC range from 0 to 1, values for
AROC should be interpreted as (adapted from Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)):
ROC ≈ 0.5 there is no discriminatory power.
0.7 ≤ ROC < 0.8 Acceptable discrimination.
0.8 ≤ ROC < 0.9 Excellent discrimination.
≥ 0.9 Outstanding, almost total discrimination.
The model will be further evaluated by testing the model’s ability to predict the
actual IPs. This will be done by selecting the n holdings with the highest modelled
values and evaluating how many of these were actually IPs where n is the number of
IPs in the outcome variable. This model will be compared to a second model which
will use just IPs which were infected during phase 1 of the epidemic. This is to allow
for any temporal effect resulting from culling policies which changed over the course
of the epidemic.
Sensitivity analysis will be carried out by substituting the outcome variable for all
holdings which have been culled and laboratory positive holdings to test how effective
the model is at predicting culled and laboratory positive holdings. The analysis will
be carried out on the GLMM and differences in the risk factors evaluated by plotting
the odds ratios of the models being compared. Risk factors with odds ratios whose
95% CIs overlap are not significantly different.
4.2.4 Calculating animal densities
Methods of aggregating point data to create generalised density surfaces are discussed
in great depth in the literature on spatial data processing and analysis (Bailey and
Gatrell, 1995; O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2003; Worboys, 1995). For this analysis various
measures could be derived to describe the density of holdings at a particular point,
these measures are discussed in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1.
For the purpose of this analysis some measure of density centered on the individual
holding is required, therefore the circular density measure is most appropriate. For
density calculation a radius or bandwidth (τ) is required. Some means of weighting
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Table 4.3: Different methods of describing the farming landscape and in particular
the density of holdings
Figure 4.1: Illustration of methods for describing the farming landscape. The large
black point is the holding in question, smaller points represent farm holdings and
the polygons are units in which density is calculated. Labels correspond to labels in
Table 4.3.
closer values is needed, so a kernel is applied to the density calculations. The kernel
is used to calculate some coefficient (y) based upon the distance from the central
point to the point of interest (h). Typical kernels include (see Figure 4.2 for kernel
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shape):
1. Flat kernel: y = 1 where h < τ , 0 otherwise.
2. Quartic kernel: y = 3π (1− (
h2
τ2
)2) (from Bailey and Gatrell (1995)).
3. Exponential kernel: y = e−kh/τ . A value of 4.5 was chosen for k as this is
the other extreme to the quartic and flat kernels with a rapid drop off at a
relatively short distance followed by a long tail.
Figure 4.2: Examples of kernel functions where τ = 3000. The lines describe changes
in the coefficient (y) with increasing distances between farms (h). a is a flat kernel,
b is a quartic kernel, c is an exponential function.
The range of kernel functions and values of τ will be tested to evaluate the effects
of different kernels on the statistical significance of cattle and sheep densities and
total farmed area. Values of τ will be investigated at distances up to 30km. The
different values of τ will be compared using the AIC value generated by running
logistic regression analysis of all three predictors (total cattle, sheep and area) against
the outcome at each value of τ .
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Holding level analysis
All holding level predictors were highly significant in univariate logistic regression
analysis (Table 4.4). Although all relationships are significant the protective effect of
being a sheep only holding versus a cattle only holding is significantly greater. Just
over one-third of holdings are cattle only, a similar proportion mixed cattle and sheep
and around a quarter sheep only (Table 4.4). To achieve linearity in the logit holding
area was log10 + 1 transformed. Holding area is a significant predictor of FMD risk,
which may be due to a positive relationship with animal numbers.
Predictor Unit Non-IPs IPs (%) OR (95% CIs) z value p
Species
Mixed 45,232 996 (2.20) 1 - -
Cattle 48,508 408 (0.84) 0.38 (0.34,0.42) −16.5 < 0.001
Sheep 35,843 123 (0.34) 0.15 (0.13,0.19) −19.5 < 0.001
Area log10(Ha + 1) NA NA 2.84 (2.61,3.09) 24.6 < 0.001
Table 4.4: Univariate logistic regression results of holding level predictors. The
percentages are a percentage of the Non-IPs cell.
4.3.2 National level differences
At the country level, there is a small protective effect of a holding being in Scotland
and larger protective effect of being in Wales (Table 4.5). This might be explained
by considering the country level distribution of the 1527 IPs with respect to the
susceptible population (Table 4.5). Table 4.5 shows that there are considerably fewer
IPs in Scotland than England and fewer again in Wales. To fully understand the
significance of this relationship it must be tested in a multivariate model in which
distance to seed is included to allow for differences in the distribution of seeds.
Predictor Unit Non-IPs IPs (%) OR (95% CIs) z value p
Country
England 84,765 1,315 (1.53) 1 - -
Scotland 21,450 141 (0.65) 0.42(0.35,0.50) −9.65 < 0.001
Wales 21,484 71 (0.33) 0.21(0.16,0.27) −12.70 < 0.001
Table 4.5: Univariate logistic regression results of the country variable. The percent-
ages are a percentage of the Non-IPs cell.
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4.3.3 Density measures
Three neighbourhood variables were calculated for each data point. These were:
total (kernel transformed) cattle, sheep and farm area. However total farm area
was closely correlated with total cattle and total sheep, and preliminary analysis of a
logistic regression model containing the three predictors revealed that total farm area
was not linear in its logit, instead the shape of the relationship was an inverted ‘V’.
As a result this predictor was dropped from subsequent analysis. To ensure linearity
in the logits both total cattle and total sheep were square root transformed.
Values of AIC for the three methods of calculating densities described in sec-
tion 4.2.4 were compared across a range of kernel bandwidths (τ) from 500m to
30km (Figure 4.3). Values of τ of between 5 and 7.5km return similarly low values
of AIC for both the quartic and flat kernels, for all of these values cattle and sheep
densities were highly significant (p < 0.001). The exponential kernel returns much
higher values of AIC at smaller values of τ , but returns very low values at greater
distances. The exponential kernel had a trough in AIC at 15km, which was the low-
est value returned by any model, therefore, this was the kernel selected for use in
subsequent analyses. Results of univariate analysis of these three predictors with the
exponential kernel at a bandwidth of 15km is presented in Table 4.6.
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Cattle density
√
10−3head 4.90 (4.46,5.38) 33.46 < 0.001
Sheep density
√
10−4head 2.85 (2.64,3.10) 25.72 < 0.001
Table 4.6: Logistic regression results of density based predictors.
4.3.4 Distance to seed
A square root transformation of distance to the seed returns the lowest AIC of all the
transformations which were tested (Table 4.7). A linear function returns a substan-
tially lower AIC than inverse transformed values of distance to the seed (Table 4.7).
The square root transformed distance to seed was linear in its logit and was used in
subsequent analysis.
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Figure 4.3: AIC values for univariate GLMs of animal densities where the model
is a binomial model with cattle and sheep densities as the predictors and whether
the holding is an IP as the outcome. Circles represent quartic kernel densities, flat
crosses the flat kernel and diagonal crosses the exponential kernel.
Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p AIC
km 0.928 (0.923,0.932) −33.240 < 0.001 14200
log10(km + 1) 0.056 (0.049,0.063) −46.904 < 0.001 14315
km1/2 0.525 (0.508,0.541) −40.206 < 0.001 14157
km1/3 0.225 (0.211,0.241) −43.038 < 0.001 14193
km−1 2.352 (2.033,2.722) 11.474 < 0.001 16390
km−2 1.029 (1.014,1.043) 3.898 < 0.001 16573
km−3 1.001 (1.000,1.003) 2.364 0.018 16582
Table 4.7: Logistic regression results for distance to the seed.
4.3.5 Multivariate model
All predictors had p<0.25 in the univariate analysis and therefore all were entered
into the baseline multivariate model. The baseline multivariate model is shown by
Table 4.8. The area under the ROC curve is 0.908 and the model correctly predicts
385 (25.2%) of 1527 IPs.
In the model in Table 4.8 the distance to the nearest seed is the principal risk
factor, as it has the greatest value for the Wald statistic (z-score). The effect of this
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Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −34.067 < 0.001
dist to seed
√
km 0.605 (0.584,0.627) −27.959 < 0.001
Country
England 1 - -
Scotland 0.964 (0.799,1.162) −0.389 0.698
Wales 0.124 (0.094,0.163) −14.819 < 0.001
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.653 (0.573,0.744) −6.407 < 0.001
Sheep 0.579 (0.474,0.708) −5.329 < 0.001
Farm area log10(Ha + 1) 4.290 (3.776,4.873) 22.388 < 0.001
Cattle density
√
10−3Head 4.326 (3.832,4.884) 23.666 < 0.001
Sheep density
√
10−4Head 4.128 (3.563,4.782) 18.892 < 0.001
Table 4.8: Logistic regression output for the main effects of the full multivariate
model.
predictor can be further investigated by considering a model without distance to seed
(Table 4.9), the remaining predictors are still highly significant and this model has
strong predictive power (area under ROC curve=0.878).
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −52.502 < 0.001
Country
England 1 - -
Scotland 0.719 (0.598,0.864) −3.524 < 0.001
Wales 0.060 (0.046,0.078) −21.041 < 0.001
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.659 (0.578,0.750) −6.289 < 0.001
Sheep 0.574 (0.470,0.701) −5.453 < 0.001
Farm area log10(Ha + 1) 4.260 (3.756,4.832) 22.550 < 0.001
Cattle density
√
10−3Head 6.965 (6.200,7.823) 32.724 < 0.001
Sheep density
√
10−4Head 6.717 (5.850,7.711) 27.039 < 0.001
Table 4.9: Logistic regression output for the multivariate model without the distance
to seed variable.
A comparison between the model without distance to seed and the full model
is presented in Figure 4.4. The principal change is in the animal density predictors
which are much stronger risk factors without distance to seed. However, the country
risk factor, in particular Wales also changes significantly. There is no change in the
holding level factors (species and farm area).
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Figure 4.4: Odds ratios (points) and 95% CIs (lines) for the full model (Table 4.8,
black lines) and the model without distance to seed (Table 4.9, red lines). The x-axis
is square root transformed.
There was significant spatial autocorrelation in the models presented in Table 4.9
and Table 4.8, this was corrected by overlaying a 5km hexagonal lattice on the dis-
tribution of farms and inserting the hexagon to which each farm belonged into the
model as a mixed effect. The median number of farms in each hexagon was 8 (25th
percentile = 4, 75th percentile = 15, Figure 4.5). The area under the ROC for this
model is 0.981 and it correctly identifies 46.6% of IPs.
The results of the GLMM are presented in Table 4.10 and comparison of the risk
factors from the GLMM and the GLM is presented in Figure 4.6. The confidence
intervals for the predictors in which there is some spatial dependance are considerably
wider for the GLMM compared to the GLM. These variables are the distance to the
seed, country and cattle and sheep densities. The point estimates change slightly for
species and holding area are slightly different, but the confidence intervals are the
same. The change in the spatially dependant variables reflects that there is little
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of the number of farms in each hexagon.
within-hexagon variation in the spatially dependant predictors.
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −14.55 < 0.001
dist to seed
√
km 0.525 (0.456,0.604) −8.944 < 0.001
Country
England 1 - -
Scotland 1.209 (0.607,2.406) 0.539 0.590
Wales 0.188 (0.082,0.431) −3.951 < 0.001
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.611 (0.518,0.722) −5.809 < 0.001
Sheep 0.530 (0.415,0.678) −5.061 < 0.001
Farm area log10(Ha + 1) 4.715 (3.980,5.586) 17.93 < 0.001
Total cattle
√
10−3head 3.207 (2.112,4.870) 5.470 < 0.001
Total sheep
√
10−4head 3.246 (1.916,5.499) 4.377 < 0.001
Table 4.10: Multivariate logistic mixed model of risk factors for being an IP.
Comparison of the main effects model (Table 4.10) with a model in which the
outcome is IPs infected during phase 1 (Table 4.11) of the epidemic is shown by
Figure 4.7. The only significant difference between the two models is in the distance
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Figure 4.6: Odds ratios (points) and 95% CIs (lines) for the logistic GLM (Table 4.8
- black lines) and the logistic GLMM (Table 4.10 - red lines).
to seed predictor which is a significantly stronger risk factor in the phase 1 only
model. These are likely to be linked, as the majority of cases during phase 1 were in
Wales and Wales has abnormally high sheep densities, which in other models were
not a major risk factor. The area under the ROC for this model is 0.989 and it
correctly predicted 294 (41.0%) of 717 phase 1 IPs.
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Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −9.009 < 0.001
dist to seed
√
km 0.359 (0.285,0.452) −8.683 < 0.001
Country
England 1 - -
Scotland 1.316 (0.526,3.288) 0.587 0.557
Wales 0.532 (0.171,1.653) −1.091 0.275
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.518 (0.413,0.649) −5.698 < 0.001
Sheep 0.492 (0.341,0.709) −3.803 < 0.001
Farm area log10(Ha + 1) 4.704 (3.694,5991) 12.55 < 0.001
Cattle density
√
10−3head 3.647 (1.993,6.676) 4.195 < 0.001
Sheep density
√
10−4head 1.048 (0.465,2.363) 0.113 0.910
Table 4.11: Multivariate logistic GLMM of being an IP in phase 1.
Figure 4.7: Odds ratios (black points) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) for the
main effects model presented in Table 4.8 (black lines), and the model of being an IP
in phase 1 (red lines). Odds ratios are plotted on a square root transformed scale.
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4.3.6 Sensitivity analysis
The logistic regression model parameterised with all culled holdings is presented in
Table 4.12. Comparing the odds ratios for the risk factors in this model with those
for the full model (Figure 4.8) shows changes in some of the predictors:
1. Country. Being in Scotland is not significantly different to England for the
IP model, however it is a significant risk factor for being a culled holding and
significantly different to its value in the IP model.
2. Species. Sheep only farms are at significantly greater risk in the culled model,
however it remains a protective effect relative to mixed holdings.
3. Farm area. Whilst still a risk factor farm area is significantly less of a risk
factor in the culled model.
The model has an area under the ROC of 0.956 and correctly identifies 67.5% of
culled holdings.
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −20.72 < 0.001
dist to seed
√
km 0.490 (0.466,0.515) −27.90 < 0.001
Country
England 1 - -
Scotland 4.463 (3.484,5.717) 11.84 < 0.001
Wales 0.161 (0.118,0.219) −11.66 < 0.001
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.488 (0.443,0.536) −14.82 < 0.001
Sheep 0.811 (0.728,0.904) −3.769 < 0.001
Farm area log10(Ha + 1) 2.118 (1.963,2.287) 19.26 < 0.001
Total cattle
√
10−3head 2.551 (2.184,2.979) 11.83 < 0.001
Total sheep
√
10−4head 4.284 (3.501,5.243) 14.12 < 0.001
Table 4.12: Multivariate logistic regression model of risk factors for being a culled
holding.
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Figure 4.8: Odds ratios (black points) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) for the
full single term model presented in Table 4.8 (black lines), and the model of all culled
holdings presented in Table 4.12 (red lines). Odds ratios are plotted on a square root
scale.
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Analysis discounting laboratory negative IPs did not produce a significantly dif-
ferent model compared to that of all IPs (Figure 4.9, Table 4.13 for non-laboratory
negative IPs and Table 4.8 for all IPs). The area under the ROC for this model
is 0.987 and correctly identified 43.7% of IPs. None of the predictors for the non-
negative IPs were significantly different to those for all IPs although there is a large
difference in the odds ratios for the cattle (presence and density) and farm area have
substantially greater odds ratios whilst distance to seed is less of a risk factor.
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −12.14 < 0.001
dist to seed
√
km 0.583 (0.476,0.714) −5.224 < 0.001
Country
England 1 - -
Scotland 0.854 (0.325,2.247) −0.320 0.749
Wales 0.117 (0.027,0.500) −2.898 0.003
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.747 (0.613,0.910) −2.893 0.003
Sheep 0.335 (0.232,0.483) −5.845 < 0.001
Farm area log10(Ha + 1) 6.116 (4.893,7.645) 15.91 < 0.001
Cattle density
√
10−3head 3.246 (1.790,5.888) 3.876 < 0.001
Sheep density
√
10−4head 4.062 (1.862,8.862) 3.522 < 0.001
Table 4.13: Multivariate logistic regression model of risk factors for being a laboratory
positive IP.
The results of all models are summarised in Table 4.14, this shows that the model
fit and the accuracy of IP prediction of the models do not always match. Some
models (phase 1, laboratory positive) have a larger area under the ROC but a lower
predictive accuracy than the full model. Whilst others (culled holdings) work the
other way around.
Model Area under ROC % correctly identified
GLM 0.908 25.2
GLMM 0.981 46.6
Laboratory positive IPs 0.987 43.7
All culled holdings 0.956 67.5
Phase 1 IPs 0.989 41.0
Table 4.14: Summary of results of different multivariate models developed.
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Figure 4.9: Odds ratios (black points) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) for the
main effects model presented in Table 4.10 (black lines), and the model of laboratory




A static model of holding level susceptibility has been developed using a set of vari-
ables similar to those used by Keeling et al. (2001) and Tildesley et al. (2006) but
implemented in a random effects logistic regression framework. Such a model is of
value for developing understanding of the factors responsible for driving and deter-
mining the course of the 2001 UK FMD epidemic. Additionally, this model could be
used to identify holdings at greatest risk of experiencing a local epidemic in the event
of a future FMD outbreak. The model was an excellent fit (area under the ROC of
0.981) and was able to predict 46.6% of holdings which would go on to become IPs,
this represents an improvement on the model of Tildesley et al. (2006) whose figure
was 15% of IPs correctly identified (Tildesley et al., 2008).
The principal risk factor for FMD infection was the distance to the nearest of
the 78 seeds infected before the imposition of the NMB. This variable describes the
locations of holdings in relation to the distribution of the FMD virus at the beginning
of the epidemic. Previous studies (Pfeiffer et al., 2007) have dealt with the location
of a virus introduction for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) by including
region into the model where the virus can be seen to be clustered in certain region(s).
This paper develops this by treating disease spread as a set of point sources.
Analysing solely species on the holding and holding area also produces a strong
predictive model, because it was larger holdings with cattle (and greater risk if sheep
were also present) which became infected. Animal numbers in the locality represent
the infection challenge to the susceptible holding and are significant predictors, cattle
numbers more so than sheep numbers. Densities were calculated by applying a kernel
to the farming landscape and a range of kernel shapes and sizes were evaluated. An
exponential kernel with a bandwidth of 15km performed slightly better than either
a quartic or flat kernel (Figure 4.3). Examination of Figure 4.3 shows that the
exponential kernel had not reached its minimum by 15km. Whilst the shape of the
plots for the quartic and flat kernels are similar, the shape of the exponential kernel is
very different with a much greater range of AIC values, this is shown by the minimum
of the quartic and flat kernels which was at 5km whilst the exponential kernel is at
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15km. The shapes of these kernels are shown in Figure 4.10. The area in the 2 or 3km
immediately surrounding the IP are very important for determining the transmission
challenge and hence exponential kernels at smaller bandwidths which ignore this area
have poor predictive power. Additionally, the area beyond the immediate 2 or 3km
has some influence on susceptibility, underlining the importance of a ‘sea’ of livestock
when determining risk of FMD infection. Hence capturing this area is necessary, and
the exponential kernel outperforms the other shapes in this respect.
Figure 4.10: Comparisons of the shapes of the quartic and exponential kernels at 6
and 15km respectively, the values for bandwidth at which they returned the minimum
AIC value.
Both cattle and sheep densities were significant predictors, although cattle den-
sities are more important (F1,125,223=710 and F1,125,223=368 for cattle and sheep
respectively), probably as a result of the quantity of virus excreted by cattle (Don-
aldson et al., 2001). There is little correlation between cattle and sheep densities
(r=0.084) because at the high end of the distribution of cattle numbers sheep num-
bers are lower, simply because in areas of intense cattle production there is little room
for extensive sheep production. Areas of high cattle density were generally close to a
seed and it was areas close to a seed with a lot of cattle which were at greatest risk.
In a multivariate model, species presence on the holding and animal densities
gives significant predictive power over just distance to seed. Due to the different
transformations applied to the variables in Table 4.8 direct comparison of the effects
of variables using odds ratios is difficult. However, analysis of the z-scores shows that
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distance to seed is the most important predictor, cattle densities are a stronger risk
factor than sheep densities. This again suggests that cattle are major driving forces
of the epidemic probably as a result of their greater susceptibility and potential to
transmit the virus (Donaldson et al., 2001).
There is a strong country level effect with being in Wales or Scotland apparently
being protective relative to England. The protective effect of being in Scotland is
only a factor once the larger (area) farm holdings in its FMD regions have been taken
into account. The high number of large farms in these regions should result in higher
predicted risk, however this was not the case and hence there is a large country level
effect for Scotland and interaction with farm area. Furthermore the nature of farming
in the FMD regions in Scotland is very different to farming throughout the rest of
the country, where holdings tend to cover large areas and are sparsely populated,
unlike the high intensity holdings in the South West. Some of the protective effect of
being in Wales may be explained by discrepancies between census animal numbers
and those recorded in the FMD data (Chapter 3) with sheep numbers apparently
greatly over reported in the census. There were also differences in animal densities
observed at the country level, in England IPs are characterised by higher cattle and
sheep densities, in Wales by higher cattle densities and in Scotland there are no
differences between IPs and non-IPs. This may reflect the degree to which the virus
was seeded in the respective countries and therefore the nature of the FMD regions. In
England the virus was spread widely through the country including to regions such as
Leicestershire, Essex and Kent where there is little livestock production. However, in
Scotland and Wales the virus was only seeded in major livestock production regions.
As a result of the inherently spatially autocorrelated nature of the FMD epidemic
there was significant spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of the initial GLM. This
was corrected by inserting a random effect in the form of a hexagonal lattice. Simi-
lar approaches have been adopted in previous studies (Pfeiffer et al., 2007), however
rather than use political boundaries this study used arbitrary even sized spatial units.
The addition of the random effect did not make a significant difference to the esti-
mates of the risk factors. However, for the predictors which are spatially dependant
the addition of the random effect did increase the standard errors of the predictors,
129
this would be the equivalent of reducing the degrees of freedom.
The model is contingent upon the control policies which were implemented. Farms
which were culled as non-IPs may have been sub-clinically infected and therefore the
spatial and temporal pattern of culling will have influenced the pattern of disease
spread. Phase 1 of the epidemic was a period during which non-IP culling was low
and was implemented in a relatively uniform manner. An accurate model was param-
eterized to predict the probability of being an IP during phase 1. This model differed
from the main effects model in three ways, namely that the protective effect of being
in Wales was reduced and the risk associated with sheep densities was also reduced
probably in response to the drop in risk in North Wales (Figure 4.7). Furthermore,
as the IPs during this period were tightly clustered around seeds the ‘distance to
seed’ protective effect is greater.
The same model framework can also be parameterised to predict holdings which
were culled, not just IPs. In the model in question (Table 4.8) sheep (both presence
and densities) are a greater risk factor than cattle reflecting the greater numbers of
sheep culled on non-IPs relative to cattle. This is as a result of the tendency for
smaller sheep holdings to be culled out pre-emptively and also the use of culling of
sheep (particularly 3km culls) as a means to reduce the density of the susceptible pop-
ulation in areas of high animal densities. Importantly the ability to develop a single
model which can predict both IP and non-IP culls with some accuracy demonstrates
that targeting of non-IP culls was effective by targeting those which were more likely
to become infected which were being culled. Furthermore if laboratory positive only
holdings are considered the model develops better predictive power as a result of the
tendency for laboratory positive holdings to be large cattle holdings (McLaws et al.,
2006), rather than sheep holdings which were more likely to be misidentified due to
mild clinical signs in sheep.
The model was found to be robust to sensitivity to the input data by performing
analysis using the fragment data (Table 4.14, which as discussed in Chapter 3 is not
a complete inventory of all farms in the UK. In spite of the modelled nature and
the fact that a lot of smaller farms were included in the analysis. This still only
reduced the area under the ROC by 0.035, so this methodology is not dependant
130
upon the use of agricultural census data and the larger farms this data represents.
A highly accurate predictive model of the risk factors for holdings becoming IPs
has been developed. The distance to an infectious seed was the principal predictor.
After distance is taken into account, animal densities, in particular high stocking
densities are important predictor variables. Larger cattle farms are also important.
This model is robust to sensitivities in the data and potential autocorrelations in
predictor variables. Furthermore it is a model which could be developed further to
generate a measure of risk in different epidemic situations.
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Chapter 5
Risk factors for local
transmission
5.1 Introduction
Epidemiological studies frequently focus on factors which predispose members of the
susceptible population to potentially contract an infectious disease if exposed (French
et al., 1996; Halliday et al., 2006; Odiit et al., 2006, Chapter 4). However, equally
valuable would be an understanding of the members of the population most likely
to transmit infection. However, only a few studies have investigated individual farm
level risk factors for transmitting infection once an individual has become infected.
Such analyses have been applied to E.coli super shedders (Matthews et al., 2006;
Chase-Topping et al., 2007) and HIV transmission networks (Latora et al., 2006).
Although studies have attempted to look for important nodes in FMD transmission
networks (Haydon et al., 2003), no studies have attempted to charachterise these
farms.
This chapter will develop a model of risk of transmitting infection rather than
acquiring infection. The study population is the subset of those farms which had
FMD and were therefore capable of transmitting infection. In this respect this model
is complementary to the susceptibility model (Chapter 4); together they provide





The IPs were the 1948 IPs estimated to have been infected after the NMB. For the 37
IPs for which there was no estimated date of infection the estimated date of infection
was taken as the reporting date minus 10 days as has been done previously (Savill
et al., 2006) and described in Chapter 2. Animal numbers on the IPs were taken as
the numbers slaughtered. Data on whether the IP was a dairy holding was taken
from the farm list data (Chapter 3).
Non-IP data
Data for non-IPs was taken from the June 2000 agricultural census (Chapter 3), all
holdings with cattle or sheep recorded were included.
5.2.2 Variables
Dependent variables
The ideal dependent variable would comprise:
1. Cases (hereafter referred to as infectors): IPs that have infected another hold-
ing.
2. Controls (non-infectors): IPs that have not infected another holding.
Such a variable requires a complete epidemic tree, this is because data on which farm
infected other farms is required to generate the data on infectors. To generate the
non-infectors, data on which farms did not infect other farms is required, therefore the
epidemic tree is still needed. Data for infectors can be derived from the transmission
tracing data (Chapter 2). However, the tracing data is only partially complete and,
as a consequence, non-infectors can not be reliably identified.
For the purpose of these analyses the source of infection for a holding will be
taken as the nearest possible source. A daughter IP (the secondary IP resulting
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from an infector (the parent)) must be estimated to have been infected within the
temporal infectious window of a source IP (Chapter 2). Euclidean distance is the
strongest determinant of local FMD transmission (Chapter 4, Keeling et al. (2001));
52% of sources of infections identified by the tracing data was the nearest possible
source (Chapter 2). This method of nearest neighbour method matching is one of the
methods employed by Haydon et al. (2003) to construct epidemic trees (Chapter 1).
This methodology ensures that all IPs are assigned a parent IP. Further selection
removes all infection events over distances greater than 3km. This is to ensure that
only local transmission is analysed. This selection process gives rise to an epidemic
tree with a number of disconnected branches (Figure 5.1). Local spread is analysed
because as described previously (Chapter 2) the infection processes operating locally
and at larger scales may be very different.
Figure 5.1: An example of an epidemic tree created using the source selection process.
The y-axis represents the spatial component to the selection process and the x-axis
the temporal component. Red points represent IPs which have generated subsequent
IPs (infectors) and black points IPs which have not (non-infectors). Black lines are
routes of infection over distances shorter than 3km and grey lines are the infectious
period of the IPs.
As a result of this methodology the model is not strictly a model of FMD trans-
mission, rather it is a model of the likelihood of a subsequent IP occurring within
3km of an IP. However, this is not a fundamental problem because in the event of
a future epidemic being able to predict which IPs are most likely to trigger further
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IPs is of less value than simply identifying the likelihood of there being an IP in the
locality. This is because when targeting resources, the source of a case is of little
importance, rather, authorities need to know where that case is likely to be, and this
model could be used to derive putative case reproduction values. In this respect the
analyses in this chapter are building upon the model of susceptibility (Chapter 4),
which is looking at static start of epidemic risk of infection. Rather than a static
measure, this chapter will build a generation by generation model of infection risk.
Confounders
The daughter IP must fall within the infectious window of the parent IP, therefore the
longer the infectious window of the parent IP the greater the probability of finding
a daughter IP. To allow for this the duration of the infectious period was included
in these analyses as a covariate. Infectious period may also be a determinant of
transmission, however it is not possible to identify whether any effect this predictor
has is a result of the effect of infectious period on transmission or its influence on
how the outcome was derived.
Predictor variables
The predictor variables fall into three broad categories: control effort factors, holding
factors and locality factors. The control effort can be modelled as a three level factor
corresponding to the three stages in the culling strategy (Chapter 2), the stages are
as follows:
1. Phase 1: IP and DC culling. 23rd February to 26th March
2. Phase 2: Full CP and extended culling. 26th March to 29th April.
3. Phase 3: Reduced CP culling. 29th April onwards.
Holding level factors comprise:
1. The laboratory result of the IP. Three levels: positive, not tested and negative,
with positive the reference level (Chapter 2).
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2. The DCC of the IP (Chapter 2). Due to the large number of DCCs many of
which have relatively few IPs (Chapter 2) only those with more than 100 IPs
will be used in these analysis. The remainder will be grouped into a Rest of the
UK category. This creates a six level factor: Carlisle, Ayr, Exeter, Newcastle,
Leeds and Rest GB, with the Rest GB the reference level.
3. The distance to a seed IP (see Chapter 4).
4. Species on the holding. Three level factor: whether a farm is mixed cattle and
sheep, cattle only and sheep only. Mixed is the reference level. Numbers of
animals cannot be used due to the high number of IPs with either no cattle
(319, 16.3%) or no sheep (295, 15.2%).
5. Whether there are identified satellite holdings (Chapter 3) linked to the IP.
6. Whether the holding is listed on the June 2000 agricultural census. This is
because not all IPs were identified on the agricultural census (Chapter 3) and
there may be differences between those which were on the census and those
which were not.
Factors which relate to the locality of the holding are the density of animals of
each species and the density of susceptible holdings in the vicinity of each IP which
were still standing when the IP was slaughtered. The ‘vicinity’ was defined in two
ways:
1. 3km of the IP. All holdings within a 3km ring of the IP are weighted equally.
This method describes the locality of the IP as defined by the epidemic protec-
tion zone and gives a measure of the nature of farming in the area into which
infection can be transmitted according to the outcome variable. The total num-
ber of sheep, cattle and susceptible premises within 3km is divided by π × 32
to give a measure of number of animals per km2.
2. Voronoi polygons around the IP. Voronoi polygons assign all land to the
nearest holdings. The effect of overlaying 3km rings onto this is described by
Figure 5.2. The 3km ring and Voronoi polygons were intersected to form aerial
units in which the boundary was either the 3km ring or the polygon vertex.
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The polygon vertex was used if it was less than 3km away and the 3km ring
otherwise. This was implemented using Arc Macro Language (AML) script in
ESRI ArcInfo v9.0. For each day of the epidemic, the script generates Voronoi
polygons around all IPs infected on that day. For all IPs which were estimated
to have been infected on that day 3km buffers are generated. These are clipped
using the Voronoi polygons and the remaining area is the area of influence.
This ensures that each farm is only counted once in the predictor variables and
thus ensures independence by having no overlapping 3km rings.
Figure 5.2: An example map of the distribution of IPs in an area of Cumbria in
relation to polygons defining their area. Polygons represent Voronoi polygons con-
structed for each IP (black points) and circles represent 3km rings around each IP.
The principal method of describing the locality will be the 3km ring as this is
simpler and more intuitive. However the overlap of rings is a concern regarding
independence as farms can be counted several times. As a result, the results of the
Voronoi polygon analysis will be compared to results of modeling using the 3km rings.
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5.2.3 Statistical analyses
The transmission risk model will be developed by analysing the outcome variable
against the predictors in a logistic regression framework. The methodology will follow
that employed in section 4.2.3 with univariate analysis, construction of the main
effects model and finally incorporating interactions whilst checking linearity in the
logits. Model fit will be assessed using the area under the ROC curve (section 4.2.3).
To test the validity of the outcome variable the epidemic tree constructed in
these analyses will be compared to the tracing data to analyse differences between
the datasets. Sensitivity analyses using the tracing data are complicated because the
tracing data does not match all IPs to a source and could result in a model of the
probability of having a source identified rather than risk of transmission as such. To
overcome this, only infectors in the form of IPs with a daughter IP within 3km will
be identified using the tracing data. Therefore, a second outcome will be defined in
which non-infectors will be holdings for which both the tracing and nearest neighbour
methodology record no daughter within 3km. The infectors will be those for which
both methods identify a daughter in 3km. This outcome variable will be used for
sensitivity analysis.
Model sensitivities to the source data and to the different areal units for animal
densities and laboratory confirmation of IPs will be checked using odds ratios for
the predictors. The sensitivity analysis looks for a statistically significant shift in
the odds ratios, therefore a term in 2 models is significantly different if the 95%
confidence intervals of the odds ratios do not overlap.
Potential spatial autocorrelation between predictors will be tested by running a
model which includes a term which is whether there is another infector within 3km.
Comparing the odds ratios for a model including these predictors will allow for an
assessment of spatial autocorrelation in the locations of infectors versus non-infectors.
Modelled values will be generated for each data point using the predict function
in R and plotted over the time course of the epidemic. This generates a likelihood
of being an infector for each data point. Plotting modelled values for each data
point against date of infection would be difficult to interpret because there are many
data points for most days. To overcome this, the supersmooth function in R (R
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Development Core Team, 2004) is used to interpolate between the points and create
a line which summarises the data points. Continuous predictor variables can be
overlayed by taking the value for each data point as a proportion of the maximum
value for that variable, and smoothing the data to create a line. Discrete variables
must be handled as binary variables in which positives are treated as 1s and negatives
as 0s and the data smoothed using those variables.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Outcome variable
There were 867 (44.5%) of the 1948 IPs estimated to have been infected after the
NMB which were the nearest possible sources of infection for another IP within 3km
(infectors). A source within 3km was identified for 1255 of the 1948 IPs. For the
remaining 693 IPs the nearest possible source was more than 3km away. The majority
(603, 69.6%) of holdings with daughter IPs have only one daughter (Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.3: Frequency plot of the numbers of daughter IPs for each putative source
infected after the NMB.
The peak and trough in numbers of infectors (IPs with near IPs) occurred earlier
in the epidemic than for non-infectors (Figure 5.4); this is statistically significant
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov D = 0.143, p<0.001). This is because the outcome is whether
there is a subsequent generation and therefore the epidemic curve for non-infectors
will inevitably be at least one generation after that of infectors.
Cumbria (represented by the Carlisle DCC) contains the greatest proportion of
infectors (Table 5.1). There are statistically significant differences between all DCCs
(χ25=31.1, p<0.001) with Cumbria being statistically significantly different when com-
pared to all other regions of GB (χ21=26.4, p<0.001) as well as when compared to the
other major DCCs (ie excluding the Rest of the GB category) (χ21=13.5, p<0.001).
However, comparisons between the Rest of the GB and DCCs excluding Cumbria
reveals no statistically significant difference (χ21=3.35, p=0.067).
The methodology used in this study identified a source of infection for 1,255 IPs.
The corresponding number identified using the tracing data (chapter 2) was 953, of
which 567 were infected over less than 3km. There were 192 instances of the nearest
neighbour source being the same as the tracing source (Table 5.2), in a further 304
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Figure 5.4: Epidemic timeline of the numbers of IPs per day (grey bars). Overlayed
onto this are supersmoothed lines of numbers of infectors (red line) and non-infectors
(black line). Dashed vertical lines are the cut-offs between epidemic phases.
DCC non-Infector Infector % Infector (95% CIs)
Carlisle 427 451 51.4 (48.1,54.7)
Rest GB 269 154 36.4 (32.0,41.1)
Newcastle 105 73 41.0 (38.0,48.4)
Ayr 93 75 44.6 (37.3,52.2)
Exeter 100 62 38.3 (31.1,45.9)
Leeds 79 60 43.2 (35.2,51.5)
Table 5.1: The number of infectors and non-infectors by DCC. The percentage column
is the percentage of IPs which were infectors within each DCC.
instances the tracing data and nearest neighbour data both identified a source within
3km but identified a different source. In 228 instances the tracing data recorded a
source greater than 3km away and in 75 of these instances the nearest neighbour data
matched to a source within 3km. There were 71 instances of the tracing data matching
to a source within 3km where the nearest neighbour data did not find a source. This
is because when the tracing data was being cleaned (Chapter 2) confidence intervals
were placed on dates of infection. This was not done when identifying sources in
this chapter because in this analysis, sources were to be identified with certainty and
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therefore margins to allow for uncertainty were not included.
Near source YN Tracing source YN Tracing distance Agreement Count
Y Y <3km Match 192
Y Y <3km No match 304
Y N NA No match 683
Y Y >3km No match 75
N Y <3km No match 71
N Y >3km No match 153
N N NA No match 469
Table 5.2: Whether an IP had a source identified by the nearest neighbour method
used in this chapter (near source), whether it had a source identified in the tracing
data (tracing source) and whether the tracing and nearest neighbour sources match
(agreement).
The statistic that is important when comparing the tracing data to these nearest
neighbour methods is the percentage agreement between the outcome as defined using
nearest neighbour method and the outcome as defined by the tracing data. This is
defined as all IPs which are the identified source of another IP within 3km. A total
of 454 IPs were sources of IPs within 3km according to the tracing data, of these
357 (78.6%, 95% CIs = 74.6,82.2) were also identified as infectors by the nearest
neighbour method (Table 5.3). The row percentage column in Table 5.3 shows that
a significantly greater percentage of the tracing identified sources were also sources
by nearest neighbour matching than those which were not.
Tracing data





infector 357 510 41.2 (37.9,44.5)
non-infector 97 982 9.0 (7.4,10.8)
Total 454 1492
Table 5.3: Accuracy of identification of the outcome variable by comparing the nearest
neighbour data to the tracing data. The percentage column is the source column as
a percentage of the row total.
5.3.2 Univariate analysis
5.3.3 Infection factors
The results of univariate analysis of the predictor variables are shown in Table 5.4.
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Predictor Unit non-inf inf (%) OR (95% CIs) z value p
Infectious
Period
log10 Days NA NA 17.9(6.91,46.5) 5.931 < 0.001
Phase
1 428 467(52.2) 1 - -
2 385 201(34.3) 0.51(0.41,0.63) −6.120 < 0.001
3 260 207(44.3) 0.72(0.58,0.91) −2.815 0.005
DCC
Rest GB 269 154(36.4) 1 - -
Carlisle 427 451(51.4) 1.89(1.49,2.40) 5.216 < 0.001
Newcastle 105 73(41.0) 1.26(0.88,1.80) 1.244 0.214
Ayr 93 75(44.6) 1.49(1.04,2.15) 2.159 0.031
Exeter 100 62(38.3) 1.06 (0.73,1.55) 0.317 0.751
Leeds 79 60(43.2) 1.33 (0.90,1.97) 1.438 0.150
dist to Seed
√
km NA NA 0.92 (0.87,0.98) −2.772 0.006
Lab Result
Positive 648 612(48.6) 1 - -
No result 171 129(43.0) 0.77 (0.60,0.99) −2.011 0.044
Negative 257 131(33.8) 0.53 (0.41,0.67) −5.274 < 0.001
Species
Mixed 711 621(46.6) 1 - -
Cattle 172 123(41.7) 0.82 (0.63,1.06) −1.535 0.125
Sheep 196 123(38.6) 0.72 (0.56,0.92) −2.593 0.010
Satellites
N 393 296(43.0) 1 - -
Y 683 576(45.8) 0.93 (0.77,1.12) −0.813 0.416
Susceptible
density
holds/km2 NA NA 1.64 (1.36,1.98) 5.183 < 0.001
Cattle den-
sity
head/km2 NA NA 1.19 (1.15,1.23) 9.546 < 0.001
Sheep den-
sity
head/km2 NA NA 1.02 (1.01,1.04) 3.226 0.001
Table 5.4: Univariate logistic regression analysis of all predictors. For categorical-
scale factors the numbers of infectors and non-infectors which fall into each factor
level are given by the non-inf and inf columns.
Infectors had significantly longer infectious periods than non-infectors (Table 5.4,
Figure 5.5). However the magnitude of the difference is relatively small, the difference
between infectors and non-infectors was 0.7 days when the mean values are compared,
and 1 day if the median values are compared (Figure 5.5). A log10 scale was applied
to this variable to ensure linearity in the logits and this is reflected in the per unit
odds ratios.
Analysis of the three epidemic phases shows that the second and third phases of
the epidemic contained statistically significantly fewer infectors compared to the first
phase (Table 5.4), as well as statistically significant differences between the first and
third phase although the magnitude of this effect is not as strong. There are also
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Figure 5.5: Boxplot of infectious period against outcome, plotted on a log10 scale.
The widths of the boxes represent the proportion of the data in that group. One
infector with a value of 70 has been left off this plot.
statistically significantly more infectors in phase 3 compared to phase 2 (OR = 1.52,
95% CIs = 1.19, 1.96).
For DCCs Carlisle and Ayr were significantly different to the Rest of GB category
and were at higher risk (Table 5.4). The remaining DCCs were not statistically
significantly different. Post-hoc analysis was carried out by merging the Rest of GB
category with the non-significant DCCs. The Ayr DCC was no longer statistically
significantly different (p>0.2), however Cumbria remained statistically significant
(OR=1.62, 95% CIs = 1.35,1.94, p<0.001).
IPs which were either negative or recorded no result for FMD in the laboratory
were statistically significantly less likely to be an infector than those which were
positive (Table 5.4). However the magnitude of the effect is much greater between
positive and negative than between the positive and no result groups. Furthermore
the no result and negative groups were statistically significantly different (p=0.017)
in terms of the outcome.
The distance to an initially infected seed was statistically significantly less for
infectors than non-infectors (Table 5.4). Infectors are on averaged 1.5km closer to a
seed than non-infectors (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6: Boxplot of distance to an infectious seed against the outcome. The y-axis
is square root transformed.
Sheep-only holdings are at significantly lower risk than mixed holdings (The
species variable in Table 5.4). When animal numbers are analysed there were statis-
tically significant differences when cattle numbers were analysed on those holdings
which contain cattle (p=0.004) in a positive direction (OR=1.35, 95% CIs=1.12,1.64),
although there were no significant differences for sheep (p>0.05) (Figure 5.7). This
becomes evident when comparing holdings above and below the population mean
(Table 5.4).
Total numbers of cattle within 3km are also statistically significantly higher on
infectors compared to non-infectors (Table 5.4, Figure 5.8). There was also a sig-
nificant difference when sheep are analysed, albeit the strength of the effect is of a




Figure 5.7: Boxplots of Cattle and sheep numbers by outcome. Data points are
holdings which have cattle or sheep respectively. Widths of boxes represent the




Figure 5.8: Boxplots of total cattle and sheep densities against the outcome. Widths




The results of multivariate analysis of the predictors entered as single terms are shown
in Table 5.5. Cattle densities, IPs in Cumbria (the Carlisle DCC) and the length of
the infectious period were highly significant (p<0.001). Further post-hoc analysis was
carried out by merging the non-significant DCCs with the Rest of GB category. This
resulted in the Newcastle DCC becoming non-significant. Furthermore there was a
statistically significant difference between epidemic phase 1 and 2, but not between 1
and 3. Laboratory negative IPs remain highly significantly different from laboratory
positive IPs, whilst those not tested were not significantly different in terms of the
outcome.
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value p
Intercept NA −8.561 < 0.001
Infectious Period log10Days 41.40(13.96,122.78) 6.712 < 0.001
Phase
1 1 - -
2 0.71(0.55,0.91) −2.733 0.006
3 1.13(0.83,1.55) 0.769 0.442
DCC
Rest GB 1 - -
Carlisle 1.95(1.43,2.65) 4.223 < 0.001
Newcastle 1.51(1.01,2.25) 2.030 0.042
Ayr 1.37(0.86,2.18) 1.33 0.185
Exeter 0.95 (0.64,1.42) −0.227 0.820
Leeds 1.50 (0.94,2.39) 1.711 0.087
dist to Seed
√
km 0.96 (0.88,1.04) −1.076 0.282
Lab Result
Positive 1 - -
No result 0.77 (0.58,1.02) −1.831 0.067
Negative 0.57 (0.43,0.74) −4.074 < 0.001
Species
Mixed 1 - -
Cattle 0.94 (0.71,1.24) −0.432 0.665
Sheep 1.00 (0.75,1.33) 0.005 0.996
Satellites
N 1 - -
Y 0.95 (0.78,1.16) −0.494 0.621
Susceptible density holdings/km2 1.12 (0.80,1.58) 0.673 0.500
Cattle density head/km2 1.18 (1.11,1.24) 5.642 < 0.001
Sheep density head/km2 1.01 (0.99,1.03) 1.213 0.225
Table 5.5: The main effects model derived using logistic regression analysis.
Biologically plausible interactions between the variables in Table 5.5 were tested
and the resulting model is shown by Table 5.6. The area under the ROC curve for the
main effects model is 0.692 and the AIC is 2478.8, whilst the values for the model with
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interactions are 0.705 and 2457 respectively suggesting that the interaction model is
a better fit.
Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value P Fig
Intercept NA −9.252 <0.001
Infectious Period log10Days 44.77(14.94,134.2) 6.788 < 0.001 1
Phase
1 1 - -
2 0.47(0.34,0.65) −4.499 < 0.001 2
3 0.95(0.67,1.33) −0.325 0.745 3
Cumbria
No 1 0 0
Yes 1.16(0.84,1.59) 0.910 0.363 4
Species
Mixed 1 0 0
Cattle 0.57(0.19,1.68) −0.611 0.541 5
Sheep 5.30(2.37,1.19) 4.061 < 0.001 6
Lab Result
Positive 1 0 0
Unknown 0.82(0.43,1.56) −0.611 0.541 7
Negative 1.18(0.62,2.26) 0.505 0.614 8
Cattle density head/km2 1.23(1.17,1.30) 8.320 < 0.001 9
Sheep density head/km2 1.03(1.01,1.05) 2.776 0.006 10
Phase × Cumbria
1 × Cumbria 1 0 0
2×Cumbria 2.20(1.37,3.53) 3.252 0.001 11
3×Cumbria 1.49(0.91,2.44) 1.565 0.118 12
Cumbria ×
Species
Cumbria ×Mixed 1 0 0
Cumbria × Cattle 1.85(1.06,3.21) 2.164 0.030 13








1.02(0.91,1.14) 0.352 0.725 15
Sheep ×
head/km2








0.99(0.95,1.03) −0.426 0.670 17
Negative ×
head/km2
0.95(0.91,0.99) −2.610 0.009 18
Table 5.6: Full multivariate logistic regression model of holding level FMD trans-
mission. The Fig column corresponds to the axis labels in Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11.
There were no significant differences between phases 1 and 3, however the effect
variable was maintained as a three level factor as phases 1 and 3 are not coincident.
Merging the untested and positive levels of the laboratory result category resulted in
an increase in AIC, therefore laboratory result was maintained as a three level factor.
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Figure 5.9: Plots of the odds ratios and 95% CIs for the predictors described in
Table 5.6 (black lines) and for the model with just laboratory positive holdings (red
lines). Variable numbers on the y-axis correspond to numbers in the Fig column in
Table 5.7. Terms relating to laboratory result (variables 7,8,17 and 18) have no red
lines because they were not in the model. The x-axis is log10 transformed.
There were four interactions identified in the model in Table 5.6:
1. Phase 2×Cumbria (OR=2.20): There was lower transmission during phase 2,
however, during phase 2 transmission underwent less of a decline in Cumbria
compared to to other DCCs.
2. Cumbria×Species (Cattle) (OR=1.85): Cattle holdings are at elevated risk of
transmitting infection in Cumbria relative to other DCCs.
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3. Species (sheep)×Cattle density (OR=0.83): Infectors are in areas of higher
cattle numbers than non-infectors when there are cattle on the farm. However,
infectors and non-infectors with sheep are in areas of similar cattle numbers.
4. Laboratory result (negative)×sheep density (OR=0.95): When the result is
either positive or not tested, infectors tend to be in areas of higher sheep num-
bers than non-infectors. Laboratory negative holdings however, are in areas of
equally low sheep numbers for both infectors and non-infectors.
Further analysis was conducted by rerunning the model without the laboratory
negative predictor and analysing only the subset of the IPs which were not laboratory
negative. This model had an area under the ROC curve of 0.683 and the risk factors
in this model were not statistically different from the full model. This is shown in
Figure 5.9 where there is no major shift in any odds ratio as a result of the exclusion
of non-positive IPs, however phase 2 has a greater protective effect.
The source selection was checked by rerunning the model with only those cases and
controls whose designations agreed with designations made using DCS and VLA the
tracing data, this data comprised 324 infectors and 961 non-infectors. The results of
these analyses are presented in Table 5.7, the odds ratios from these analyses overlap
the odds ratios from the full model (Figure 5.10) showing that there is no significant
difference between the predictors from the two models.
The use of 3km rings for calculating animal densities compared to the Voronoi
polygons (section 5.2.2) resulted in no significant change in the odds ratios and the
widths of the credible intervals for the predictors remained the same. This shows
that the model is insensitive to the area used to calculate animal numbers.
Spatial autocorrelations were tested by comparing the full model in Table 5.6
against a model with the presence of IPs within 3km entered as the first term (sec-
tion 5.2.3). The model with the spatial term was not significantly different either in
terms of the widths of the credible intervals, also there was no shift in the odds ratios
(Figure 5.11).
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Predictor Unit OR (95% CIs) z value P Fig
Intercept NA −7.627 <0.001
Infectious Period log10Days 22.33(5.66,88.10) 4.436 < 0.001 1
Phase
1 1 - -
2 0.78(0.52,1.16) −1.245 0.213 2
3 1.39(0.91,2.11) 1.519 0.129 3
Cumbria
No 1 0 0
Yes 1.34(0.90,1.98) 1.442 0.149 4
Species
Mixed 1 0 0
Cattle 0.63(0.17,2.40) −0.678 0.498 5
Sheep 3.82(1.34,10.9) 2.507 0.012 6
Lab Result
Positive 1 0 0
Unknown 1.15(0.52,2.53) 0.347 0.729 7
Negative 1.36(0.61,3.03) 0.747 0.455 8
Cattle density head/km2 1.21(1.15,1.29) 6.489 < 0.001 9
Sheep density head/km2 1.05(1.02,1.07) 3.891 0.006 10
Phase × Cumbria
1 × Cumbria 1 0 0
2 × Cumbria 1.50(0.85,2.66) 1.396 0.163 11
3 × Cumbria 0.85(0.46,1.58) −0.508 0.612 12
Cumbria ×
Species
Cumbria ×Mixed 1 0 0
Cumbria × Cattle 1.34(0.67,2.66) 0.822 0.411 13








1.03(0.89,1.18) 0.367 0.714 15
Sheep ×
head/km2








0.98(0.93,1.03) −0.801 0.423 17
Negative ×
head/km2
0.94(0.90,0.99) −2.516 0.012 18
Table 5.7: Full multivariate logistic regression model using only infectors and non-
infectors where the tracing data agrees with the nearest neighbour identification. The
Fig column corresponds to the values in the y-axis of Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Plots of odds ratios and 95% CIs for the predictors described in the
model parameterised with tracing data (Table 5.7, red lines) against the full model
(Table 5.6, black lines). Variable numbers on the y-axis correspond to numbers in
the Fig column in Table 5.7. The x-axis is log10 transformed.
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Figure 5.11: Plots of odds ratios and 95% CIs for the predictors described in Table 5.6
(black lines) and a model with the spatial dependency term added (red lines). Vari-
able numbers on the y-axis correspond to numbers in the Fig column in Table 5.6.
The x-axis is log10 transformed.
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5.4 Discussion
A novel statistical model of FMD transmission has been constructed. The model
does not describe true transmission because the true pattern of transmission is un-
known, and more importantly the farms which did not infect others are not known
with certainty. Instead of using incomplete tracing data the source of infection for
each IP was taken to be the nearest possible source IP. As a result it is a model of
finding next generation IPs in the vicinity of an IP rather than modeling transmis-
sion explicitly. The distance between source and potential daughter was capped at
3km to ensure that only local spread was analysed. Some cap was required because
the mechanisms behind local and longer range spread are likely to be very different.
Long range transmission is likely to be determined by the efficiency of biosecurity
measures, as virus transport over distances greatest than 3km in the absence of ef-
fective wind-borne carriage must involve some human element, either on personnel,
on vehicles, through movements of animals (legal or illegal) or via fomites (National
Audit Office, 2002). Many such mechanisms of spread can be stopped with stringent
biosecurity, through the disinfection of people and machinery and minimising non-
essential services coming onto farm holdings. The mechanisms of local spread are
not so clear; it may be the result of various mechanisms which are harder to control
through biosecurity such as third party vehicles passing between holdings as well as
short range wind-borne (‘over the fence’) spread, wind-borne fomites and escaped
animals (National Audit Office, 2002). Therefore as local spread is the more difficult
to control it is this which should be understood in order to manage future FMD
epidemics.
Using this methodology 1255 IPs were assigned to 875 sources, the remaining 693
IPs did not have a candidate source within 3km. Of the 454 IPs for which there
was both a source as defined in this chapter and a source identified by tracing within
3km, the sources agreed in 192 instances (38.7%, Table 5.2), but the assigned outcome
agreed in 357 (78%) instances (Table 5.3). This is the statistic of importance as this
is being tested in this analysis. The risk factors of the logistic regression model
parameterised with these data were not significantly different from the full model
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(Figure 5.10). Other methods have been used to reconstruct epidemic trees, the gold
standard is that of sequencing virus samples (Cottam et al., 2006). However, this
technique has only been applied to 22 IPs. Therefore it was necessary to derive a
new way of reconstructing the pattern of transmission.
Following a methodology involving univariate analysis and variable selection fol-
lowed by the building of a main effects model and the incorporation of interaction
terms a multivariate model with 7 main effects and four interaction terms was de-
veloped. The final model had an area under the ROC curve of greater than 0.7,
showing that this is an acceptable model fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Both in
univariate and multivariate modeling, IPs with cattle were a greater risk factor than
sheep only IPs. This was in terms of presence on the IP for which IPs with sheep were
significantly different from both cattle only and mixed IPs. Sheep presence was a risk
factor in the final multivariate model after the effect of sheep presence in relation to
cattle densities was accounted for as an interaction term.
Cattle density was also significantly more important in determining transmission
than sheep density, although both were significant (at the 99.9% level for cattle
and 95% for sheep). This is likely to reflect differences in susceptibility because the
number of animals in the locality are the animals at risk. In spite of the significance
of animal densities, the number of susceptible premises is not a significant risk factor
in multivariate analysis. The non-significance of the number of susceptible premises
further underlines the importance of the numbers of susceptible hosts, in particular
cattle rather than the number of at-risk premises (the true susceptible population for
the purposes of these analyses) in determining FMD spread.
The infectious period was a highly significant predictor, however this was a con-
founder variable because the process for selecting daughter IPs was dependent upon
the infectious period of the IP. Although it is unclear whether infectiousness changes
over time (Savill et al., 2007a) the daily virus production (and therefore its potential
to transmit infection) of a farm which is infectious for a long period may be less than
that of a farm which is infectious for shorter period and the total virus production
over the period may be similar. This is because less infectious farms are likely to
have fewer animals infected and may therefore take longer to detect disease on these
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farms.
Epidemic phase was a significant univariate predictor, both phases 2 and 3 were
significantly different from phase 1 with a protective effect. However, in multivari-
ate analyses phase 3 was not significantly different from phase 1, instead phase 2
is associated with a protective effect over phase 1 and 3. The significant protective
effect reflects the epidemic curve falling during phase 2 whilst the epidemic was in
decline and the case reproduction ratio (R) was less than 1 whilst phase 1 represents
a period in which R was greater than 1 and phase 3 a period in which R fluctuated
either side of 1. The significance of the protective effect of phase 2 may be associated
with culling being undertaken during that period, although no firm conclusions can
be drawn from these analyses. Another contributing factor may be the geography
of the 2001 epidemic. Phase 1 represents the beginning and expansion of the North
Cumbria, Devon and Dumfries and Galloway clusters. Phase 2 represents the de-
cline in the Devon and Dumfries and Galloway clusters and the slowing down of the
Cumbria cluster as it spread into Southern Cumbria and phase 3 the slower “rum-
bling” epidemics in South Cumbria, Settle and North East England. The slowing
down rather than dying out of the Cumbria epidemic as it moved south explains the
interaction between phase 2 and Cumbria.
Laboratory test-negative holdings were less likely to transmit infection, and hold-
ings which were not tested in the laboratory produced similar results to positive farms
in multivariate modeling, but were at significantly lower risk in univariate analysis.
Further validation of the model by analysing only those holdings which were not labo-
ratory test-negative produced a set of predictor variables which were not significantly
different from the full model. This further validates the outcome selection processes
by demonstrating that those holdings which could not transmit infection because the
virus was not present on the farm were at significantly lower risk of transmitting
infection than those which could.
The reason for Cumbria being a risk factor is less clear. The ‘being in Cumbria’
variable is a proxy for some biological or epidemiological process and could be a
proxy for many factors. The interactions with cattle infections shows that Cumbria
was more of an epidemic of cattle rather than sheep when compared to the rest of
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GB. The ‘Cumbria effect’ is explained by its interaction with phase 2 of the epidemic
when as noted above the epidemic continued in Cumbria whilst it declined in other
regions. However after taking account of the interactions with phase 2, the main
effect of being in Cumbria remains a risk factor and the reasons for this are unclear.
A novel approach has been developed to overcome the problem of uncertainties
in the transmission structure of this epidemic to develop a model of the likelihood
of infected farms to transmit infections to other farms in their locality. Distance
between holdings is the principal risk factor for FMD transmission (Chapter 4) and
is accounted for implicitly in the outcome by assigning the nearest neighbour as the
source. The model is robust to potential sensitivities, and the fit is reasonable, but
not excellent due to stochasticity in virus transmission and factors which could not
be modelled in this analysis such as contacts with other farm holdings. The model
further underlines the importance of cattle in this epidemic as well as the unusual
nature of the epidemic in Cumbria which shows a very different transmission pattern




determinants of local FMD
transmission
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 described the development of a model of the local and IP specific risk fac-
tors for disease transmission whilst Chapter 4 described the development of a model
of local and farm specific risk factors for FMD infection. These are models which
describe the likelihood of an individual farm transmitting or contracting infection but
do not incorporate dynamic processes to describe the likelihood of infection between
an infectious and susceptible premises pairs. This process is spatially dependant and
has been simplified to a transmission kernel for the purposes of mathematical mod-
elling (Keeling et al., 2001, 2003; Tildesley et al., 2006, Figure 6.1) and is based on
the tracing data described in Chapter 2. The kernel describes gradually declining
infection risk with distance to an infectious source.
The transmission kernel (Figure 6.1) assumes that the farming landscape can be
modelled as a homogenous surface and features of the landscape do not influence the
pattern of transmission. However it is possible that potential transmission routes
are influenced by geographic features such as roads which may act as conduits for
transmission, whilst rivers, railways and in a different way roads may act as barriers
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Figure 6.1: Transmission kernel showing the likelihood of a holding becoming infected
against the distance from an infectious source. Kernel derived from Tildesley et al.
(2006).
to transmission (Figure 6.2). The importance of geographical features as barriers to
epidemic progress has been previously demonstrated for a rabies epidemic in which
large rivers act as “semi-permeable barriers” to transmission causing a 7-fold reduc-
tion in the rate of spread of the epidemic (Smith et al., 2002). Understanding and
quantifying the roles of geographic features in the spread of FMD would add vital
information to our understanding of how FMD is transmitted between farms.
(a) Homogenous landscape (b) Influence of barriers
Figure 6.2: Diagram illustrating spatial dependency of transmission when a linear
feature does not influence the pattern of transmission (Plot 6.2(a)) and when the
feature reduces transmission by 50% (Plot 6.2(b)). The central point is the IP and
coloured bands represent bands of equal transmission risk.
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The roles of geographic features in the transmission of FMD have been partly
investigated by Savill et al. (2006) who compared road distance against Euclidean
distance as a measure of virus transmission. The authors did not use the tracing data
and calculated the road and Euclidean distance for each IP to every other IP within
a 10km radius and from each IP to every other uninfected susceptible holding within
10km. Comparing the distributions of road to Euclidean distances for the IP-IP
pairs against the IP-susceptible pairs they find no statistically significant difference
between the two groups. This is with the exception of instances in which the road
distance is inflated by the presence of a river estuary, where the barrier increases the
road distance between holdings. The analysis of Savill et al. (2006) suggests that
road distance is less valuable as a predictor of transmission than Euclidean distance
but does suggest that major river estuaries can influence virus transmission. However
this analysis was undertaken at a coarse scale in terms on the numbers of pairs of
farms which were included and the analysis does not make use of data on known
transmissions.
This study will carry out a finer scale study of barriers to transmission. A case-
control methodology has been developed which selects an IP (source) which has
infected a daughter IP (case) and has not infected one or more control farms to form
groups of farms. A single source-case pairing and a single control form a triplet. The
controls are matched to the source-case pairing such that the controls are a similar
distance to the source as the case and have a similar composition in terms of animal
numbers. Controlling for distance and numbers of animals is necessary to ensure that
susceptibility to FMD infection is similar on the control and the case. Intervening
geographic features between the source and case, and source and control can then be
evaluated. Therefore the aims of the chapter are:
1. To identify a workable set of cases and controls which have been matched on
distance to an infectious source and farm composition.
2. To compare animal numbers on sources, cases and controls when distance is
controlled for.
3. To identify potential barriers or conduits to transmission and measure these
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between the farms in the group.
4. To statistically analyse the relative importance and the direction of influence
of the barriers and conduits to transmission
6.2 Methodology
The data for this analysis consisted of groups of farms comprising an IP (the source)
which infected a second IP (case). The case is matched to one or more control farms
which share some similar characteristics to the case. The methodology must take
account of the spatial dependency of FMD transmission during the 2001 outbreak
and ensure that controls were selected which were a similar distance to the source as
the case and therefore were equally as exposed to infection as the case. To ensure
analysis of local spread the distance between source and case will be capped at 3km.
6.2.1 Case Selection
Transmission dynamics before and after the NMB were different (Chapter 2), there-
fore the 78 IPs which were infected before the NMB will not be included as animal
movements mean there are a greater range of infection routes between source and
case. Chapter 2 discussed the generation of reliable data on the source of infection
for 823 IPs. However, only 554 of these IPs were infected over distances of 3km or
less. The selection processes are summarized in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Flow diagram explaining the identification of groups. The red section
refers to the selection of IPs, the yellow section to the identification of controls and
the blue section to the identification of triplets. The orange diamonds and yellow
ovals relate to the number of candidate IPs and controls remaining at each stage of




The controls were livestock holdings taken from the 139,195 georeferenced holdings
on the June 2000 agricultural census (Chapter 3). As sheep and cattle were the main
agents in virus transmission in the outbreak only controls which held either sheep
and/or cattle were considered. Removing all pig-only holdings reduced the number
of holdings to 131,711. Chapter 3 identified livestock farms with field fragments for
which animal numbers could only be simulated and animal numbers on the main
holding were inflated. To prevent bias being introduced by lack of accurate data on
animal numbers on the main holding, these fragmented holdings were not included
in the control set (Figure 6.3), leaving 92,449 controls. As the controls are distance
matched, only those controls which were within 4km1 of an IP were used. The final
set of potential controls consisted of 13,320 holdings (Figure 6.3).
6.2.3 Identifying groups
If every one of the 554 source-case pairings could form a group with every one of
the 13,320 controls there would be 7,379,036 source-case-control units, but only 554
groups as there are still just 554 source-case pairs. However, as some of the potential
controls were culled as part of the disease control effort it is essential to ensure that
the selected controls were culled after the case and they were culled a sufficient
time after the case to ensure that there was no chance of the control harbouring a
subclinical infection originating from the source. Experimental laboratory infections
with the UK2001 FMD virus strain suggest that 14 days is the maximum estimate for
the period from infection to clinical symptoms in cattle and 10 days is the equivalent
value for sheep (Kitching, 2002; Kitching and Hughes, 2002). Therefore a rule was
applied stipulating that if the control was culled it must have been slaughtered at
least 14 days after the source was culled. Thus any incubating infection originating
from the source to become clinical and be identified when the holding was visited
for culling. This process reduced the number of triplets to 6.26 million, a 15.1%
reduction. In some instances the control is a farm which became an IP later in the
14km allowed some margin for control selection either side of the 3km cut off for distance from
source to case
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epidemic. In these instances it is essential to ensure that there is no possibility that
the IP was infected by the source. In such instances the estimated date of infection for
the control must be at least 14 days after the source was culled. The 14 day window
allows for difficulties in assessing the date of infection for IPs and thus minimises the
likelihood that the control was infected by the source.
Spatial dependence in FMD transmission was controlled by matching for Eu-
clidean distance. The distance from source to control (dn) needed to be similar to
that between source and case (dc), and therefore controls were selected if dn was
within a certain distance (dp) of dc. However, simply taking dc ± dp will introduce
bias as the area of dc + dp will be greater than dc − dp and therefore there are more
controls for which dn > dc (Figure 6.4). Controls will be matched to cases where:
dc − dp < dn
dc + da > dn
(6.1)
da is derived from the area (A) between the rings generated by dc and dp where
A is given by:
A = πd2c − π(dc − dp)2 (6.2)







Figure 6.4: Diagram illustrating adjustment of control selection distances. The case
(green dot) is dcm from the source (red dot), this distance is shown as the solid
ring (c). In the situation illustrated by A cases are searched for using percentage
bounds of dc the area outside (shown by the ring a) is much greater than that inside
(shown by the ring p), therefore the probability of identifying a control (blue dots)
whose distance from the source (dn) is far greater when dn>dc than when dn<dc and
therefore the control identification will be biased. To remove this selection bias the
scenario illustrated in B is used where the outer ring is fixed at a radius such that its
area defined by da is identical to that defined by dp.
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A range of possible values for dp and da were considered by evaluating a range
of values of dp and as a fixed value of dp of 250m (199.5m for da, Figure 6.5). From
Figure 6.5 a value of 90% and dp=250 and da = 199.5 were selected as this left a
feasible number of triplets whilst maintaining a tight distance ring. Furthermore at
90% the ratio of numbers of controls to numbers of cases is around 3:2, much smaller
than at some higher values of dp. Both absolute values and proportions were used
because at small values of dc, da becomes very small and matching becomes unlikely.
Figure 6.5: Plot of changes in numbers of source-case-control units as dp changes and
da changes accordingly to calculate a matching area. The red line is the number of
triplets generated by calculating dp as proportions of dc (x-axis) and the blue line the
equivalent values using exact values of dp of 250m and 195.5m for da. The black line
represents the total number of units and is the sum of the red and blue lines. The
total number of cases is shown by the green line.
.
The triplet selection processes were implemented in JavaTMcode.
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6.2.4 Groups and potential biases
The program identified a total of 325 case-source pairings matched to 647 controls.
Within these 325 groups between 1 and 11 controls were assigned to each pairing,
and certain controls were assigned to several cases (Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: Frequency distribution of the number of controls for each of the 325 cases.
Groups were evaluated to look for bias in terms of differences in animal numbers
between case and control. Animal numbers were available for all the controls from
the agricultural census and numbers were available for all cases and sources from
the DCS data. However there is not total agreement between cull and census data
(Figure 6.7). Numbers of both cattle and sheep on cases and controls were compared
using logistic regression; numbers were statistically significantly different both when
census and cull data were compared (Table 6.1).
This analysis underlines previous analysis by other authors (Keeling et al., 2001,
2003) and analysis presented in Chapter 4 that susceptibility to infection is a function
of animal numbers. Those holdings which did not become infected (controls) were
smaller than those infected (cases, sources). Therefore in addition to controlling for
Euclidean distance, it is essential to control for differences in susceptibility arising
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Cattle Sheep
Comparison Data n χ p χ p
Case Census 251 98.59 <0.001 46.7 <0.001
Control Census 647
Case Cull 325 116.8 <0.001 59.7 <0.001
Control Census 647
Case Cull 325 1.61 0.18 20.07 <0.001
Source Cull 325
Table 6.1: Results of generalised linear model (binomial errors) analysis of animal
numbers on group members.
from differences in animal numbers. To ensure that susceptibility is controlled for, the
controls must have similar numbers or more animals of each species than the case. To
control for this only controls will be selected which meet one of the following criteria:
1. At least 70% of the numbers of cattle, sheep and pigs as the case.
2. No more than 50 fewer cattle than the case and no more than 100 fewer sheep
and pigs than the case.
The latter criterion makes allowances for small holdings, for instance it allows a
case with 50 head of cattle to be paired with a control with 30 head which would not




Figure 6.7: Boxplots of animals numbers on the group members broken down by data
used and by cattle and sheep. Both plots are on a square root scale.
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Revised dataset
After applying the animal number selection criterion the revised dataset comprised
123 groups with 208 controls, 8 of these controls were controls for 2 cases. The
distribution of controls to cases is shown by Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Frequency distribution of the number of controls for each of the 123 cases.
Figure 6.8 shows that the number of controls per case in the revised dataset has
a greater degree of negative skew as there are many more cases with only one control
compared to Figure 6.6. The difference between these distributions is significant
at p<0.05 (Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test D=0.198, p=0.002). This set of
triplets was further reduced by removing instances in which the case contained cattle
and the control contained only sheep. Due to the difference in infectiousness and
susceptibility between cattle and sheep (Donaldson et al., 2001) the reverse scenario
is not considered to be a problem, however it could bias the analysis if there were
instances of cases with up to 50 head of cattle being controlled by holdings with only
sheep. Excluding such instances leaves 114 cases being controlled for by 196 controls.
Furthermore there were 8 controls which were controls for more than one case, so
in instances where a control was included in more than one group it was excluded
from the group which had the most controls, when the groups had the same number
of controls a randomly selected group lost its control. The resulting dataset had 113
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cases and 189 controls.
The principal objective of the group selection process was to control for Euclidean
distance. Analysis of the Euclidean distances between source and case and source
and control shows that although controls are further away, there is no statistically
significant difference (two sample, two tailed t-test t188=1.51,p>0.1, Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.9: Boxplot of Euclidean distance to the cases compared to those to the
controls and the difference between distances to cases and controls.
The spatial distribution of groups does not exactly match the spatial distribution
of IPs during the 2001 epidemic. Comparative analysis shows that there are statis-
tically significant differences in the numbers of groups relative to IPs for the DCCs
(Figure 6.10, Fishers exact p=0.055). From Figure 6.10 it appears that it is the
smaller DCCs of Leeds, Cardiff and Worcester which are overrepresented in terms of
numbers of cases.
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Figure 6.10: Barplot of the proportion of all IPs in each DCC (black bars) compared
to the proportions of cases in this study in each DCC (grey bars). Bars are ordered
in decreasing numbers of IPs in each DCC.
The method for selecting triplets produced a temporal distribution of cases which
is not statistically significantly different from the temporal distribution of IPs in
the actual epidemic (Figure 6.11, Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test D=0.109,
p=0.126). There is a discrepancy at the beginning of the epidemic as a result of the
NMB, because no triplets were selected during the pre-NMB phase of the epidemic.
After this, however the curves match closely, as IPs infected before the NMB are not




Figure 6.11: Temporal distribution of cases (red line) compared to the temporal
distribution of all IPs (black line). This is broken down and shown as number of
cases by day (Figure 6.11(a)) and cumulative proportion by day (Figure 6.11(b)).
In addition to accounting for distance these analyses took into account species
numbers. This was to ensure that there were no species differences between cases
and controls or that the controls were not substantially under-represented for any
species. Farms were classified as cattle only, sheep only or mixed if both species were
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held2. Figure 6.12 shows that slightly more cases were mixed farms however these
differences are not statistically significant (χ22=5.54, p=0.063).
Figure 6.12: Comparison of farm type for cases (Black bars) and controls (grey bars).
Red lines represent the upper limits of 95% confidence intervals and the white lines
the lower limits.
Of the 113 cases identified in 30 of the instances the case tested negative for
FMDV in the Institute of Animal Health Pirbright FMD reference laboratory (Chap-
ter 2). In a further 17 instances the source tested negative but in 8 triplets both the
case and source were negative, so in 39 groups either source or case tested negative
to antibody or antigen. Sensitivity analysis will be carried out analysing just the
laboratory positive IPs.
Having identified a set of matched case-control groups data on potential barriers
and conduits to spread must be derived. This was undertaken in a GIS framework
using data from the EDiNA Digimap service (www.edina.ac.uk/digimap).
2There were three instances (1 case, 2 controls) of holdings which were mixed cattle sheep and
pig. There were no holdings which were pig only, therefore pig farms are not considered
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Calculating predictor variables
The predictor variables analysed in this chapter can be divided into three groups
described in Table 6.2. These three categories broadly describe the location of the
holdings, factors which may reduce the effective distance between holdings (connec-
tivity) and factors which may prevent the transmission of the virus between holdings
(barriers).
Locational Connectivity Barriers
Access Road distance Rivers






Table 6.2: Variables used in these analyses broken into three categories.
All variables with the exception of cumulative elevation change were derived by
overlaying the farm points onto the scanned OS maps and manually inspecting the
case-control pairings. These analysis could have been performed using OS vector data
in ESRI ArcView v3.2 (www.esri.com) by generating straight lines between source
and case and controls and overlaying the lines on vector datasets. However, the
vector data was found to be less accurate than the scanned raster maps. As a result
the raster maps were used and the following criteria were ascertained:
1. Road Distance between holdings. This was calculated using the measure
tool in ESRI ArcGIS 9.0. Where there were several possible routes between
farms, all possibilities were measured and the shortest distance used3.
2. Farm accessibility. Measured on the following scale:
1 = Track or dead end road.
2 = Beside a minor road
3 = Beside a main road
4 = At the junction of 2 main roads.
3This process was carried out manually using scanned maps rather than by using OS Meridian
vector data in a GIS because upon inspection the Meridian data was found to be missing a number
of small roads and tracks which limited the accuracy
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3. Number of intervening roads. A count of the number of roads and footpaths
crossed in a direct route between holdings.
4. Intervening rivers. A river is counted as a river if it appears on OS map data
as more than a single line. Single line rivers or streams on OS maps denote
rivers or streams that are less than 1 meter wide. Streams less than 1 meter
wide are not considered to offer sufficient barrier to the movements of animals
and therefore are insufficient barrier to transmission. The criteria for scoring
rivers are:
0 = No intervening river.
1 = A partially intervening river. This is any case of a river separating two
farms with a bridge for access or where the path between farms intersects the
apex of a river meander.
2 = Farms separated by a river with no direct crossing point.
5. Intervening railways. A similar scale is applied to scoring railways as is used
for rivers:
0 = No intervening railway.
1 = A partially intervening railway. This is any case of a railway separating
two farms with a bridge for access.
2 = Farms separated by a railway with no direct crossing point.
6. Intervening Forest. A binary scale is used to denote the presence of forest.
0 = No forest in a direct line between holdings.
1 = Forest in a direct line between holdings.
7. Intervening urban areas. A binary scale is used to denote the presence of
urban areas.
0 = No urban in a direct line between holdings.
1 = Urban in a direct line between holdings.
8. Non-livestock holdings. A 250m buffer was placed around farms identified
in Chapter 3 as not having livestock and intersection with these buffers was
evaluated using this scale:
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0 = No non-livestock buffer in a direct line between holdings.
1 = Non-livestock buffer in a direct line between holdings.
The cumulative elevation change between source and case and source and con-
trol was calculated in the GIS using the OS Panorama 50m Digital Terrain Models
(DTMs). In ESRI ArcView v3.2 lines connecting the source and case and source and
control were constructed using the JoinTheDots Extension. The Surface tools ex-
tension (v1.6) (Jenness, 2005) was used to calculate the cumulative elevation change
along the lines.
An example of a group and the intervening features is shown by Figure 6.13. This
example also illustrates some of the problems which arose in evaluating the data for
the groups and shows how the issues were resolved. This group is in Dumfries and
Galloway, the source was infected on the 11th June and slaughtered on the 20th. The
estimated date of infection for the case is the 20th June. The case is 1969m from
the source and is a small sheep unit with 310 head of sheep. The road route from
the source to the case is a relatively direct route. The case lies between a dead end
track and a minor road, and it is unclear from which direction the farm is accessed.
However, the farm was measured to be closer to the track than the road, so it was
assigned an access score of 1 and the road distance was measured to the end of the
dead end track. With this taken into account there was only one reasonable shortest
route by road to the Farm. There are no intervening railways or rivers in a direct
line between the source and case and this same line crosses a minor road, a track
and a footpath, so the road score is 1 as no major roads are crossed and the road
count is 3. One non-livestock holding (not shown in Figure 6.13) and no forest or
shaded built up areas are crossed, although the latter is somewhat ambiguous as the
shortest route passes close to some buildings.
The control is 1,789m from the source and is a large sheep and cattle holding
containing 230 cattle and 1005 sheep. The road route between the source and control
is less direct than that between source and case as the road must take a detour to
a crossing point over the river. Across the river there are two possible routes to the
control both of which were measured and the shortest was 3505m, 130m shorter than
the alternative. The control lies on a dead end track, therefore the access score is
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Figure 6.13: Map intervening features between the source (red point) and case (blue
point) and source and control (Green point). For simplicity non-livestock holdings
were excluded from this map.
1. Two rivers lie in between the source and control as well as a a railway and 3
major roads. A main road does cross the railway, however this still offers limited
opportunity for close contact between animals, therefore the railway score was 2.
There is no direct crossing for the first river, therefore this score is 2. There are no
crossing points over the roads therefore the road score is 3. There are intervening
non-livestock farms, and the direct route does intersect some of the shaded built up
area, therefore these scores are both 1.
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Data
Ordnance Survey (OS) data from the EDiNA R©Digimap service were used for these
analyses. OS 1:50,000 scanned raster maps tiles were downloaded for the relevant
areas. In addition, 1:50,000 OS Land-Form Panorama Digital Terrain Model (DTM)
data was downloaded for carrying out the topographic analyses. The DTM data were
downloaded in NTF format and converted to ESRI Grid format in ESRI MapManager
v6.2. Where appropriate, the Grid data were mosaiced in ESRI ArcMap 9 creating
five separate Grids covering the relevant areas as follows as these areas cover the
distribution of triplets:
1. North Cumbria and Dumfries and Galloway.
2. South Cumbria, the North East and North Yorkshire.
3. Anglesey.
4. The Midlands and Welsh borders.
5. Kent
6. Devon.
Data for each tile was compiled separately and subsequently merged to form one
dataset.
6.2.5 Statistical Analysis
To undertake this analysis some method of handling the instances where there are
multiple controls for a case is required. Introducing the same case (with the same
barrier data) into the analysis several times would create duplicate values and po-
tentially bias the analysis, but the additional controls will provide useful additional
data for these analyses. Wherever possible the data will be analysed by comparison
of cases and controls treating them as separate units of data, however this may not
always be valid and there will be some replication by having multiple controls in a
group.
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Screening of continuous variable will be conducted using a Student’s t-test. The
problem of multiple controls is overcome by using the mean of the controls in each
group.
Remaining analysis will be carried out using indirect comparison of the 113 cases
and 188 controls using a logistic generalised linear mixed effects model (GLMM)
with binomial errors. Whether a holding was a case or control will be treated as the
binary dependent variable. To control for the effect of multiple controls the particular
group to which the case and its controls belong will be included as a random effect.
Therefore if a particular case has four controls the case and all its controls will be
classified as group i. The test statistic used to evaluate risk factors within the R
statistical package is the Wald statistic given by the t-value.
The variables will be analysed using both univariate and multivariate analysis.
Where predictors are likely to co-vary, multivariate techniques will be employed to
check for interactions where appropriate. The control category will form the reference
level for the outcome in all logistic regression analysis.
Prior to model construction, analysis of the relationship of Euclidean distance
to group size will be carried out using a GLM with Poisson errors as this could
potentially confound other results.
6.3 Results
A dataset has been generated comprising 113 groups of farms with data regarding
factors which may act as potential barriers or conduits for virus transmission.
6.3.1 Univariate Data Analysis
The methods used to analyse the data were discussed in Section 6.2.5.
Potential confounders
Figure 6.4 describes the increase in the search area for selecting potential controls as
Euclidean distance from source to case increases. As a result there is a statistically
significant relationship between the size of the group and the Euclidean distance
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between source and case (estimate=0.242km−1, p=0.038, generalised linear model
with Poisson errors).
Locational
Initial analysis of the access scores assigned to cases and controls suggests that cases
are on the whole less accessible than controls (Figure 6.14). However there is no
statistically significant difference in the values for farm access (p>0.5).
Figure 6.14: Access to farms as measured by the 1:3 scale (section 6.2.4, there were
no values of 4). Dark grey denotes cases, light grey controls. White lines represent
the lower half of 95% confidence intervals, red lines are the upper half.
Connectivity
Figure 6.15 shows that the median road distance is slightly greater to the control than
the case. However this difference is statistically non-significant (t188=1.67, p>0.1),
furthermore this result remains when only laboratory positive triplets are analysed
(p>0.1).
The number of roads separating holdings is not statistically significant (Fig-
ure 6.16, t188=1.40, p>0.1). The statistical significance of these analyses did not
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Figure 6.15: Boxplot of road distance between source-case pairings compared to road
distance between source-control pairs.
change when the numbers of categories were changed by merging levels based on the
sizes of roads. For instance by creating a 2 level variable of 2 or fewer roads and more
than 2 roads.
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Generalised linear mixed model analysis of the barrier variables presented in Ta-
ble 6.2 is presented in Table 6.3. In the univariate analysis none of the results were
statistically significant at p<0.05, however certain variables will be analysed in more
detail.
Variable Unit OR (95% CIs) t-value p
Road 0 1 - -
1 0.959 (0.46, 2.02) -1.109 0.913
2 & 3 0.737 (0.33, 1.67) -0.732 0.465
Rivers Absent 1 - -
Present 0.594 (0.33, 1.08) -1.72 0.087
Rail Absent 1 - -
Present 0.550 (0.24, 1.28) -1.389 0.166
Forest Absent 1 - -
Present 0.990 (0.60, 1.62) -0.041 0.967
Urban Absent 1 - -
Present 0.778 (0.42, 1.45) -0.791 0.430
Non-livestock Absent 1 - -
Present 0.929 (0.57, 1.53) -0.292 0.771
Elevation change
√
m 0.965 (0.92, 1.01) -1.448 0.149
Table 6.3: Univariate generalised linear mixed model analysis (binomial errors) anal-
ysis results of barrier variables. For rivers and railways categories 1 and 2 were
merged to form the present category as there were less than 5 holdings in each of the
‘1’ categories.
Further analysis of road barrier scores indicates very little difference between
cases and controls (Figure 6.17). These categories can be further collapsed to ‘ma-
jor roads’ (categories 2 and 3) and ‘minor roads’ (categories 0 and 1) but there is
still no statistical significance when this variable is analysed (p>0.2). Groups were
investigated further to establish whether the major road was multi-carriageway to in-
vestigate any possible effect but there were only five instances of holdings separated
by a multi-carriageway road.
There were relatively few instances in which either cases or controls were sepa-
rated by rivers or railways. Table 6.4 shows that fewer than 26% of holdings were
separated by rivers and fewer than 15% by railways. However, Table 6.4 also shows
that a larger proportion of controls are separated by rivers and railways than cases.
To overcome the lack of observations the river and rail variables were combined
to produce a barrier variable defining whether a pair of holdings is separated by a
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Figure 6.17: Road barriers as measured by the 0:3 scale (section 6.2.4). Dark grey
denotes cases, light grey controls, red lines are 95% confidence intervals.
river and/or railway. These barriers would act in a similar way to prevent virus
transmission by preventing the movements across them. Furthermore, railways are
often built alongside rivers. Of the 31 holdings separated by a railway in Table 6.4, 15
were also separated by a river. This combination variable is statistically significant
(t188=2.38,p=0.018, OR=0.507, 95% CIs=0.29, 0.89, mixed effects logistic regression
analysis). This result remains when only laboratory positive groups are considered
(t124=-2.12, p=0.036, OR=0.499 95% CIs=0.26,0.95, mixed effects logistic regression
analysis).
0 1 2
River Case 94 (83.2) 3 (2.6) 16 (14.2)
Control 141 (74.6) 3 (1.6) 45 (23.8)
Rail Case 105 (92.9) 1 (0.9) 7 (6.2)
Control 166 (87.8) 3 (1.6) 20 (10.6)
Rail & Rail Case 91 (80.5) NA 22 (19.5)
Control 128 (67.7) NA 61 (32.3)
Table 6.4: Counts of holdings separated by rivers and railways, numbers in brackets
are the percentages based on the row total. The Rail & River category is the result
of merging categories 1 and 2 for the features.
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There is little difference in the elevation change between source and case and
source and control (Table 6.3, Figure 6.18). This result is also not statistically
significant (p=0.174) when only laboratory confirmed cases are analysed.
Figure 6.18: Cumulative elevation change between source-case pairings and source-
control pairings. The y axis is on a square root scale.
6.3.2 Multivariate analysis
In light of the relationship between group size and Euclidean distance, the relation-
ship between the barrier variable and Euclidean distance was tested and found to be a
significant positive relationship. The odds of a barrier being present increase approx-
imately 3 fold with every km (generalised linear mixed model with binomial errors
odds= 3.096km−1, 95% CIs = 1.84, 5.20), p<0.001). As a result of the relationships
between number of controls and the presence of barriers with Euclidean distance, the
barrier predictor was analysed in a multivariate model with Euclidean distance to
the holding the first term entered and whether the holding is a case or control as the
outcome. The presence of an interaction between distance and barriers was checked
but was not statistically significant (p>0.2) and was removed. After removal of this
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interaction the presence of the barrier remained statistically significant (Table 6.5).
Unit odds (95% CIs) t-value p-value
Intercept NA -0.317 0.752
Dist km 0.865 (0.61,1.22) -0.824 0.411
Barriers Absent 1 - -
Present 0.540 (0.30,0.96) -2.087 0.038
Table 6.5: Multivariate generalised linear mixed model analysis (binomial errors) of
the presence of barriers and Euclidean distance.
Further multivariate analysis was carried out between barriers and road distance
and elevation change however there were no statistically significant relationships
(p>0.1).
6.4 Discussion
The results presented in this paper suggest that rivers and railways formed semi-
permeable geographic barriers to virus transmission during the 2001 GB epidemic.
The results were generated by a case-control methodology generated by a complex
series of matching for Euclidean distance and animal numbers.
The results presented are heavily dependent upon the process of identifying
groups, particularly the process of identifying controls. Numbers of animals by species
and Euclidean distance from the infectious source have previously been identified
as the two principal risk factors for FMD transmission (Ferguson et al., 2001a,b;
Keeling et al., 2001, 2003). Here a methodology was developed to identify triplets
which controlled for the Euclidean distance only. Analysis of these groups under-
lined the importance of animal numbers in determining the susceptibility of holdings
and underlined the results of previous chapters (Chapters 4, 5) and previous studies
(Ferguson et al., 2001a,b; Keeling et al., 2001; Diggle, 2006). Therefore when re-
searching inter-farm FMD transmission there must be accurate information on the
demographics of the holdings in question.
In addition to the controls for animal numbers and Euclidean distance further
constraints were placed on the triplet selection criteria. These are principally that
the case had to be infected by local spread (ie. over a distance of 3km or less).
However, this distance is arbitrary and as there can be no distinct cut off between
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local and longer range spread, the mechanisms of spread may be distinct although
there will be overlap between local and long range spread. Other studies (Savill
et al., 2006) used a maximum distance of 10km, although the authors were not just
examining local spread. Further constraints placed upon group identification are that
the controls must be holdings listed on the agricultural census and those without off-
fields identified in Chapter 3. Whilst this removes a number of potential groups
from the analysis it is essential to ensure an accurate estimate of animal numbers
on the holding, which are not available for off-fields. The numbers of animals on
each holding relate to June of the previous year, and the numbers for the period
in question will be those values for June with some error either side. However the
section on demography (Chapter 3) demonstrated that, particularly for cattle this
error is relatively small and there are no large variations in animal numbers between
June 2000 and the FMD epidemic.
Having identified a set of case-control groups, predictor variable data for each
group was gathered manually (with the exception of elevation change) using scanned
paper maps as this was found to be more accurate than using less complete digital
data. The data were analysed using linear mixed effects modelling. In univariate
analysis the one factor which came out as statistically significant was that more
controls were separated by rivers and/or railways than cases. This result remained
when Euclidean distance was included as a confounder. This finding suggests that
these linear features are acting as semi-permeable barriers to the transmission of
FMD and that a holding on the far side of such a feature from an infectious source is
less likely to become infected. This result is partially in agreement with the findings
of Savill et al. (2006) however the authors conclude that the role of these barriers is to
increase travel times and effective distance between holdings. Multivariate analysis
in this study could find no interaction between barriers and road distance, although
statistical power was limited. The analysis conducted by Savill et al. (2006) used all
possible transmission events rather than transmission events inferred on the ground
and therefore the actual effects may be masked. This study uses matched farms and
transmission data gathered on the ground, therefore results are more likely to reflect
what was involved in transmission between individual farms.
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Therefore, rivers and railways act as a barrier to virus transmission, probably by
preventing the crossing of people, animals and vehicles. However major roads were
not statistically significant when included as a barrier, possibly suggesting that they
are more permeable than rivers and railways.
Other potential influences on transmission of FMD were investigated, roads and
topography do not appear to have an influence on the transmission of the virus
by acting as conduits. It is possible the 3km scale is too small for differences in
topography to be seen, however it may be more of a factor in longer range spread.
In conclusion, case-control pairs have been derived using a robust methodology
and using OS data layers a dataset of potential barriers and conduits for FMD trans-
mission has been derived. Results show that rivers and railways act as statistically
significant barriers to FMD transmission. More data on sources of infection and more
robust demographic data particularly with regard to numbers of animals on off-fields




Risk Mapping of FMD
7.1 Introduction
Retrospective analysis of FMD epidemics could be aided by maps of the distribution
of cases in relation to risk. Such maps could be used to understand why a disease
spread widely in some areas whilst the epidemic ended earlier in other areas. In the
event of an epidemic of FMD both effective targeting of resources and evaluation of
the control effort required could be facilitated by maps of the spatial distribution of
risk of local FMD spread. Such maps could be used to forecast and understand the
size of FMD outbreaks.
Risk mapping has been applied to infectious diseases using a variety of techniques
to first generate a measure of risk and then map these values. For FMD Keeling
et al. (2001) generated values of R0 for each holding in GB and aggregated these
values to create a 10km raster surface of R0. However, this is a very coarse scale of
analysis and Chapter 4 demonstrated that the model of susceptibility developed in
this thesis is more accurate at predicting IPs than stochastic mathematical models
of disease transmission. Lawson and Zhou (2005) developed maps of relative risk
for FMD in Cumbria during the 2001 epidemic using Standardised Incidence Ratio
(SIR) calculations. These data are fortnightly counts of IPs aggregated to the parish
level and spatial dependency is modelled by including terms in a Bayesian binomial
model for the x and y ordinates of the parish centroid. The SIR implicitly accounts
for the population at risk in terms of the number of farms. However, this thesis
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has demonstrated that numbers of animals in the locality and farm size is more
important in determining risk of spread than the number of susceptible holdings
(Chapters 4 and 5). Furthermore, by aggregating to the parish level a degree of
accuracy is lost as the median number of farms on the census per parish is 7 but
the 95 percentiles lie in the range from 1 to 50. As FMD was in areas of greatest
livestock density there are likely to be greater numbers of farms in parishes with
greater animal density.
A model based upon a distance kernel was used to map the risk of H7N7 Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) transmission in the Netherlands (Boender et al.,
2007). The authors used a transmission kernel to demonstrate that there were two
poultry dense foci in the Netherlands which were at elevated risk of HPAI. The
transmission kernel was a function of interfarm distance and was therefore strongly
correlated with poultry density, as a result the risk map closely reflected the poultry
distribution in the Netherlands. In a similar study applied to Classical Swine Fever
(CSF) Boender et al. (2008) use data from previous CSF epidemics to parameterise
the kernel and derive a risk map at the herd level using these data.
Risk mapping of H5N1 HPAI in Vietnam has been conducted by Pfeiffer et al.
(2007). The authors have records of reports of HPAI H5N1 in 2,771 of 10,067 com-
munes in Vietnam. HPAI appeared in three distinct temporal waves in Vietnam
during the period 2004-2006 and the outcome variable for the spatial multivariate
model is whether a commune reported a case during a particular wave. Predictors
included the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), area used for paddy
and domestic poultry density as well as epidemic period and region. Spatial auto-
correlation in the predictors was accounted for by including the district to which the
commune belongs as a random effect. As HPAI was clustered in different regions
of the country in different epidemic periods, the interaction between epidemic phase
and region is a very strong risk factor in the model, however other predictors such
as distance to an area with high population density and poultry density were also
important in the model. The predicted probability of infection for each commune for
each of the three epidemic periods are plotted to generate choropleth risk maps of
HPAI.
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On risk maps areas at elevated risk, known as ‘hotspots’ are of interest. During
the 2001 FMD epidemic the majority of disease transmission was over relatively short
distances, so the shape and size of hotspots is important. This is because if the virus
is introduced into a relatively small hotspot the local epidemic is likely to burn itself
out relatively quickly. However, if the hotspot is large there is much greater potential
to generate a substantial epidemic.
This chapter will describe the development of risk mapping based upon the risk
factors for holding level susceptibility (Chapters 4) and the risk of an IP transmitting
disease given geographical barriers (Chapters 5 and 6). Maps of retrospective risk
for the 2001 epidemic will be created, as well as general non-epidemic risk maps.
Furthermore, the techniques will be applied prospectively to an outbreak of FMD in
Surrey, England in 2007. Additionally risk mapping will be carried out for Scotland
which was an uninfected area but could have become infected given a set of potential
introduction events via animal movements from Surrey.
7.2 Methodology
Developing the risk surface requires the combination of two models developed else-
where in this thesis:
1. The probability of a holding becoming infected (Chapter 4).
2. The probability of a holding already infected with FMD transmitting infection
to further holdings (Chapter 5) given the potential of landscape barriers to
inhibit disease transmission (Chapter 6).
These models must be combined to produce the map of risk. As the potential for
a holding to transmit infection is dependent upon that holding already being infected
the risk ascribed to each holding (Rh) can be described by equation 7.1.
Rh ≈ Susceptibility × Transmission|Barriers (7.1)
Some method of transforming the models described is Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is
required in order to generate inputs for equation 7.1 which can be applied to all
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holdings. The process for doing this will be described for each of the susceptibility,
transmission and barrier models.
7.2.1 Susceptibility
A logistic regression model of holding level susceptibility was developed in Chapter 4.
This model can be used to calculate modelled values for different datasets which
represent the probability of being an IP given another 2001 type of epidemic. As
the model was generated in the R statistical environment these values are generated
using the predict.glm function. The model contains 6 main effects (two - country and
species are factors with three levels) all of which can be calculated for each holding.
The only value which cannot be generated directly from agricultural census data is
the distance to the infectious seed which is dependent upon the distribution of seeds
at the start of the epidemic. There are four possible solutions to the problem of
identifying seeds which will be used in this chapter:
1. Distribution of seeds from epidemic data: This formed the variable in
the initial model and therefore the modelled values can be used to generate a
risk map for the 2001 or 2007 GB epidemics.
2. Each holding is a seed: Calculate an average modelled value for each holding
based on every other holding in turn being a seed. Given the population of
holdings (n) the mean probability of holding h becoming infected given that
each other holding is a seed will be calculated (Sh). Therefore, this is the mean
value of Phi where Phi is the probability of holding h becoming infected given








3. A farm identified at high risk of being a seed: Farms receiving animals
from holdings known to have FMD or from areas in which FMD is present are
treated as seeds. This is of relevance at the start of an epidemic if there have
been movements of potentially infected animals.
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4. No seeds: The model described in Table 4.9 which does not have a distance
to seed parameter is used.
The distribution of risk over the full course of the epidemic is very dependent
upon the control policies which were implemented. During the 2001 epidemic this
is particularly pertinent to phases 2 and 3 during which extended culling was im-
plemented. In future epidemics extended culling on the scale of 2001 may not be
employed. To overcome this a model in which the outcome was only IPs from Phase
1 will be used (Table 4.11). During phase 1, control by culling was moderate and
relatively consistent across space and time so is more likely to resemble the control
approach that would be implemented in future outbreaks.
7.2.2 Transmission
The transmission model (Chapter 5) contains 7 main effects. Some of these are static
variables derived from demographic data which can be applied to all holdings. Others
are pertinent only to holdings which were declared IPs. The use of these variables is
described below:
1. Infected period: Pertinent to IPs only. A value of 10 days will be applied
to all holdings as this is equivalent to the median infected period for the 2001
FMD data.
2. Epidemic phase: Pertinent to IPs only. As the risk mapping is only being
applied to phase 1 this will be set to phase 1.
3. Laboratory result: Pertinent to IPs only. This will be treated as positive in
all instances thus assuming that diagnosis is perfect in every instance.
4. Cumbria: It will be assumed that the features of Cumbria which result in IPs
in Cumbria being more predisposed to transmitting infection would apply to all
epidemics. Furthermore, it is assumed that similar processes do not operate in
other counties in which the virus may not have been seeded prior to the NMB.
5. Species on the holding: Mixed (reference level), cattle only and sheep only.
Can be derived for all holdings from the census.
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6. Cattle density in 3km: Can be calculated for all holdings from agricultural
census data
7. Sheep densities in 3km: Can be calculated for all holdings from agricultural
census data
7.2.3 Barriers
The transmission model describes the probability of transmission within 3km of an IP.
Likewise the barrier model (Chapter 6) describes the protective effect of river and rail
barriers on transmission within 3km of an IP. Therefore, the modelled transmission
value should be transformed to reflect the presence of barriers. Thus, the proportion
of farms in the 3km ring which are hidden by a barrier will be calculated as described
by Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: The 3km ring around the IP (red point) along with semi-permeable
river/rail barriers (blue lines) and the distribution of farms (yellow points) within
that ring.
The modeled values of transmission (Th) will be transformed to T ′h based on the
proportion of farms in the 3km ring which are hidden by barriers using the formula
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in equation 7.3. In equation 7.3 Pa is the proportion of farms in the 3km ring which
are not hidden by barriers and Pb the proportion which are so Pa + Pb = 1. O+ is
the odds ratio quantifying the decreased likelihood of infection associated with the
presence of a barrier, from Chapter 6 we know that O+=0.54. However, the total







ensure this, those holdings not separated by a barrier should be multiplied by a
function O−









where n is the population of farms. The resulting value of O− is 1.12 given that
O+ is 0.54 (Table 6.5).
The proportion of farms inside the barrier was calculated using an ESRI Arc
Macro Language (AML) script in ArcInfo 9.0. The code takes each holding in turn
and creates a 3km buffer around the holding. An OS Strategi vector dataset supplied
by EDINA Digimap of the combined river and rail network is clipped with this buffer
and the clipped layer itself is buffered to 1m to simulate its width. Using the buffered
river/rail network the 3km farm buffer is broken into several polygons using the Erase
function and the polygon containing the farm is identified. The number of holdings
in this polygon and the number in the entire 3km buffer are written to a file along
with the CPH of that holding.
7.2.4 Mapping values
Taking Rh as the product of Sh and T ′h generates a value of risk for each holding.
These values will be mapped to describe spatial variations in risk. There are a total of
129,226 holdings for which Rh was calculated, therefore, mapping individual points
would generate a very unclear picture as there is too much data to detect spatial
patterns. Instead of mapping discrete data points a continuous gridded raster surface
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will be created by aggregating values where the aggregated value is some summary
statistic within the neighbourhood of each raster cell. Interpolation techniques, in
particular Kriging (Bailey and Gatrell, 1995) are commonly used for such mapping
but were inappropriate for these analyses as the data should meet the following
criteria in order to interpolate which these data do not meet (derived from Bailey
and Gatrell (1995, p.143)):
1. The data are a spatially continuous surface. This applies to variables such as
elevation or rainfall for which every point has some value and the data are
implicitly spatially autocorrelated. These data are not spatially continuous,
they are a number of discrete events (in this case the events are the farms).
Furthermore the data are not implicitly autocorrelated in the same way as a
variable such as rainfall is. For instance a small sheep farm (low risk) can be
the neighbour of a large mixed farm (high risk).
2. The data must be a sample of the surface. For instance it is not currently
possible to measure rainfall across the entire surface. Interpolation uses sam-
pled spatially autocorrelated datapoints to impute datapoints which were not
sampled, however in these analyses the farm data is the population and not a
sample.
3. Kriging is not a method applicable to finite populations and therefore does not
allow for differences in the density of the population. For instance consider two
areas of the same size, one is populated with 5 farms each with a modelled
value of 0.2, the second area with 10 farms with a modelled value of 0.1. In
both areas the expected number of cases in each area is 1 (5 × 0.2 and 10 ×
0.1). However, as Kriging extrapolates from the given values to create a surface
the interpolated value across the first area would be 0.2, and 0.1 in the second
area.
Rather than interpolation, data have been aggregated by taking the summary
statistic (sum) of all points (farm holdings) within some radius of each raster cell,
this method is described by Figure 7.2. Two parameters must be set, the cell size (c)
and the radius of the search circle (s).
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Figure 7.2: A 200m grid is created (grey outline represents the cells of the grid and
the black cell represents the grid cell for which data is being calculated. The data
for the black cell is some summary statistic of all the points (green points) within a
3km ring (red ring) of the centroid of the cell (red point) in question.
The effect of altering s and c can be seen in Figure 7.3. Comparing Plot 7.3(b)
with Plot 7.3(a) highlights the effect of large values of c which increases the granu-
larity of the output map. The chosen value of c is a trade off between the granularity
of the output and computational power. The result of this trade off should create
a non-granular output whilst still allowing efficient browsing of the data. Altering
the values of s affects the actual values in the output data. At smaller values of s
individual holdings with large values have a greater influence than at greater values
at which the output is much smoother. However, extending s too far may compro-
mise the local nature of the analysis. This is shown by comparing Plot 7.3(c) with
Plot 7.3(d). In Plot 7.3(c) the value of s is relatively small and individual holdings
have a great effect with pockets of higher values. Plot 7.3(d) has a large value of s
and the effect is a much smoother surface. Values of s of 3km and c of 100m cor-
responding to Plot 7.3(a) were selected for these analyses because this represents a
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reasonable trade off between clarity and computational efficiency. Furthermore, the
coordinates are from OS grid references which have a resolution of 100m.
(a) c=100m, s=3km (b) c=1000m, s=3km
(c) c=100m, s=1km (d) c=100m, s=10km
Figure 7.3: Examples of the effects of altering cell size and search radius on the same
dataset. The data used to generate these maps are sheep numbers on holdings.
One drawback with this method of aggregation is the generation of slivers at the
intersection of two points (Figure 7.4). This is principally a problem in instances
where data are sparse, in denser areas such features are smoothed out.
As a result the maps will show the following depending upon the statistic being
summarised:
1. Susceptibility maps: The sum of modelled values for susceptibility within
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Figure 7.4: The generation of a high risk sliver (red area) at the intersection of two
3km search areas. Such slivers are an artefact of sparse data and will be visible in
areas with a low density of farms.
3km of each raster cell. Therefore the maps show the expected number of IPs
within 3km of each cell. Methods 1 and 3 outlined in section 7.5 will generally
generate larger values than method 2, unless the seeds are in areas of extremely
sparse livestock density. However, the magnitude of the values of risk will be
dependent upon the number and distribution of seeds. More seeds dispersed
more widely will ensure that the distance to seed parameter is low for most
holdings and therefore the risk of holdings becoming infected is higher. In
method 2 the effect of taking one seed at a time is averaged over the total
number of farms, as only a single seed at a time is treated the averaged values
are very small.
2. Transmission maps: The mean of modelled values for transmission within
3km of each raster cell. Given that IP i is infected and that all n holdings
within 3km of i are susceptible the probability that i will infect at least one
other holding. To generate the risk map this is repeated for every holding and
the sums of the probabilities mapped. Therefore, the map represents the mean
expected number of IPs spreading FMD within a 3km radius of each raster cell.
3. Combined susceptibility and transmission maps: The product of the
modelled transformed transmission and susceptibility values. Therefore, this
represents the probability of a farm transmitting infection given the probability
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that the farm becomes infected. These values are also summed such that each
raster cell is the total for all holdings within 3km. Therefore the map represents
the expected number of IPs and IPs transmitting infection within 3km and is
therefore the most complete measure of virus spread.
The Orkney and Shetland Isles were not included in the mapping as they were a long
way to the north of the remainder of GB and their inclusion would reduce the clarity
of the remainder of the country.
7.2.5 Risk mapping the 2007 FMD outbreak in Surrey
Section 1.2 described the outbreak of FMD in Surrey in 2007. In this outbreak there
was a long temporal lag between the first and second clusters during which time
many considered the area disease free, restrictions were eased and on farm vigilance
was reduced (DEFRA, 2007c). As a reflection of the period with eased restrictions
between outbreaks risk maps will be generated for the two clusters in isolation. The
seeds for the first cluster are IPs 1 and 2 as IP2 is estimated to have been infected
before IP1 was confirmed and restrictions were put in place (DEFRA, 2007d). In
the second cluster IPs 3 (B and C), 4 and 5 were infected before IP3 was declared,
however IPs 6B, 7 and 8B are all secondaries so IPs 3 (B and C), 4 and 5 are treated
as the three seeds (Figure 1.4).
FMD risk for the affected areas of Surrey will be mapped using agricultural cen-
sus data from June 2006 supplied by the National Epidemiology Emergency Group
(NEEG). Holdings with cattle and/or sheep were extracted from this data and risk
maps generated for the two clusters using the seeds described above. The susceptibil-
ity model alone will be used to generate these risk maps as this is substantially more
accurate and therefore the outputs more reliable than the transmission model. Fur-
thermore, the transmission model is a dynamic model contingent upon FMD being
present. Therefore, the susceptibility model describes the risk of IPs in the subse-
quent generation, whilst the transmission model will describe the risk of subsequent
generations. Evaluation of the use of susceptibility data alone to predict transmission
risk will be conducted by plotting the modelled values of susceptibility against trans-
mission. The relationship between transmission and susceptibility will be evaluated
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by assessing the fit of linear models with increasing number of polynomial terms until
the addition of further terms leads to an increase in AIC.
The relative likelihood of an individual holding becoming infected will be evalu-
ated by assessing the ranks of all actual secondary IPs (IPs 6, 7 and 8 for outbreak
2) against the ranks of all holdings within the surveillance zone (SZ) for outbreak 2.
There were no secondary IPs in outbreak 1. The total expected number of cases will
be calculated by taking the sum of predicted values for the two outbreaks.
7.2.6 Risk mapping FMD in Scotland during the 2007 outbreak
The potential for spread following introduction of FMD into Scotland via animal
movements was evaluated using animal movement data. Both direct and indirect
movements of cattle, sheep and pigs into Scotland from farms within a 20km radius
of the Pirbright laboratory were identified from the Cattle Tracing System (CTS),
Animal Movement Licensing System (AMLS) and Scottish Animal Movement Licens-
ing System (SAMS) databases. All movement data was analysed using an algorithm
written and implemented by Dr Nick Savill (University of Edinburgh). The algorithm
searched for both direct (single movement from Surrey into Scotland) and indirect
(a series of movements connected by animals sharing premises en route) movements.
This identified 15 indirect movements into Scotland and 30 indirect movements into
northern England from which the disease could spread locally across the border into
Scotland. The locations of holdings receiving these animals were treated as infectious
seeds for the susceptibility model. These seeds could be handled in two ways:
1. The model is run n times where n is the number of potential introductions
identified. A modelled value is calculated for each seed in turn and the mean
is taken as the overall measure of risk.
2. All n introductions are taken as seeds simultaneously, so there are n seeds.
The second method was used to generate the risk maps. This is because an individual
introduction may have the potential to cause a large outbreak but this could be
masked if its effect was averaged over n. Risk maps were generated using the phase 1
susceptibility model and populated with Scottish agricultural census data from 2006
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supplied by the Scottish Government. The map shows the likely number of secondary
cases arising from individual introductions in the same way as the risk map based
upon the 2001 seeds. However, as the seeds are not actual IPs, the map shows the




Figure 7.5 is the risk map parameterised with 2000 census data and the mean distance
to every other holding (section 7.5 - solution 2) as the seeds. The high risk areas are
broadly in the same areas as the FMD cases although the following observations can
be made about the distribution of high risk areas:
1. The Outer Hebrides (inset a). This high risk area stretches along the
north coast. The apparent high risk in this area is likely to be an artefact
of the structure of farm holdings and the way farms are modeled rather than
actual high risk of susceptibility to FMD. Figure 7.6 illustrates the clustering
of farms in lowland coastal areas. These locations are likely to be the addresses
of farm holdings which farm the higher land inland. As a result of the apparent
proximity of the holdings to each other the value for distance to seed is very
low which results in a high density of high modelled values.
2. Northern England (inset b). This area is characterised by an area of higher
risk stretching through the FMD belt of Cumbria and areas of high risk in the
high intensity dairy farming areas of Cheshire.
3. Wales and the Welsh borders and south west England (inset c). There
is a large area of high risk in the south west of Wales where the disease was
not seeded. However, areas in the south west of England and the Welsh border
areas where the disease was seeded are at higher risk, albeit a patchy high risk

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.6: The distribution of farm holdings in relation to elevation in the Outer
Hebrides. The area shown corresponds to box d in inset a on Figure 7.5. Elevation
data is derived from a OS Panorama 50m Digital Elevation Model (supplied by
EDiNA digimap (www.edina.ac.uk)).
The static risk map presented in Figure 7.5, should be compared to the map
of the output of the susceptibility model without reference to the distance to seed
variable (Figure 7.7, section 7.5 - solution 4). In this map the Outer Hebrides are no
longer a high risk area, instead risk is distributed throughout south west and western
England. This demonstrates that these higher risk areas in the Outer Hebrides are
an artefact of the data which records a high density of farms in this area.
Further influence of holding density in the susceptibility model can be seen by
comparing the higher risk in southern Scotland in Figure 7.7 with Figure 7.5, in
particular Dumfriesshire. This area has larger areas of higher risk in Figure 7.7
compared to Figure 7.5. This is because this area is characterised by more sparsely
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Figure 7.7: Susceptibility relative risk for the susceptibility model without the dis-
tance to seed variable, described in section 7.5 - solution 4.
distributed but very large holdings (Table 7.1). Both mean numbers of cattle and
sheep on each holding in Dumfriesshire are greater than in Cumbria, but the density
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of livestock holdings is almost 50% lower. As a result of the difference in the density of
farms there will be fewer close farms in Dumfriesshire and as a result when calculating
susceptibility risk based on distances to all other holdings, this area appears at lower
risk than areas with greater farm density. The reverse is true for Dyfed where holding
density is much higher than Cumbria, yet holdings have around 40% fewer animals
(Table 7.1). This reflects this differences in the Dyfed area of south west Wales when
Figure 7.5 is compared with Figure 7.7 the former shows high risk for this area and









Cumbria 6,823 5,114 0.74 510,266 99.8 2,625,583 513
Dumfries’ 2,791 1,085 0.39 173,297 159 757,382 698
Dyfed 5,576 7,978 1.43 509,791 63.9 2,281,385 285
Table 7.1: Numbers of holding, cattle and sheep and in Cumbria, Dumfriesshire and
Dyfed.
The risk map generated by the model run with the 78 seed IPs from the 2001
epidemic using methods described in section 7.5 - solution 1 is displayed in Figure 7.8.
The Cumbria and Dumfries & Galloway (inset a) cluster and to an extent the Devon
cluster (inset c) were in large areas of high risk and there was extensive spread in
these areas. Although there were areas of high risk in the Welsh Borders area (inset
b), these areas are more fragmented than those in south west or north west England.
This may explain why the epidemic in this area was more sporadic with fewer, less-
clustered cases. In the north east of England there are patches of high risk but a
number of cases spilled over into areas of relatively low risk. In south east England





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Risk of transmission (Figure 7.9) does not show the same distinctive high risk hot
spots as risk of susceptibility. There are higher risk areas in Cumbria, Dumfries &
Galloway, Wales, the Welsh borders and the south west of England which essentially
follows areas of high cattle density illustrated by comparison of Figure 7.10 and
Figure 7.9. The effect of cattle densities upon Figure 7.9 can be seen by setting
all values for cattle density to the national mean (Figure 7.11). The resulting map
is rather homogenous in colour with few differences in risk between regions. The
importance of cattle densities reflects the fact that most variables in the transmission
model are dependent upon the holding actually being infected and were all set to the
same value. Cattle densities were the only major variable remaining in the model for



























































































































































































































































Figure 7.10: Cattle densities in GB. The raster is parameterised with c=100m and
s=3km. The values represent the total number of cattle within 3km of each pixel.
7.3.3 Combined risk map
The result of combining the barrier transformed transmission risk with the suscepti-
bility risk model in which every farm is a seed (section 7.5 solution 2) is presented in
Figure 7.12. The main areas of risk have not changed extensively from the suscep-
tibility map. However, areas in Cumbria and Dumfries and Galloway (inset a) are
at higher risk than in the susceptibility map (Figure 7.7) as a result of the higher
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Figure 7.11: Transmission risk based upon the model presented in Table 5.6 but with
cattle density set to the national mean value. The values correspond to the sums of
modelled transmission risk. The raster is parameterised with c=100m and s=3km.
transmission values in these areas. In contrast, some of the patches of higher risk
in the Welsh Border region (inset b) are lower risk compared to the susceptibility
map because of a drop in the values for transmission in these areas. In south west




















































































































































































































































































































































































There is a highly significant relationship between modelled transmission risk and
modelled susceptibility risk (Figure 7.13). The relationship between the covariates is
modelled most parsimoniously by a third order polynomial, which returned an AIC of
-170484 lower than either first order (-168597), second order (-170460) or fourth order
(-170482) linear models. r2 for the third order model is 0.322 and F3,129222=15400,
p<0.001. This suggests that there is not a direct linear relationship between trans-
mission and susceptibility. The gap at the bottom of the y-axis transmission data in
Figure 7.13 is a result of the transmission model being parameterised for all IPs rather
than all farms, as a result there are several IPs specific predictors which were all set
to the same value, so all farms already have some base level of risk. The discrimi-
natory power of the model was poorer than the susceptibility model and as a result
of the data points being IPs it does not distinguish IPs which have no probability of
transmission because they were in areas with no other holdings.
7.3.4 Mapping the 2007 FMD outbreak
Risk mapping of the Surrey outbreak using the susceptibility model suggests that
there was a very low likelihood of spread in the vicinity of the epidemic (Figure 7.14).
The scale of risk measured as the total number of expected cases within 3km is over
two orders of magnitude lower than for the 2001 epidemic, furthermore comparison
with Figure 7.5 (box e) shows that this area is very low risk. This is a result of
very low livestock densities in the area, Surrey has 25 cows and 48 sheep per km2
compared to 75 and 386 in Cumbria.
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Figure 7.13: Scatterplot of transmission risk against susceptibility risk. Susceptibility
risk has been double square root transformed to ease viewing. The solid red line is
the regression line from a third order polynomial linear model and the broken red








































































































































































































































































However, these do not appear to predict the risk of infection associated with
individual holdings. Analysing the ranks of the modelled values for the 107 farms
within the SZ for outbreak 2 shows that the three subsequent IPs in the second
outbreak were ranked relatively low; IP6A was ranked 42, IP7 64 and IP8B 54.
Although the model was rather more accurate in predicting the total epidemic sizes,
the sums of predicted values for outbreak 1 where there were no secondaries was 1.99,
the sums for outbreak 2 where there were three secondaries was 1.83.
Potential FMD spread in Scotland was mapped based upon the 45 potential
introductions into Scotland and northern England (Figure 7.15). The majority of
potential introductions and subsequently risk is focussed in the south of the country.
However, there are additional high risk areas associated with introductions further
north in the central lowlands. The scale of risk in these maps is similar to that for
the 2001 epidemic suggesting that had the virus been introduced the risk of a sizeable
epidemic was real.
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Figure 7.15: FMD susceptibility risk in Scotland in 2007 based upon agricultural cen-
sus data from 2006 and potential disease introductions being movements of batches
of infected animals from the areas affected by FMD in Surrey. The raster is param-
eterised with c=100m and s=3Km.
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7.4 Discussion
A method of producing maps of FMD risk has been developed based upon both the
susceptibility of each holding and the likelihood that each infected holding could infect
other holdings locally. These values have been derived from three models described
elsewhere in this thesis (Chapters 4, 5, 6); as a result the risk map is dependent
on the model upon which it is based; furthermore, the epidemic should be similar
in nature in terms of species affected, virus strain and control effort. However, the
latter point is handelled to an extent by using a model parameterised for only phase
1 of the 2001 epidemic.
As the mapping is derived from the results of modelled risk of infection and
transmission during the course of an epidemic the mapping does not display smoothed
R0 values as was done by Boender et al. (2007) and Keeling et al. (2001). Instead
the mapping is a combination of the predicted numbers of holdings acquiring and
transmitting infection within 3km. However, more information can be gleaned by
interpreting maps of susceptibility and transmission in isolation. This is due to
differences in the nature of the models, the transmission model being a dynamic
model parameterised for IPs only and the susceptibility model is a static model
defined at the start of the epidemic. Furthermore, Figure 7.13 demonstrated that
there is a positive relationship between susceptibility and transmission, this suggests
that using the susceptibility model alone can be used to map both risk of susceptibility
and transmission with some accuracy.
The susceptibility risk map based upon the actual distribution of the 2001 seeds
(Figure 7.5) shows that the IPs were distributed throughout the high risk areas in
northern England (inset a, Figure 7.8), this is with the exception of the high risk
hotspot in the southern area of inset a. Likewise the areas of Devon (inset c) are
relatively high risk and experienced a number of IPs. In Wales (inset b) despite the
extensive seeding and large numbers of animals which created high risk areas, the
numbers of IPs in this area were relatively few. The disease was seeded in some areas,
particularly in the South East of England that are low risk areas and subsequently did
not experience a major epidemic. This shows that this tool can be used as a measure
220
of risk of FMD ‘take-off’, given a seeding it shows the likelihood of an epidemic.
The overall map of risk based upon all holdings being potential seeds (Figure 7.5)
shows that the virus was seeded in many of the areas of highest risk. However,
there are areas of northern and western Wales which were relatively high risk but
which do not contain seed IPs. The issues discussed concerning the Outer Hebrides
underlines one of the problems with applying this model outside the context of the
2001 epidemic. The model assumes that farming practices are the same in areas which
experienced IPs and those which did not. As shown by Figure 7.6, the pattern of
farming in this area is very different, with farm holdings clustered around low coastal
areas, whilst the areas actually farmed are the higher areas inland. If the disease
had been seeded to these areas this would be accounted for in the model; however,
as there was no seeding in the Outer Hebrides and this area is over 350km from a
seed, the data points in the susceptibility model have little influence in the model.
The effect of distance in the Hebrides can be seen in the map of the model without
a distance component (Figure 7.7) in which the Hebrides are no longer recorded as
being at elevated risk. The problems of heterogeneity in farming practices is not just
restricted to outlying areas such as the Outer Hebrides. Table 7.1 demonstrated how
the farm population can be distributed very differently in two neighbouring counties
both of which experienced the greatest FMD epidemic in their respective countries.
The differences in farm densities which are discussed have a strong effect on the
pattern of risk.
The risk map for disease transmission is strongly driven by cattle densities. As
the model included many IP specific parameters these had to be simplified to create
a map of disease transmission applicable to all farms. This smoothed risk map suffers
because the dependent variable for the model is whether an IP transmitted infection.
Therefore, the model is parameterised upon a subset of farms described by the model
in Chapter 4. As a result the IPs which form the data upon which the transmission
model is parameterised cannot deal with areas of low risk of disease introduction.
Such areas include areas with very few holdings such as northern Scotland still have
some risk of disease transmission.
The susceptibility map showed strong spatial differences which were not evident
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in the transmission maps. As a result, when results from these are combined and
spatially aggregated to form a map it closely resembles the susceptibility map.
The risk maps were applied to analyse the 2007 FMD outbreaks in the UK. In
this respect the risk mapping was applied in two different ways:
1. As a start of epidemic tool in Surrey to evaluate the potential risk of spread
and identify potential hotspots.
2. To identify the potential for spread in Scotland given a distribution of potential
seeds.
The analysis showed that in the two areas of Surrey which experienced outbreaks of
FMD the risk of local spread was very low, with just under two secondaries predicted
in both outbreaks. This reflects the low densities of animals in Surrey compared to
the areas on which the model is parameterised for, principally Cumbria.
In Scotland, had the virus been introduced onto one of the farms identified as re-
ceiving animals indirectly from Surrey the likelihood of subsequent spread was high.
Application of these methods to other outbreaks are very dependent upon the char-
acteristics of the outbreak and were contingent upon the assumption that the virus
strain and the epidemic would behave similarly to the 2001 epidemic. In applying
these models to the 2007 outbreak it must be born in mind that although both epi-
demics were caused by the same serotype (type O) of FMDV, the isolate was different
but from the 1967/68 outbreak it appears that the 2007 isolate spreads in a similar
manner to that of 2001 (Northumberland, 1968). However, under different circum-
stances, such as a different serotype or an epidemic in a pig population, modifications
to the model may be necessary. Based upon these maps, surveillance could be tar-
geted to those areas with the greatest risk of localised spread. Little is known about
the infectiousness of the virus strain, but the epidemic started in and was principally
in cattle which, as has been discussed elsewhere (Chapters 4, 5), were the principal
driver of the 2001 epidemic.
These maps of FMD risk can be compared with others, principally that of Keeling
et al. (2001) which is based upon a stochastic mathematical model (Figure 7.16).
Keeling et al. (2001) calculate the risk map using the formula in equation 4.1 to
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calculate an R0 value for each farm. The value plotted is the mean R0 in the 10km
grid squares. Figure 7.16 is directly comparable with Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.5.
There are some distinct differences namely that the risk as shown outside the south
west of Scotland is distinctly higher in Figure 7.16 compared to Figures 7.12 and
Figure 7.5. There are several reasons for this:
1. The susceptibility model has a country level effect in which being in Scotland
is a protective effect.
2. The cells in Figure 7.16 are populated using mean rather than the sum of values
in each cell. The mean value may exaggerate the risk in cells which are sparsely
populated if that cell contains one or a few high risk holdings. These areas of
Scotland are sparsely populated with large (and therefore high R0 of around
5) holdings (Table 7.1). Areas of northern England and the Welsh borders
are densely populated with smaller (medium risk holdings, R0 around 1 or 2)
however the overall risk of these combined values is much higher than the mean.
Taking the sum of the values allows for the number of holdings and as a result
gives a more realistic measure of risk.
3. Local animal densities are much more important predictors in the transmission
and susceptibility models than species on the holding. This relates to the
previous point that large farms in otherwise low density areas will have a higher
estimate of risk in equation 4.1 which places similar importance on holding size
and animal density.
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Figure 7.16: Risk map of FMD from Keeling et al. (2001). The scale is R0 and
is based upon the stochastic model of FMD in Keeling et al. (2001). The model
calculates an R0 value for each holding and the average of these values for 10km
squares is shown.
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The risk maps developed in this paper are comparable to those of Pfeiffer et al.
(2007) in that they use predicted values from a logistic regression model to generate
the surface. However, the model of Pfeiffer et al. (2007) of HPAI risk in Vietnam
is based upon predictors which are much more spatially correlated than the holding
specific predictors which form several of the predictors for the FMD model. Fur-
thermore, the data are on the commune level rather than individual holdings, so
there is no need to generate a continuous raster surface as was done in this chapter.
In conclusion, a method of mapping FMD risk has been developed and applied
in different contexts; retrospectively to the 2001 epidemic, in a static non-epidemic
context, to a start of epidemic situation (Surrey 2007) and to guide resource allocation
for surveillance given the potential for introduction of the virus into Scotland during
the 2007 FMD outbreak. This demonstrates that these methods are valuable and
easily applicable in the event of future FMD outbreaks and can be used to target




This thesis has explored the epidemiology of the 2001 FMD epidemic with particular
reference to the underlying distributions of farms and livestock. The risk factors
identified have been used to develop models of FMD susceptibility, transmission, and
an understanding of how landscape features influence transmission. The three models
were combined to create risk surfaces of FMD for the UK in order to understand the
spatial variations in FMD risk and incidence. These risk surfaces show that many
of the most at-risk areas with the greatest densities of susceptible animals in the
UK were areas which experienced large numbers of cases of FMD during the 2001
epidemic. By contrast, the 2007 FMD outbreak was introduced into and contained in
a low risk area with low probabilities of local spread. A third way in which these risk
surfaces have been employed is through investigation of potential virus introduction
into an apparently FMD free area, in this case Scotland in 2007. This demonstrated
that had the virus been introduced from one of 45 indirect animal movements from the
affected area in Surrey there was great potential for a large epidemic. The maps were
valuable for prioritising surveillance in Scotland because those potential introductions
which presented the greatest likelihood of local spread could be investigated first.
The thesis was a three stage process involving collating, cleaning and conducting
accuracy assessment of the data, model construction and finally combining these to
map risk. These three stages will be discussed in turn before considering how this
research can be used to inform decision makers in the event of a future epidemic as
well as how the research might be taken forward.
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8.1 Data
The 2001 FMD dataset represents one of the most comprehensive veterinary epi-
demiological datasets gathered to date, particularly for an epidemic of this size. The
FMD dataset includes the results of detailed epidemiological evaluation of each in-
fected premises. Knowledge of each case, information on the timing and source of
infection are usually only available from controlled experiments, rarely has such data
been produced in the field.
However, as was discussed in Chapter 2 and elsewhere (McLaws et al., 2006) there
remain limitations with these data. This is because thorough scientific investigation
should always seek to push the limits of what the data can tell us, and the FMD data
is no exception. It is essential to understand and investigate the limitations of the
data in order to be able to guide the research and interpret the results.
One of the principal limitations of these data is that there is ambiguity into what
is actually a case farm (IP). The ‘gold standard’ definition of an IP would be a farm
holding on which one or more animal(s) have FMDV antigen or antibodies to FMDV.
As discussed in Chapter 2 the presence of antibody and antigen can be identified in
two ways:
1. Identifying animals which are showing clinical signs of disease.
2. Laboratory identification of antibody or antigen.
This definition of a case is a major simplification. A single case could comprise
a holding with one hundred animals on which all the stock has FMD, a holding of a
hundred animals on which one animal is infected or a holding of one animal which is
infected. The disease burden for the first example is markedly greater than for either
the second or the third farm, but all three holdings represent one case each. However,
the farm with one hundred infected animals has greater potential to transmit infection
and in this respect farm size and the number of infected animals could be regarded in
the same way as super shedding cattle for Escherichia coli are considered (Matthews
et al., 2006). Although animal numbers on the holding are often considered when
evaluating the potential of a holding to transmit infection, this still does not capture
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the within-farm dynamics and therefore does not allow for the number of infected
animals on the farm.
In spite of these limitations, modeling a case as any holding with one or more
animals with FMD is sensible. A farm holding is a meaningful epidemiological unit.
Although there may be epidemiological sub-units on that holding other animals on
that holding are at greater risk of being infected than animals on different holdings.
Consider one hundred infected cattle, if these cattle are on one holding that is one
case, if they are spread over 100 holdings that represents 100 cases. Although the
difference may not be 100-fold, the epidemiological burden and potential to spread
FMD is undoubtedly greater in the latter instance. For epidemiological analyses what
is required is detailed on-farm epidemiology describing the numbers and locations of
infected stock. This is unfortunately lacking in the FMD data.
Further issues arise as a result of the way in which cases are identified. Both
methods- clinical and laboratory diagnosis have problems. Firstly, not all animals
display distinctive signs of FMD, or animals may have recovered. A particular prob-
lem in this respect are sheep as sheep display at best mild clinical signs which are
easily confused with other common ailments such as foot rot and orf (Kitching and
Hughes, 2002). Laboratory diagnosis is dependent upon the timely and adequate
sampling of animals (National Audit Office, 2002), which may be difficult if animals
are not showing signs of disease. Furthermore, not all IPs were tested in the labora-
tory (Ferris et al., 2006): 1,320 were positive in the laboratory, 396 negative and 310
untested.
In addition to overreporting there was underreporting of the number of infected
holdings as a result of the extensive culling of apparently uninfected farms (Na-
tional Audit Office, 2002; Woolhouse et al., 2001). Animals on a proportion of these
holdings will have been infected and not detected because they were pre-clinical or
because there were not the veterinary resources to inspect all animals prior to culling.
However, there have been no empirical studies which attempt to identify the likely
numbers of culled premises which were infected. As a result, the number of farms
actually infected with FMDV is the 1,320 IPs which tested positive in the labora-
tory, plus a proportion of the 706 IPs which tested negative or were untested, plus
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some proportion of the 8,820 non-IP culls. As both proportions in this equation are
unknown the outcome in this thesis and indeed all papers which use data on IPs is
whether a holding is declared an IP rather than whether it is confirmed as being
infected with FMDV. There should be no seropositive animals on farms which were
not culled as such farms would have been detected in post-epidemic serosurveillance.
Therefore, the final pattern of IPs is heavily contingent upon the policies and
decisions regarding resources which were implemented at the time. The final pattern
(spatial and temporal) of cases is entirely dependent upon these decisions, partic-
ularly decisions regarding epidemic control and where the seeds are distributed. If
the epidemic were being run as a laboratory experiment the experiment would be set
up with a control (an epidemic in which no controls were implemented) and several
parallel epidemics incorporating different control interventions which would be im-
plemented uniformly in space in time. As a result of this the risk maps were based
on just phase 1 of the epidemic as this represents the period of the epidemic in which
control by culling was at its minimum and was subject to the least spatial variation.
However, all analyses must take these control policies into account when interpreting
their results.
Analysis was conducted on the variables which are estimated for IPs; namely the
date of infection and the most probable source of infection (Chapter 2). Both are
based upon veterinary judgement and experience although it has been subsequently
demonstrated that the latter can be established with certainty using sequence data
(Cottam et al., 2006), although this was only conducted for a subset of 22 IPs. In-
stead, Chapter 2 evaluated the source of infection data with respect to the estimated
dates of infection and dates of slaughter of source and daughter farm. There were a
large number of inconsistencies which had been introduced, either in the estimated
infection dates or the sources, removing these inconsistent sources reduced the num-
ber of holdings with an identified source of infection from 1,425 to 953. This suggests
that there is potential for improvement in the identification of the infection date and
infection source in the event of future epidemics.
Chapter 3 described the farm inventory of the UK which is one of the most
complete in the world and is regularly updated. For this study the data was mainly
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derived from the UK agricultural census but also from the UK farm list. The farm
list comprises a full inventory of farm holdings in the UK with address data and an
accurate (usually within a few metres) georeference for the main farm building. From
this list a census of the numbers of animals on holdings is taken and in 2000 (the
year of interest) a full census was taken. The UK is one of few countries which can
distribute such complete farm level data to researchers.
The data gathered on holdings culled during the 2001 FMD epidemic is in a similar
format to the agricultural census. However, there is one major difference which is
the definition of a farm holding. The census defines a farm holding as a single farm
enterprise irrespective of how its livestock may be distributed. As animals on fields
more than 1km away from the main farm holding form a separate epidemiological
unit this was defined as a separate farm holding during the FMD epidemic (Mansley
et al., 2003). Although these holdings could be identified in the farm list data they
could not be reliably populated with animals. The only way these problems could
be overcome would be to maintain a full register of all land parcels and ensure that
farmers update the register every time animals are moved between parcels of land,
however implementation of this would be difficult.
Further differences arise as a result of the timing of the FMD epidemic with
respect to the collection of the census data. This is particularly a problem with
respect to the national sheep flock whose numbers are subject to an annual cycle
with a peak in spring immediately after lambing which is followed by a gradual
decline and a trough immediately prior to lambing in early March (section 3.2.3).
Therefore the June 2000 census represents a time when the sheep flock was near
its peak and the FMD epidemic started at a time when the national flock was near
its minimum. In this respect the representativeness of the census data should not
be considered in terms of how recently it was taken, rather, whether it was taken
at the same time of the year as the epidemic. This problem was observed when
animal numbers on the FMD cull data were compared to numbers on the census
(section 3.5, particularly Table 3.6). Sheep numbers were substantially lower when
farms were culled than they reported on the census, this is particularly the case in
Wales, something also observed by Keeling et al. (2001) and born out in the holding
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susceptibility model (chapter 4) where Wales is a highly significant protective effect.
Wales is very distinctive due to the amount of hill sheep farming practiced in Wales.
Hill sheep farming is even more cyclical (section 3.2.3) as it is only practiced in the
summer. Farms rear lambs on the hills in the summer and in September or October
they are moved to slaughter or other lowland premises and only the adult animals
are retained in lowland fields. Given that the average number of lambs born per
pregnant ewe is 1.1 (section 3.2.3) this explains why the sheep population in Wales
was 41% lower during the FMD epidemic than in June 2000 (Table 3.6). The same
would be true for other areas of the country, notably the Highlands of Scotland,
however this is not seen in the data as there was no FMD in these areas. As a result
of this the models of Keeling et al. (2001) over estimate the risk of disease spread
in central Wales which the susceptibility model in this thesis does not as it has the
country parameter to allow for this. However, other areas of hill sheep farming where
there was no FMD are not allowed for. Furthermore, if the model was applied to an
epidemic in Wales in June it would underestimate the risk as then the sheep numbers
on the census are accurate.
The spatial locations of farm holdings was derived from the address of the main
farm holding. Generally, this is a representative point for the farm holding and
in a study from Cornwall this was found to be the most representative location to
georeference (Durr and Froggatt, 2002). However, there is an exception to this which
was identified in the risk mapping chapter. This was the Outer Hebrides in which
the farms were registered to addresses around the coast whilst the farms actually
kept animals on higher ground inland. Therefore, whilst the farm holding may be
the most optimal location it should be born in mind that this is not always the case
and there can be exceptions.
In spite of these limitations this thesis has compiled the most complete demo-
graphic and disease datasets that have been compiled for any non-human epidemic
to date. It has built on spatial epidemiological analyses of FMD from other countries
in which the data is aggregated to some areal unit such as the county (Rivas et al.,
2003; Ward and Perez, 2004). Full knowledge of the individual locations and size of
the entire population at risk coupled with similar data for disease incidence as well as
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detailed epidemiology of the incidences is largely unprecedented. This demographic
dataset coupled with the FMD data generated by this epidemic provided the basis
for further developments in spatial epidemiological tools described in this thesis.
8.2 FMD spread
The extended period between the introduction of the disease into the country and
the confirmation of the first case coupled with the extensive movements of infected
animals during this period resulted in the extensive seeding of the disease throughout
the UK (Anderson, 2002; Gibbens et al., 2001; Haydon et al., 2003). The final
distribution of IPs shows that some of these seedings resulted in extensive epidemics
in the locality, whilst others did not (Figure 1.7). IPs are clustered around these
seeds and therefore spread is determined (in part) by Euclidean distance from a seed
(chapter 4). A large part of the reason that the 2001 epidemic was so large was that
the disease was seeded so widely throughout the country, creating a large number of
foci from which the disease could spread.
After Euclidean distance to a seed has been taken into account it is still possible
to accurately derive a measure of holding level susceptibility using farm level factors
and in particular the density of animals in the locality of the holding (chapter 4).
Animal densities are of particular importance as they represent the potential infec-
tious challenge to a farm. In these analyses cattle densities are a more important risk
factor than sheep densities. This is likely to represent the greater susceptibility and
ability of cattle to transmit FMD (Donaldson et al., 2001).
The model of transmission also shows that cattle are more important transmitters
than sheep (Chapter 5). Many sheep holdings were infected during the epidemic and
are therefore susceptible to infection, but sheep holdings do not play a major part
in virus transmission (Chapter 5). This suggests that for post-NMB inter-holding
spread, sheep may have been largely a dead end host, becoming infected but not
passing on infection. Therefore, it could be argued that the control effort should have
focused upon cattle farms rather than sheep holdings. The main apparent danger
sheep represent in prolonging the epidemic is of acquiring infection and passing the
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disease to cattle on the same holding.
There are regional differences in the FMD epidemic, in both the susceptibility
model in which the country of the farm was a significant risk factor and the trans-
mission model in which farms in Cumbria behaved differently to the rest of the UK.
These regional effects are likely to be acting as a proxy for some variable which has
not been measured explicitly. Country level differences primarily reflect differences in
the seeding of the virus and in differences concerning the farm demographics already
discussed. In England the virus was seeded in areas with large numbers of animals
and therefore high risk (Cumbria, Devon, Cheshire, see Figure 7.7) as well as lower
risk areas (Kent, Essex, Northamptonshire), whilst in Scotland and Wales the virus
was seeded only in areas at greater risk. The differences noted between Cumbria
and the remainder of GB are likely to result from epidemiological factors with the
Cumbrian epidemic spanning the entire epidemic which is at least in part due to the
extent of seeding in Cumbria as a result of trade through the infected Longtown mar-
ket. However, this may also result from Cumbria comprising a large continuous area
of high FMD risk through which the virus was able to spread during the course of
the epidemic. Other areas tended to be smaller areas of high risk and experienced an
epidemic of shorter duration. Differences may also be a result of the intensity of the
epidemic in Cumbria. At its peak there may not have been the personnel resources
available to manage the epidemic effectively (National Audit Office, 2002).
Fine scale analysis of FMD transmission with respect to barriers (Chapter 6)
shows that at the level of the IP farm size is a very significant predictor of FMD
transmission over and above Euclidean distance. This is an important result because
the models of transmission and susceptibility developed in this thesis included animal
density as the principal measure of animal numbers. The result at the holding level
shows that numbers of animals on the individual farm does actually matter and is a
risk factor rather than solely animal densities. However, incorporating these predic-
tors into the statistical models used in this thesis is problematic because numbers of
animals on a holding can not easily be treated as a continuous variable (Section ).
As a result they were treated as species presence/absence and are unable to take size
into account above this simple variable.
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These fine scale analyses go on to show that geographical features, namely rivers
and railways can act to inhibit virus spread. Furthermore, the findings support the
conclusions of Savill et al. (2006) by finding that road distance is no more of a risk
factor than Euclidean distance (Chapter 6). This is an important result as future
FMD epidemics in the UK are likely to be spatially dependent and therefore the cor-
rect metric to measure the spatial dependence must be known. These analyses took a
rather novel approach to spatial analyses in applying a case-control methodology has
rarely been applied to spatial epidemiology. Analysis of barriers to transmission has
been identified as an area of spatial epidemiology to be further investigated (Ostfeld
et al., 2005).
This thesis has investigated FMD spread from the point of both the ‘sending’
farm (transmission) and the ‘receiving’ farm (susceptibility) as well as investigating
intervening geographical features. Farm size and animal densities are important
determinants for both acquiring and transmitting infection and within this cattle
holdings are more important for both. There is also some residual spatial level
effect with national level differences in susceptibility and regional level differences
concerning Cumbria for transmission (Chapter 5).
8.3 Risk mapping
The data on the locations of holdings andthe models of susceptibility and transmission
were combined to generate risk maps for FMD. The risk maps give an accurate
description both of the 2001 outbreak, but also applied prospectively to the 2007
epidemic and can accurately predict the likely distribution of IP clusters. These
maps are generated at a very fine scale (100m grid cells) which is made possible by
the high spatial accuracy of the input data.
Risk maps will always be dependent upon accuracy and assumptions of the un-
derlying models. For these maps, the susceptibility model is a very good fit (area
under the ROC=0.91), whilst the transmission model suffers from a rather poorer
model fit (area under the ROC=0.71). The transmission model is more limited than
the susceptibility model in that it is a subset of farms that became infected with
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FMD and therefore are already likely to exhibit the characteristics described in the
susceptibility model. It may be the case that within this narrow subset of farms those
which will go on to transmit infection are highly stochastic and the risk factors used
do not offer the scope to fully identify differences. A further issue with the use of the
transmission model to develop risk maps was that it includes a number of IP specific
parameters (infected period and laboratory result) which had to be set to the same
value for every holding. As a result the map of transmission risk is much more of a
homogenous smear than the susceptibility risk maps which show distinct hotspots of
risk. The variation which is present on the transmission map is largely the result of
differences in cattle densities.
The map of susceptibility risk showed that there were extensive areas of high risk
in many areas which experienced FMD epidemics during the 2001 epidemic. Indeed,
analysis of the non-epidemic risk map shows that the virus was seeded in many of
the high risk areas. This is because the virus is seeded by animal movements and
animals typically move to areas with the most animals, which in turn defines high
risk. The 2001 risk maps suggest that in many areas but in particular in Cumbria
and Dumfries & Galloway the epidemic appears to have exhausted itself. The cases
cover the areas at high risk and therefore the epidemic effectively burned itself out.
These methods were used to evaluate the likelihood of extensive spread during the
2007 FMD outbreaks in Surrey and subsequently used to guide surveillance efforts
within Scotland (Savill et al., 2007b). This demonstrated that these are valuable tools
which can be applied rapidly in the early stages of an epidemic to understand the risk
and allocate resources accordingly. Surrey represents a very different epidemiological
setting to Cumbria in that Surrey is an area of very low animal densities with typically
small farms. As Cumbria experienced the majority of the 2001 epidemic the model
was parameterised for this area. However, the model was able to predict the size of
the epidemic in the Surrey area albeit it did not predict the overall risk of infection
in this area.
These risk maps represent a development of previous models (Keeling et al., 2001).
Keeling et al. (2001) use model output to map mean values of R0 and Lawson and
Zhou (2005) map standardised incidence ratios at the parish level. The former is
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aggregated at a coarse scale (5km grid cells) and the problems with using mean
values of R0 are discussed in chapter 7. The model of Lawson and Zhou (2005) is
constructed at the parish level and the data is aggregated to fortnightly counts, so a
large amount of information is immediately lost. This study uses a very fine raster
surface (100m cells) and uses the predicted number of IPs within 3km of the cells as
the metric which due to heterogeneities in risk is a more robust statistic than the mean
number of cases (chapter 7). Such tools should always be used with consideration
of the key limitation that they were developed for a unique epidemic which involved
a particular strain of the virus. Use of these tools in different epidemics should be
with reference to virus differences and local differences in the nature of farming,
and the model may require modification under different circumstances. For example
if an epidemic was seeded in areas of East Anglia with large pig populations and
the potential for considerable viral plumes, these tools would require alteration to
allow for the characteristics of FMD in pig farms and the potential for longer range
transmission events. Likewise, differences in the nature of farming compared to GB
should be considered when applying these techniques to FMD epidemics in different
countries.
8.4 Future directions
The datasets resulting from the 2001 FMD epidemic generated an enormous amount
of research. This is largely as a result of the fact that veterinary epidemiology was a
field reaching maturity and found itself presented with the largest and most detailed
disease and demographic datasets ever available. The opportunity to work on such
a dataset has generated a large amount of research using a variety of techniques.
However, this epidemic is a one-off and was the result of a large amount of apparently
stochastic spread. What is unclear is if the 2001 epidemic was seeded in exactly the
same way again how it would behave; however, some conclusions such as the species
level factors should be robust. In the epidemic from 2001 it appears that in Cumbria
and Dumfries & Galloway the epidemic was not brought under control. Rather,
through a process of spread and culling that it burned itself out and the density of
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the susceptible animal population became sufficiently low that the epidemic could
not sustain itself. In light of this and the observation that sheep appear to be a near
dead-end host, control strategies could be reevaluated such that the cattle population
is vaccinated promptly using the methodology outlined by Tildesley et al. (2006), the
sheep population should be monitored for infection and to ensure that they are not
transmitting infection in future epidemics.
From the FMD epidemic of 2001 and the outbreak in 2007 the importance of
virus seeding in determining the final size of the epidemic can be seen. When the
virus is seeded by animal movements the areas at greatest risk appear to become
infected, this is as a result of animals moving to areas with a lot of animals. This
relationship should be investigated more closely particularly to identify whether there
are any high risk areas which appear to receive excessively high numbers of animal
movements and are therefore at elevated risk. The 2007 outbreak was contained
because it was introduced into an area of low risk and there were no out movements
of infected stock.
Given a future epidemic more detailed information on the on-farm epidemiology of
the disease such as gene sequencing to reconstruct the pattern of transmission would
allow more accurate analysis of transmission. A second major further development
would be detailed analysis of the pattern of on-farm spread. Understanding of within-
farm epidemiology would also assist in modeling transmission as the actual number
of infectious animals could be established and the potential for FMD super-shedders
further investigated.
Whilst data on animal demographics in the UK is very good there is still room
for improvement. This is particularly important given that scares surrounding epi-
demics of livestock are becoming increasingly frequent, with introductions of FMD,
bluetongue (DEFRA, 2007b) and HPAI into the UK during the first 10 months of
2007. To facilitate management of these epidemics an accurate and up to date knowl-
edge of precisely where animals are with accurate and accessible records of movements
is essential to understanding the threat these diseases can pose to the country. The
agricultural census is at best adequate, however it has limited the scope of this and
previous studies (Keeling et al., 2001; Matthews et al., 2003; Morris et al., 2001; Savill
237
et al., 2006) and both a more regularly updated and higher resolution dataset would
be of enormous assistance to scientists and policy makers.
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